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Abstract 
 
Bargaining over Nature: 
Formal and Causal Analyses on Climate and Conflict 
 
Kyosuke Kikuta, Ph.D. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2019 
 
Supervisor:  Michael G. Findley 
 
Despite the growing attention to environmental changes and their consequences on 
conflict, we still do not know the roles of human responses and strategic interactions. This 
dissertation is composed of three essays that address this void of knowledge. The central 
argument is that natural environments do not only directly affect conflict, but their effects 
are intermediated by human responses, political institutions, and strategic opportunities. In 
each essay, I elaborate this argument by using formal models, causal inference methods, 
and geospatial data. The analyses indicate that natural environments do not automatically 
cause or inhibit conflict, but human’s actions can critically shape the relationship. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
With growing attention to environmental changes, an increasing number of studies have 
examined the relationship between natural environments and conflicts. Summarizing 60 studies 
about climate changes and human conflicts across diverse fields, Hsiang et al. (2013; 2011) 
conclude that there exists “strong causal evidence linking climatic events to human conflict” (2013, 
1213). Despite the plethora of studies, however, extant studies focus on how natural environments 
affect conflict, dismissing human responses and strategic interactions that can shape the causal 
relationship. Since our behaviors are not completely determined by natural environments, the 
paths from natural environments to conflict are conditional on our strategic choices. Three essays 
that constitute my dissertation are attempts to examine the roles of strategic actions in the 
relationship between natural environments and conflict. 
The central argument in the dissertation is that natural environments do not only directly 
affect conflict, but their effects are intermediated by human responses, political institutions, and 
strategic opportunities. For instance, from a perspective of bargaining theories, a large shift in 
natural environments, such as natural disasters, might shift the power balance between the 
stakeholders, which in turn could make the commitment to peaceful conflict resolution difficult 
and hence result in violent conflicts. A closer look at the commitment problem, however, indicates 
that the real cause of armed conflicts is not the environmental shift per se but the anticipated 
recovery from the shift. Because natural disasters are unpredictable ex ante, parties cannot foresee 
the disaster-driven power shift a priori. By contrast, parties can see the future of post-disaster 
reconstruction. If one party is more benefited from post-disaster reconstruction than the other 
parties, the disadvantaged parties can optimally initiate violent conflicts to prevent such an 
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unfavorable power shift. Thus, from the viewpoint of commitment problems, the real cause of 
violence lies in not natural disasters itself but in human responses to natural disasters. The first 
essay examines the causal effect of post-disaster reconstruction on violent conflicts, taking the 
case of the 2004 Tsunami in Sri Lanka. 
Although the commitment problems can explain the effect of large shifts in environments, 
they are less insightful for explaining the consequences of much smaller changes in environments. 
Although such a small shift may not influence bargaining in civil war, more institutionalized 
politics can be sensitive to such a small change. In the second essay, I explore this possibility by 
extending private-information models to explain how rainfall deviation can effect violence risks 
via its impacts on voter turnout. Although free and fair elections are supposed to provide reliable 
information about the support bases of an incumbent and oppositions and hence to lessen the risks 
of strategic miscalculation and inefficient violence, abnormal rainfall can affect voter turnout and 
hence the learning processes. In particular, my formal model indicates that, rather 
counterintuitively, high turnout “drowns-out” the voices of dissidents, creates uncertainties about 
the size and intensity of social discontents, and thus raises the risk of protests. Thus, it is possible 
that even a small shift in natural environments can cause conflicts through its effect on electoral 
politics. The second essay examines this possibility in the case of the Indian State Assembly 
elections. 
While so far I focus on a single outcome of conflict in each of these two essays, in reality, 
actors have choices over multiple actions. This raises a possibility that natural environments may 
shape their strategic opportunities―the availability of alternative choices―which in turn can 
affect their conflict behaviors. For instance, rainfall may directly affect the costs and benefits of 
the use of violence during civil war; it can hinder military deployment, force rebel groups to march 
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on muddy ground, and lower the moral of the armies. However, rainy weather often coincides with 
windy ocean conditions, which may make it difficult for the rebels to conduct maritime piracy, 
limit their strategic opportunities, and hence leave no choices other than resorting to violence. If 
this is the case, not only do weather conditions directly affect the use of violence, but also they can 
shape rebels’ strategic opportunities and thus indirectly affect violence. In the third essay, I 
examine these direct and indirect effects of weather conditions on the use of violence and maritime 
piracy during civil war. 
The focuses on the intervening factors, however, pose new empirical challenges. With the 
intervening factors, we can no longer simply rely on the exogeneity of natural environments in 
order to make a causal identification. Isolating the effects of a natural disaster or weather 
conditions themselves from their indirect effect through post-disaster reconstruction, elections, and 
strategic opportunities is not as straightforward as the estimation of the overall effects. The quality 
of data about natural environments also raises another challenge; while previous studies tend to 
rely on government reports on the tsunami and rainfall, they are subject to nonresponses and 
misreports. 
The three essays are a collection of my efforts to address these empirical challenges as well. 
In these essays, I develop a series of causal identification strategies, including instrumental 
variable designs, in order to address the problems relating to the intervening factors. Using the 
environmental variables, including off-shore wave height and election-day rainfall deviation, as 
predictors for the corresponding explanatory variables, I can isolate the effects of the intervening 
factors from the endogenous relationship. The instrumental variable approach, for instance, can 
account for the fact that stakeholders are less likely to allocate reconstruction materials to the 
locations of higher risks of violent conflicts, and hence allow me to identify the causal effect of 
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post-disaster reconstruction on violent conflicts. In all of the three essays, I also address the 
potential measurement problems by using satellite-based data sources, including those about 
tsunami wave heights, rainfall deviations, and ocean wind speed. 
REFERENCES 
Hsiang, Solomon M., Marshall Burke, and Edward Miguel. 2013. “Quantifying the Influence of 
Climate on Human Conflict.” Science 341 (6151): 1235367.  
Hsiang, Solomon M., Kyle C. Meng, and Mark A. Cane. 2011. “Civil Conflicts Are Associated 
with the Global Climate.” Nature 476 (7361): 438–41.  
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Chapter 2. Post-disaster Reconstruction as a Cause of Intrastate Violence1 
On December 26th 2004, the third largest earthquake since 1900 hit Sumatra Island and 
propelled a massive tsunami across the Bay of Bengal to Sri Lanka, a country undergoing a fragile 
peace process after a twenty-year separatist war (Bandarage 2009). The tsunami killed more than 
35,000 people, and destroyed over 78,000 homes, leaving 800,000 people without shelter in the 
country. The tsunami wave was followed by another wave: disaster relief. International 
organizations disbursed more than one billion dollars through at least 710 projects (RADA 2006). 
The government of Sri Lanka, moreover, spent over 200 million dollars on recovery (RADA 2005). 
By May 2006, at least 40,000 houses had been constructed. These efforts, however, did not 
successfully build peace nationwide. Sinhalese nationalists opposed the post-disaster agreement 
with the Tamil Tigers. The rebels also resumed suicide terrorist attacks. Finally, in February 2006, 
the government launched a full-scale military offensive and the country officially descended into 
another three years of civil war.  
Is it destruction or reconstruction that really drives intrastate violence? If post-disaster 
reconstruction would be irrelevant, destruction would be the primary cause of war and peace. If 
reconstruction does matter, however, we risk incorrectly attributing the causes of war to 
destruction and its antecedent conditions such as physical forces and mitigative infrastructure, and 
thereby understating the role of human actions after a natural disaster. Thus, depending on whether 
destruction, reconstruction, or both are primary drivers of intrastate violence, we will have 
                                                          
1 This chapter is based on a published article: Kikuta, Kyosuke. 2019. “Postdisaster Reconstruction 
as a Cause of Intrastate Violence: An Instrumental Variable Analysis with Application to the 2004 
Tsunami in Sri Lanka.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 63 (3): 760–85. 
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markedly different interpretations with their own sets of practical implications about the effect of 
a natural disaster on conflicts. In this paper, I contend that reconstruction is a crucial explanatory 
variable in the relationship between a natural disaster and intrastate violence. I also address the 
endogeneity problem by using the wave heights in the 2004 Tsunami in Sri Lanka as an 
instrumental variable. 
With increasing attention on the political effects of environmental change, a growing 
number of scholars have analyzed the relationship between natural disasters and intrastate violence 
(Gleditsch 2012). Surprisingly, however, no studies of which I am aware have incorporated the 
role of post-disaster reconstruction in the causal relationship. This void in the literature requires 
special attention, as humans are not only affected by natural disasters but can also respond to them. 
Indeed, in the wake of natural disasters, the international community pours relief assistance into 
disaster zones. Thus, without considering post-disaster reconstruction, we can only partially 
understand the disaster-violence nexus. This omission may provide an explanation for the unstable 
and even contradictory findings in previous studies. 
To address this problem, I extend bargaining theories of war to explain how destruction 
and reconstruction change the strategic landscape and consequently affect patterns of violent 
conflicts. Theory implies that destruction does not preclude the possibility of peaceful settlement 
and thus may not be the primary driver of violence. Instead, post-disaster reconstruction causes a 
strategic predicament between parties because it provides parties with opportunities to divert 
resources to military use and to expand sources of taxes and manpower. These opportunities can 
enhance the bargaining position of a warring party, while missing these opportunities relegates it 
to an inferior bargaining position. The strategic environment incentivizes parties to use violence 
with the aim of controlling the locations of reconstruction programs. Thus, I hypothesize that 
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reconstruction has the effect of increasing the number of violent events, while, in contrast to 
previous studies, the effect of destruction is only weakly identified as a coarse proxy of 
reconstruction. 
This hypothesis, however, raises a new empirical challenge; unlike physical hazards, 
reconstruction processes are endogenous to violence. The expectation of future violence can hinder 
reconstruction efforts in disaster zones. Even worse, the fear of violence makes data collection 
unfeasible, resulting in underreporting of destruction and reconstruction. Thus, naïve estimators 
may suffer substantial bias about the effects of reconstruction on violent events. 
To overcome these difficulties, I apply an instrumental variable approach to the case of Sri 
Lanka before and after the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. The fact that Sri Lanka experienced a 
nationwide disaster between two civil wars, the Eelam III and IV Wars, provides a unique 
opportunity for a before-and-after comparison. Drawing on the exogeneity of wave heights, and 
using it as an instrument, I separately estimate the effects of the number of destroyed houses and 
the difference in the number of constructed houses on the difference of violent events before and 
after the tsunami. Consistent with expectations, an increase in housing construction raises the 
number of violent events, while the number of destroyed houses has no discernible impact on 
violence. The finding survives extensive robustness checks, as summarized at the end of this paper. 
These findings remind us of a crucial aspect of human responses; reconstruction is 
manipulable and therefore highly contingent on the decisions of policy makers. The analysis in 
this paper suggests that a natural disaster does not automatically determine the future of intrastate 
violence and that we can potentially alter the trajectories through post-disaster responses. This 
point is of particular importance because it is not uncommon for natural disasters to occur before 
or during civil wars, as seen in the 1970 Bhola Cyclone in East Pakistan, 1972 Nicaragua 
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Earthquake, 1976 Guatemala Earthquake, 1997 Somali Flood, 2002 Hindu Kush Earthquake, 2008 
Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar, and 2012 and 2015 avalanches in Afghanistan. 
DESTRUCTION, SCARCITY, AND INTRASTATE VIOLENCE 
There is a growing number of studies on the security implications of environmental change 
(Gleditsch 2012; Hsiang, Burke and Miguel 2013; Salehyan; 2014). Although several authors have 
focused on historical trends of climate change and patterns of violence (Tol and Wagner 2009; 
Zhang et al. 2011), the causal effect of long-term climate change on political violence is subject to 
numerous conceptual and empirical challenges, such as an absence of micro-level explanations, 
conflicting results across different analyses, and issues of endogeneity (Scheffran et al. 2012; 
O’Loughlin, Linke, and Witmer 2014). These difficulties shifted scholarly attention from long-
term climate change to short-term weather variability (Hendrix and Glaser 2007; Ide et al. 2014), 
including natural disasters, which is the focus of this study.2 
A natural disaster is defined as a situation in which “a natural hazard affects a vulnerable 
population so forcefully that it causes substantial death and/or damage” (Slettebak 2012, 164). In 
this paper, a natural “hazard” refers to a geophysical event such as earthquakes (Alexander 2000), 
which is exogenous to human factors, while a natural “disaster” is a function both of a natural 
hazard and human vulnerability, of which the latter is endogenous to society (Busby, Smith and 
Krishnan 2014). Previous studies, for instance, show that a natural disaster causes different levels 
                                                          
2 Although natural disasters are often associated with climate changes (IPCC 2014), the former are 
comprised of sudden and large physical shocks, while the latter takes the form of a gradual and 
long-term shift in the environments. 
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of damage, depending on political institutions (Cohen and Werker 2008), economic development, 
ethnicity (Kahn 2005), and gender roles (Neumayer and Plumper 2007). 
Some scholars have posited adverse impacts of natural disasters on intrastate violence, 
taking positions analogous to the broader literature of Neo-Malthusianism (Kaplan 1994; Percival 
and Homer-Dixon 1996). They hypothesized that a natural disaster causes marginalization of 
minorities (Drury and Olson 1998; Raleigh 2010), shortages of basic needs (Brancati 2007; Burke 
et al. 2009; von Uexkull 2014), and overwhelming demands on a government and a resultant 
resentment of the government’s failure (Berrebi and Ostwald 2011; Carlin, Love, and Zechmeister 
2014). According to this approach, a natural disaster leads to acute scarcity, which in turn provides 
motives, strategic incentives, and opportunities for initiating violent conflicts (Nel and Righarts 
2008). 
Other scholars have argued that a natural disaster has pacifying effects (Adano et al. 2012; 
Slettebak 2012). For instance, relying on sociological studies about post-disaster behaviors (Fritz 
1996), Slettebak hypothesizes that “disasters should reduce the likelihood of violent conflict 
through generating a sense of unity among the victims and reducing the importance of divides that 
might otherwise be conducive to conflict” (Slettebak 2012, 165). Furthermore, large-scale 
destruction removes buildings and thins vegetation, and thereby creates unfavorable environments 
for insurgents (Theisen 2012). 
These two unconditional explanations not only offer opposing stories, but also lack robust 
empirical support. The results of cross-country analyses, in particular, are highly sensitive to small 
specification changes (Gleditsch 2012; Meierding 2013). The absence of consistent findings has 
led to the recent emphasis on conditional effects of disasters. There is an emerging consensus that 
numerous antecedent and intervening factors condition the consequences of a natural disaster, and 
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that without accounting for them, the complexity masks the actual causal relationship (Meierding 
2013; Scheffran et al. 2012). Previous studies analyzing conditional factors have considered 
agricultural production and state repression (Nardulli, Peyton, and Bajjalieh 2015), economic 
growth (Bergholt and Lujala 2012), size of a ruling coalition (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010), 
and rebel-civilian relationships (Walch 2014). 
Surprisingly, however, no studies of which I am aware have systematically analyzed the 
role of post-disaster reconstruction in the relationship between a natural disaster and political 
violence. Post-disaster reconstruction refers to “the process of repairing damage, restoring services 
and (re)constructing facilities after disaster has struck” (Alexander 2002, 5).3  Because post-
disaster reconstruction is the opposite of destruction, it holds special importance for properly 
specifying the effect of a natural disaster. If a natural disaster induces greater scarcity of basic 
materials, for instance, reconstruction could compensate for this shortage, which may either rescue 
the victims from despair or drive them to self-interested competition for disaster relief. Thus, the 
effect of a natural disaster on intrastate violence is highly contingent on post-disaster 
reconstruction, and without isolating the heterogeneous effects, we can only weakly identify the 
causal relationship.  
The absence of scholarly consideration of post-disaster responses relates to a broader 
theoretical problem in the literature. Previous studies of disasters and conflicts have not answered 
the core puzzle of war: why do actors initiate a violent conflict despite its ex post inefficiency 
(Fearon 1995)? In other words, are there any reasons that destruction and post-disaster 
                                                          
3 For analytical purposes, I use “reconstruction” as a generic process and “construction” as specific 
efforts of building facilities. 
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reconstruction impede a peaceful settlement and thus lead to costly violence? Both the Neo-
Malthusian and disaster-peace approaches consider the onset of violence as a function of resource 
availability, but they do not provide the reasons why a shift in the amount of resources triggers 
inefficient violence. This corresponds to the generic limitation in the expected utility models 
(Bueno de Mesquita 1985; Grossman 1992); the existence of something new to bargain over does 
not preclude the peaceful division of the stakes, and hence we need an explanation about the 
bargaining failure. The emerging conditional arguments are more nuanced, but still do not 
explicitly answer this question. As discussed in the following section, bargaining theories of war 
provide insight into this problem.4 
RECONSTRUCTION, STRATEGIC OPPORTUNITIES, AND A COMMITMENT 
PROBLEM 
A central puzzle of bargaining theories is that of inefficiency (Fearon 2004); why government and 
rebel parties fight each other even though war entails massive human and material costs. Ideally, 
whether a natural disaster produces scarcity or abundance of relief, parties would peacefully divide 
the resources without paying extra costs for violence. A peaceful solution, however, is not always 
achieved, most notably due to commitment problems (Powell 2006). When the power balance 
between parties begins shifting, a rising party has an incentive to renege on the peace agreement 
and demand a better settlement once it gains power. Being aware of this incentive, the opponent 
                                                          
4 The explanation provided in the following section is similar to those of Lischer (2006) and 
Narang (2014). My focus, however, is to show that destruction itself does not generate the 
expectation of a future power shift, while reconstruction does create such an expectation and thus 
triggers a war. 
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cannot accept a settlement and initiates war to stop the power shift. Note that the commitment 
problem assumes that parties foresee a power shift in the future, and do not look back at a power 
shift in the past. Indeed, if the power shift were completed in the past, parties could reach a 
negotiated settlement based on the ex post power balance. 
Based on the commitment problem framework, I explain how the two primary components 
of a natural disaster—destruction and reconstruction—affect the strategic dynamics of civil war. 
Throughout this section, I consider two parties that contest for a preexisting bargaining issue, such 
as territorial autonomy and government authority.5 Following the foreign aid literature (Nielson et. 
al 2011; Findley et. al 2017), I also assume that negotiators do not have control over the allocation 
of disaster relief. Given the urgent humanitarian needs, donors’ strategic interests (Girod 2012), 
vested local politics (Strandow et al. 2014), and bureaucratic processes (Carey 2007), it is 
extremely difficult for negotiators to manipulate the allocation of disaster relief for the purposes 
of war bargaining.6 The possible cases that potentially meet these assumptions include the 1970 
Bhola Cyclone in East Pakistan, 1972 Nicaragua Earthquake, 1976 Guatemala Earthquake, 2002 
Hindu Kush Earthquake, 2008 Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar, 2012 and 2015 avalanches in 
Afghanistan, and the 2004 Tsunami in Sri Lanka.  
                                                          
5 Although this is beyond the scope of this paper, a recent study extends bargaining theory to 
multiple competing parties (Wolford 2015). 
6 One could argue that negotiators might not have full controls over a bargaining issue as well. 
This, however, requires further extensions to intra-party politics (for instance, Wolford 2012). In 
this paper, I follow the standard assumption in bargaining theory. 
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Note also that although the primary outcome variable in this paper is the locations of 
intrastate violence given the onset of civil war, the explanation about locational patterns of ongoing 
civil war requires proper understandings about the onset of the war. Furthermore, there are no 
reasons to believe that bargaining theory has implications only about the onset of civil war. Thus, 
I focus on strategic dynamics after a natural disaster in order to derive implications about the 
location of intrastate violence. 
Destruction 
A natural disaster entails substantial fatalities and property destruction. The distribution of 
destruction, including damages to military facilities, deaths of solders and supporters, and loss of 
tax sources, is rarely proportional among parties, and thus destruction may disturb the power 
balance between a government and potential rebel organizations. However, because a physical 
hazard and the extent of destruction cannot be known in advance, destruction generates only the 
ex post fact of, not ex ante expectation for, a power shift. In other words, because parties cannot 
predict the onset of a natural hazard, the parties have no expectation for a future power shift before 
the disaster and thus engage in bargaining as if there would be no power shift in the future.7 
Immediately after a hazard occurs, the parties have already experienced the power shift, and thus 
                                                          
7 According to the formal model of Powell (2006), if parties foresee a sufficiently large power shift 
before the onset of a natural hazard, they should initiate war even before the hazard. Thus, the fact 
that parties do not engage in war before the onset of a hazard means that there is no expectation 
for a major power shift at the time. 
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they can reach a new settlement based on the post-disaster power balance.8 Since the power shift 
already took place, neither party has reason to fear a weakened bargaining position in the future. 
Therefore, from the perspective of bargaining theory, destruction itself does not cause a 
commitment problem. 
Moreover, destruction does not automatically create the expectation of reconstruction and 
the resultant power shift. The post-disaster reconstruction is a highly political process and almost 
never a mere function of destruction. As the literature on foreign aid suggests, the allocation of 
international aid depends on numerous factors, including the strategic interests of the donors 
(Girod 2012), the political stakes in a recipient country (Strandow et al. 2014), and the bureaucratic 
process in planning and implementation (Carey 2007). This means that destruction is only a crude 
proxy for reconstruction, and thus that we need to consider post-disaster reconstruction as an 
independent variable. 
Reconstruction 
If there is a commitment problem after a natural disaster, it comes from the expectation of post-
disaster reconstruction. Unlike destruction, reconstruction can be anticipated, at least after the 
initial implementation. It thus generates an ex ante expectation of a power shift. Although the 
                                                          
8  Destruction and resultant insanitation may sow epidemics and gradually erode the human 
resources of a region, resulting in a power shift. I assume however that post-disaster reconstruction 
generally outweighs the long-term power shift caused by destruction. An epidemic, for instance, 
will eventually spread in both government- and rebel-controlled regions, and hence the 
distribution of medicines generally determines which side suffers a relatively large loss of human 
resources. 
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complexity of the post-disaster reconstruction process may obfuscate the pattern of relief 
allocation, the initial implementation of reconstruction and a resultant slight shift in the power 
balance indicate which parties will obtain a more substantial amount of benefits and hence a 
bargaining advantage in the long run.  
Post-disaster reconstruction provides strategic opportunities to accumulate power. As the 
political studies on foreign aid imply (Strandow et al. 2014), disaster relief can directly benefit 
parties. As an intermediary agency, a party that controls the afflicted locations is able to receive 
foreign relief (Blouin and Pallage 2008). This allows a party to divert the aid to military purposes, 
especially in the absence of proper monitoring mechanisms during the humanitarian emergency. 
In addition, parties can levy taxes and fees on the import of emergency supplies and visits by 
humanitarian agencies, and even plunder the resources (Webersik 2006).  
More importantly, in the absence of lucrative resources such as gemstones and oil, parties 
need to rely on taxes and conscription from citizens. As the economic literature of foreign aid 
suggests (Collier and Dollar 2002), international relief can stimulate the growth of local economies 
and populations. Indeed, post-disaster reconstruction involves resettlement of victims, which in 
turn increases the consumption level and thus bolsters local business even to above the pre-disaster 
level (Skidmore, Mark, and Hideki Toya 2002). In the long term, the resurgence of the population 
and economy provides parties with important sources of taxes and manpower, and hence 
influences the power balance between parties (Strandow et al. 2014). These points indicate that 
post-disaster reconstruction can cause a potentially large shift in the power balance. 
Except on rare occasion, it is extremely difficult to allocate post-disaster reconstruction 
proportionally so as to mitigate a future power shift. The strategic interests of donors can permeate 
the allocation of disaster relief, favoring one side over another (Girod 2012). Furthermore, when a 
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party has a say in the allocation of disaster relief, the party has strong incentives to speak for local 
demands even though it creates a strategic deadlock in the war bargaining (Lischer 2006). Finally, 
because the parties engage in bargaining given the power balance after a natural disaster, if one 
side suffers significantly heavier damage, the return to the pre-disaster status means a power shift 
from the post-disaster status quo. This means that in most cases the power shift is prevented only 
at the expense of meeting humanitarian needs. Thus, although it is theoretically possible that the 
parties could allocate resources without perturbing the power balance (Chadefaux 2011), they are 
rarely able or willing to do so in practice.9 
As formal models about preventive war show (Fearon 1995; Powell 2006; Walter 2013), 
the expectation for a future power shift triggers a war. A party that is expected to gain less from 
post-disaster reconstruction resorts to violence in order to prevent the power shift. If it were not 
for the preventive war, the opportunities of post-disaster reconstruction would allow the opponent 
to misappropriate disaster relief, expand their tax and manpower bases, and therefore accumulate 
power over time. Because the power shift would erode its bargaining position (Powell 2006), the 
declining party would be forced to accede further concessions. To prevent the unfavorable shift in 
                                                          
9 The argument can be extended to the cases where parties have imperfect but partial controls over 
reconstruction. As Powell (2006) and Chadefaux (2011) show, a peaceful settlement requires 
parties to influence every bit of power transfers (so-called a continuous bargaining space). For 
instance, when parties can influence the allocation of disaster relief only at program levels, the 
power adjustment remains coarse and hence it still results in a power shift. The power shift may 
be small in the short term but can accumulate to very large in the long term. 
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the power balance, the party is incentivized to initiate war and thus seize the locations of 
reconstruction programs or at least disrupt its opponent’s opportunities.10 
Thus, I hypothesize that post-disaster reconstruction has a causal effect of increasing the 
number of violent events; ceteris paribus violent events are more likely to increase in the locations 
of active reconstruction. Note that while bargaining theories have been applied to the onset of war 
at a national level, they also have implications at a subnational level, as this hypothesis indicates. 
If a power shift triggers a civil war, violent events should be concentrated in the locations 
associated with the power shift. This paper focuses on the subnational implication. 
In contrast to the disaster-peace approach, which identifies destruction as a main 
explanatory variable, I posit that destruction is only a rough proxy of reconstruction and thus its 
effect is only weakly identified, as destruction is not a primary cause of a commitment problem. 
To examine this possibility, I estimate the effect of destruction on violent events. More importantly, 
in contrast to the Neo-Malthusian approach, which claims that violence arises from scarcity, 
bargaining theory predicts that violence is more likely to happen in the locations of active 
reconstruction. Because the predictions are opposite and neither of the theories is nested in each 
other, I empirically test the hypotheses by estimating the effect of reconstruction on violent 
events.11 
                                                          
10 Given the strategic incentive of the declining side, the rising side also has an incentive to preempt 
the attacks. Thus, the theory does not exactly specify which side starts violence at a subnational 
level. 
11 Another possibility is that parties compete for reconstruction materials even incurring the costs 
of violence; put simply, violence happens if there is something to fight for (a something-to-fight-
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An empirical challenge is that unlike geo-physical hazards, reconstruction is endogenous 
to violent events. Because people tend to avoid living and working in violence-prone areas, there 
may be reverse causation; future violence may curtail current reconstruction efforts. Moreover, 
outbreaks of violence will hinder data collection on post-disaster reconstruction programs. This 
results in underreporting of violent events in locations of higher violence risks and thus further 
underestimates the causal effect of reconstruction. These problems require careful case selection 
and a suitable identification strategy, to which I now turn. 
THE 2004 TSUNAMI IN SRI LANKA 
In the following empirical analysis, I chose Sri Lanka as it provides at least five unique analytical 
opportunities. As an island beside the southern tip of the Indian subcontinent, Sri Lanka has a long 
history of civil war (Bandarage 2009), which can be traced back to 1983 when the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the northern-based Tamil separatists, killed thirteen government 
soldiers. Although the first war, called the Eelam I War, was halted in 1987 by an Indian military 
intervention, the peace talks broke down and were followed by another war (the Eelam II War), 
which continued until both sides agreed on a ceasefire in January 1995. The ceasefire lasted less 
than a year and the country descended into the Eelam III War in July 1995. 
                                                          
for explanation; Grossman 1992; Collier and Hoeffler 2002). Note that the something-to-fight-for 
and bargaining explanations are complementary; while the former explains how post-disaster 
reconstruction increases the stakes of bargaining, the latter explains why the bargaining actually 
fails. Because previous studies, both Neo-Malthusian and disaster-peace approaches, rest on 
utility-based explanations, this paper extends the bargaining theory and hence fills the missing 
link in the something-to-fight-for argument.  
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The first reason for the case selection lies in the fact that the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami 
occurred between the two civil wars, the Eelam III and IV wars, which provides a unique 
opportunity for a before-after comparison. The Eelam III War began in July 1995 when the 
government launched an offensive operation against the LTTE and ended with a ceasefire 
agreement on 21 February 2002. After nearly four years under the ceasefire and the tsunami in 
2004, the country descended back into violence with the outbreak of the Eelam IV War in early 
2006. Taking advantage of this temporal structure, I investigate the changes in the counts of violent 
events between the two wars, which controls for static factors, such as geography, and reduces 
potential confounders. 
Second, the existence of the ceasefire agreement at the time of the tsunami meant that 
subnational data were collected over the entire country, which are rarely available in countries 
facing civil war. The government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE signed a ceasefire agreement on 21 
February 2002. However, the ceasefire agreement encountered increasing uncertainties, such as 
the LTTE’s unilaterally pulling out of the negotiations in April 2003, the demonstration of over 
50,000 Sinhalese nationalists opposing the ceasefire in February 2004, the LTTE’s split into two 
factions in March, and the rise of the Sinhalese nationalist party in the parliamentary election in 
April. The tsunami and nationwide suffering in December, at least tentatively, rescued the 
ceasefire from possible breakdown (Bandarage 2009). This political environment enabled the 
Department of Census and Statistics to gather the data regarding the tsunami and its effects even 
in the LTTE-held regions. 
Third, the unexpected nature of the magnitude and distribution of tsunami damage ensures 
relative exogeneity of the physical hazard to confounders, providing a unique source for an 
identification strategy. Although the first wave hit the island 120 to 150 minutes after the 
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earthquake (Wijetunge 2009), the absence of a warning system and prior experience hindered a 
rapid response and evacuation across the nation, making the disaster almost unexpected for the 
residents (Kurita et al. 2006). Indeed, according to the best available records, the last tsunami had 
occurred in 1883 and produced a wave of only 0.5 meters in Colombo (Goff et al. 2006). That 
tsunami also lacked a significant second wave. In addition, the fact that the extent of suffering due 
to the 2004 tsunami varied across the country also ensures the variability of the destruction variable. 
According to the census, while more than one third of the houses in the eastern coastal districts 
collapsed, less than one sixth were completely destroyed in the west (Department of Census and 
Statistics 2005).  
Fourth, in addition to the tsunami damage, the post-disaster reconstruction process also 
varied across the country, which provides variability on the key explanatory variable. Despite the 
urgent needs, the number of constructed houses increased only by one and a half times in the 
northern and northwestern provinces, while the number tripled in the eastern and southern 
provinces. The variation of housing construction may reflect reconstruction policy that 
intentionally or unintentionally favored the government’s strongholds. Indeed, by May 2006 the 
Reconstruction and Development Authority (RADA) disbursed over 46 million dollars in order to 
build houses in the southern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka, which were under the control of 
the government, while the rebellious northern and northeastern provinces received only about 13 
million dollars (RADA 2006). 
Fifth, after the natural disaster, Sri Lanka experienced another civil war, which is a 
prerequisite for this analysis because the outcome variable is a subnational pattern of violent events. 
Although the government and LTTE agreed on the Post-Tsunami Operational Management 
Structure after the disaster, the Muslim and Sinhalese constituencies protested the agreement, and 
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a former coalition partner, JVP, appealed to the Supreme Court, claiming the agreement would 
infringe on its sovereignty. The LTTE also boycotted the presidential election in November 2005. 
In that election, Rajapakse, seen as a hardliner against the LTTE, won a majority of votes. Around 
early 2006, there were increasing skirmishes, suicide bombings, assassinations, factional battles 
within the Tamil rebels, and reports of human rights violations committed by the LTTE. In 
February 2006, the new president ordered a full-scale military offensive against the Tamil Tigers, 
which is generally regarded as the de facto beginning of the Eelam IV War. That war continued 
until May 2009 when the president declared a complete victory over the LTTE. 
Despite these analytical opportunities, the Sri Lankan Civil War may be a somewhat unique 
case. Although Sri Lanka has several common characteristics of civil war countries—such as 
underdevelopment, fragile democracy, and ethnic diversity—this case differs in that the rebels 
were highly organized and the duration of the conflict was one of the longest of all civil wars. 
Nonetheless, because the theory of commitment problems is particularly appropriate for prolonged 
wars (Fearon 2004; Powell 2006), the case of Sri Lanka provides an opportunity to test its 
applicability to the analysis of natural disasters and violent conflicts. To be sure, the purpose of 
this paper is not to establish a general law but to show that without considering reconstruction, 
destruction could at best weakly explain the pattern of civil war. The analysis of a single case 
serves this purpose. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
The unit of analysis in this study is the Grama Niladhari (GN) division, the lowest of Sri Lanka's 
four administrative levels (their average geographical size is about two thirds of Manhattan). 
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Because the scope of the theory implies areas that are susceptible to a tsunami, I limit the sample 
to the 1,567 GN divisions within one kilometer of the coast line.12  
The outcome variable of interest is a count of violent events, obtained from Yuichi Kubota 
(Kubota and Kikuta 2014).13 The violent events are coded based on the procedures of the Armed 
Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED).14 Political violence is defined as “the use of 
force by a group with a political purpose or motivation” (Raleigh, Linke, and Dowd 2014, 5). The 
variable, violence, is a count of all types of battle events between the government and rebel 
organizations, and violence against civilians that resulted in more than one deaths.15 For the period 
before the tsunami, I include the past events during the Eelam III War up to the day of the tsunami 
(19 April 1995 - 26 December 2004). For the post-disaster period, the sample contains the events 
during the Eelam IV War, excluding the events in 2004 and 2005 to avoid endogeneity concerns 
                                                          
12 Descriptive statistics are provided in Table A1-1-1 and Figure A1-1-1 in SI 1-1. I also conduct 
the analyses with divisions up to five or ten kilometers from the coast. The larger sample sizes 
even increase the statistical significance. See the later subsection about robustness checks. 
13 Upon publication, the data used in the analysis will be publicly available. 
14 The data sources are the newspaper articles stored in LexisNexis, primarily the wires of the 
Associated Press and United Press. See Table A1-2-1 in SI 1-2. 
15 I check robustness of the measurement. See the subsection for the robustness checks. 
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(1 January 2006 - 19 May 2009).16 In total there are 167 events in 50 divisions before the tsunami 
and 117 events in 35 divisions afterwards.17 
The empirical analysis is comprised of two regression models: one of violence on 
destruction, which addresses the logic of previous studies, and a main regression model of violence 
on reconstruction. In the main model, the key explanatory variable is construction, which is 
available at the GN division level.18 The data are obtained from the Census of Population and 
Housing 2012 (Department of Census and Statistics forthcoming). For the period before the 
tsunami, the data are the annual average of newly constructed houses from 2000 to 2004.19 For the 
post-disaster data, the variable captures the number of constructed houses in 2005.20 
                                                          
16 Including the events during 2004 and 2005 does not change the results. See the next subsection 
for the robustness checks. 
17 Note that the Eelam IV War was shorter and more intensive than the Eelam III War. In annual 
averages, there were 17.3 and 35.1 events each year during the Eelam III and IV Wars respectively. 
18 The number of houses that were reconstructed by the recovery programs is available only at the 
DS division. As I will discuss in the subsection of robustness checks, I find that construction 
correlate with the DS-level reconstruction variables in statistically significant and substantively 
sensible ways. 
19 Table A1-2-7 in SI 1-2 describes the data source. The data for each individual year are not 
available in the census. 
20 Because the sample distribution of this variable is highly skewed, and also because this variable 
is an outcome variable of the first-stage regression of an instrumental variable analysis, I take its 
natural logarithm. In addition, although the housing construction data in 2006 is also available, I 
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Note that the measurement of housing construction is retrospective; the number of 
constructed houses was recorded during the 2010 census. This fact raises a substantial risk of 
reporting bias. The bias, however, is expected to be opposite the working hypothesis. Housing 
construction would tend to be undervalued in divisions that are more susceptible to violent events, 
and thus a larger number of constructed houses should be associated with a lower risk of violence, 
which is contrary to my prediction. Therefore, if the results show a positive relationship, the 
finding can be considered as stronger evidence. In the robustness check, I also assess the validity 
of the measurement by comparing the housing construction data to alternative data. In addition, 
the instrumental variable approach I later describe further addresses this endogeneity problem. 
The variable, destruction, is an explanatory variable in the destruction regression and a 
control variable in the main model. The variable is the proportion of collapsed, destroyed, and 
damaged housing units to total housing units.21 The data are derived from the first-round reports 
of the Tsunami Census (Department of Census and Statistics 2005). I divide the sum of collapsed, 
                                                          
only use the data in 2005 to capture the initial implementation of reconstruction. I also check the 
robustness of this decision. See the next subsection for the robustness checks. 
21 Table A1-2-4 in SI 1-2 describes the data source. I suspect the death and casualty measures are 
more susceptible to endogeneity, because these measures highly depend on the people’s instant 
behaviors after the occurrence of the earthquake. The indicators of non-housing units have less 
variation and many missing values. The proportion of collapsed, destroyed, and damaged non-
housing units is very highly correlated with destruction (r = 0.898). 
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destroyed, and damaged housing units by the total number of housing units.22 Since the tsunami 
may affect violent events not only by destroying buildings but also by directly affecting the 
population and causing demographic shifts, I include a control variable, affected, in all models. 
This variable is derived from the 2004 Tsunami Census to measure the proportion of people who 
moved out of a division after the tsunami.23 
To these data, I apply an instrumental variable approach. First, and most importantly, I use 
an instrumental variable analysis for addressing the problems of reverse causality and reporting 
bias, as well as the omitted-variable problem. Intuitively, the instrumental variable estimator limits 
the variation of an explanatory variable to that caused by an exogenous variable, called an 
instrumental variable. Because such exogenous variation cannot be explained by omitted variables, 
reverse causality, or reporting bias, the instrumental variable design can effectively address these 
inferential problems. The instrumenting variable is offshore wave height (wave), a measurement 
of the level of the physical hazards. The average wave height of each GN division is computed 
from the GIS data of Garcin et al. (2008), which is available at the 540 meter grid resolution.24 I 
                                                          
22 I check the robustness of the measurements of housing destruction. See the next subsection for 
the robustness checks. 
23 Despite the high correlation of affected and destruction (r = 0.811), exclusion of affected does 
not alter the results. 
24 Table A1-2-11 in SI 1-2 describes the data source. The method of simulation is a modified 
version of the GEOWAVE model. The GEOWAVE model requires the information about the 
locations and magnitudes of the seismic movements as well as bathymetry. Later, as a robustness 
check, I also repeat the analysis using a different data source of tsunami. 
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use the offshore, instead of nearshore, measure for isolating it from the coastal geographies and 
infrastructure, which could introduce endogeneity.25 In each of the destruction and reconstruction 
regressions, the explanatory variable is instrumented by the tsunami wave height. 
Although the instrument of offshore tsunami wave height addresses the omitted-variable, 
reverse-causality, and missing-data problems, it is not perfectly random and does correlate with 
pre-tsunami demographic and geographic variables as I mention in the robustness check. To 
control for these pretreatment conditions, I use the first-differences of the variables. In particular, 
I estimate how the differences in the numbers of constructed houses affected the differences in the 
counts of violent events before and after the tsunami. Because the pre-tsunami conditions are fixed 
and thus cannot explain the changes in the outcome variable, the first differencing accounts for the 
                                                          
25 There are a number of difficulties to measure nearshore wave height, runup elevation, runup 
distance, inundation areas, and inundation levels, partly because these metrics are affected by 
coastal infrastructure and geographies. However, because offshore waves are less affected by 
coastal infrastructure and geographies, they are more exogenous and thus more appropriate as an 
instrument than the alternatives.  
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pre-tsunami confounders.26 Thus, I assume that after differencing out the variables, the instrument 
is orthogonal to potential confounders.27 
Another assumption required for the instrumental variable analysis is the exclusion 
restriction; the instrument should have conditionally no effect on the difference in violent events 
except for the effect via the instrument (Sovey and Green 2011). Controlling for housing 
destruction and demographic shifts “blocks” the backdoor paths that circumvent the explanatory 
variable. In other words, by holding the levels of destruction and population changes constant, I 
can exclude the possibility that wave heights affect the number of violent events bypassing its 
                                                          
26  The first-differencing accounts for pre-tsunami, not post-tsunami, confounders. Although 
demographic compositions might change after the tsunami, these post-tsunami changes were most 
likely to be the effects of the tsunami-related destruction, and hence the instrumental variable and 
the control for destruction effectively address the problem. 
27 Although I believe that first-differencing mitigates this risk, in a robustness check, I also add 
further controls, including regional fixed effects and observed covariates respectively. 
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effect on housing construction.28 I also estimate an overidentified model to show the Sargan test 
does not reject the validity of the instruments.29 
The instrumental variable analysis also assumes that the instrumental variable has a strong 
conditional effect on the explanatory variable. Holding the levels of housing and human damage 
constant, the offshore wave height positively correlates with an increase of constructed houses. 
When a division suffers a higher wave but bears the same degree of damage as a division 
experiencing a lower wave height, the division is proven to be more resilient to tsunamis than the 
others; the level of destruction is the same despite a higher wave. Thus, if people prefer tsunami-
resilient locations to vulnerable places, they should build more houses in the locations of higher 
waves even after controlling for the level of destruction. As I later discuss, the instrument has very 
strong predictive power. In addition, I also assume that the instrument has a monotonic relationship 
with the explanatory variable, and that the wave height in a given division has no conditional effect 
on the outcome variables in the other divisions. 
Formally, therefore, the main regression of violence on reconstruction is expressed as; 
 ∆𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1∆ ln(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  ;  
 ∆ ln(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑖 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑤𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑖 + 𝛿2𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛿3𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 ,  
                                                          
28 The blocking strategy requires an assumption that the level of destruction that is not explained 
by the wave heights, namely wave-unrelated destruction, is orthogonal to the difference in violent 
events. Although pre-tsunami socio-economic factors, such as housing resilience, may affect the 
level of destruction, I assume that the first-difference strategy mitigates the confounding effects 
of these pre-tsunami fixed variables. 
29 Because the over-identification test requires multiple instruments, I use a standard deviation of 
the wave heights as an additional instrument. See the next subsection for the robustness checks. 
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where i is a subscript for a GN division, and ∆ denotes a first-difference. In the estimation, I use 
robust standard errors, and therefore apply the two-step feasible generalized method of moments 
(GMM) instead of two-stage least square (2SLS) estimator.30 
ANALYSIS 
While previous studies have considered destruction as a primary explanatory variable of intrastate 
violence, bargaining theory predicts that destruction itself has no observable effect on violent 
events because it does not eliminate the possibility for a negotiated settlement. I instead propose 
post-disaster reconstruction as a cause of a commitment problem, hypothesizing that parties fight 
for the strategic opportunities created by post-disaster reconstruction and thus that violent events 
are more likely to increase in the locations of housing construction. Table 1 presents the empirical 
results of these expectations. 
                                                          
30 As discussed in the sensitivity checks, the results of the 2SLS, LIML and GMM estimates are 
the almost same and statistically significant. 
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As seen in the first two columns in Table 1, destruction and violent events have no 
discernible relationship. The first column in Table 1 shows the baseline OLS estimate without 
instruments. The coefficient of the destruction variable alone is not significantly different from 
zero (p = 0.468). In the second column, I use wave heights as an instrument of the number of 
destroyed houses. The coefficient has a p-value close to the conventional threshold (p = 0.075), 
suggesting a potential but inconclusive increase in violent events. Substantively, a division 
suffering complete destruction is predicted to experience one more violent event than a division 
with only a very minor level of destruction (destruction of 2 percent of houses). Despite the 
substantial effect size, the standard error is relatively large, implying weak identification of the 
causal effect. The estimate can be unbiased, but it is substantively under-identified as we cannot 
reject the possibility that the positive relationship reflects the effect of post-disaster reconstruction 
of houses instead of destruction itself. 
Table 2-1. Estimates on the Effect of Housing Construction on Violence 
 Outcome: ∆violence (1) (2) 
(3) (4) 
∆ln(construction)   0.006 0.577** 
  (0.03) (0.28) 
destruction -0.109 1.329* -0.113 -0.487** 
(0.15) (0.75) (0.15) (0.21) 
affected 0.079 -1.640 0.077 -0.104 
(0.21) (0.89) (0.21) (0.26) 
Constant -0.017 -0.142 -0.020 -0.269* 
(0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.15) 
Instrument No wave No wave 
Estimator OLS GMM OLS GMM 
Observations 1569 1567 
* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Estimates of instrumented variables are shown in bold letters. 
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The last two columns in Table 1 present the estimates of the main model that includes the 
variable of housing construction. The theory predicts that violent events became more frequent in 
more actively reconstructed divisions. Although the OLS estimates yield null results due to the 
endogeneity problem discussed above, the instrumental variable model provides firm support for 
the hypothesis. The OLS estimate of the coefficient in the first column of Table 1 exhibits a weak 
association due to two factors: housing construction’s effect to increase violent events and the 
endogenous effect of violence to decrease reports of housing construction. Since people tend to 
avoid and underreport housing construction in violence-prone areas, the endogeneity may mute 
the causal effect of housing construction on violent events. 
Once I account for the endogeneity, as seen in the last column in Table 1, the regression 
coefficients behave as expected. Consistent with the hypothesis, higher growth in housing 
construction increases violent events (p = 0.041). The coefficient represents a change in the 
number of violent events when the number of constructed houses from the pre-tsunami level is 
roughly doubled. The effect size suggests that doubling the number of constructed houses from 
the pre-disaster level, which is not unusual in the sample, is sufficient to offset the reduction of 
violent events due to the destruction of all houses.31 In an absolute number, if three houses are 
built in a division without any prior houses, it increases the number of violent events by one on 
average. 
In the main model, the coefficient on the destruction variable becomes negative and is 
statistically significant. This might imply that the positive relationship observed in Table 1 indeed 
                                                          
31 In fact, the values of construction were more than double the pre-disaster levels in one third of 
the divisions. 
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proxies the effect of reconstruction, while destruction itself has an effect to reduce the number of 
violent events. However, because the destruction variable is a control in the main model, the 
coefficient estimate is subject to posttreatment-control bias, and hence it should not be interpreted 
as a causal effect (Angrist and Pischke 2009; Achen 2005).32 Thus, without denying the possibility 
that destruction has a pacifying effect independent of reconstruction, I leave further examination 
to future studies. The bottom line is that the causal effect of destruction is discernible only when 
we account for reconstruction. This underlines my argument that post-disaster reconstruction is 
crucial in the relationship between a natural disaster and conflicts. 
In the main instrumental variable model, the predictive power of the first-stage regression 
is very strong, suggesting there is no problem of a weak instrument; the coefficient of wave is 
highly significant (p < 0.001) and the robust F statistic is 43.39, far beyond the Stock-Yogo critical 
value. The exogeneity of housing construction to the outcome variable is rejected at a 5 percent 
significance level, suggesting the existence of endogeneity. This result is consistent with the above 
interpretation that the reporting bias obscures the causal effect of housing construction. 
Robustness checks 
I check the sensitivity of the results to additional controls, spatial dependency, measurement, and 
various specifications and estimations. Table 2 provides a brief summary of the results. 
                                                          
32 Under the framework of mediation analysis, the coefficient for destruction in the last column of 
Table 1 would be interpreted as the effect of destruction independent of housing construction. But 
Bullock and Ha (2011) show that this interpretation requires a strong set of assumptions, which I 
do not think the present analysis satisfies. For this reason, I do not give a definite interpretation 
about the coefficient. 
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First, the results are quite robust to changes in measurement, such as the exclusion and 
inclusion of different types of violent events, different weightings of the housing destruction 
measure, different ways to calculate the number of constructed houses, alternative wave height 
data, and inclusion of GN divisions up to 5 or 10 kilometers away from the coast (Tests 1 to 10 in 
Table 2).33 I also assess the validity of the housing construction data by comparing it to an 
                                                          
33 For the details of the weights for the housing destruction data, see Table A1-2-5 in SI 1-2. 
Table 2-2. Summary of Robustness Checks 
  Tests Pass the test? SI Table 
Measurement 
(1) Exclusion of violence against civilians Yes A1-2-2 
(2) Inclusion of riots and protests Yes A1-2-2 
(3) Exclusion of low-intensity violence   Yes* A1-2-2 
(4) Inclusion of violent events in 2004 and 2005 Yes A1-2-3 
(5) Exclusion of events during the peace talk Yes A1-2-3 
(6) Standardized violence   Yes* A1-2-3 
(7) Alternative calculations of housing destruction Yes A1-2-6 
(8) Alternative measurement of housing construction Yes A1-2-8 
(9) Alternative data of wave height simulation Yes   A1-2-12 
(10) Divisions up to 5 or 10 km away from the coast Yes   A1-2-13 
Control 
Variables 
(11) District fixed effects No A1-3-2 
(12) Province fixed effects No A1-3-2 
(13) Twenty-one covariates No A1-3-3 
(14) District fixed effects with larger samples   Yes* A1-3-4 
(15) Province fixed effects with larger samples Yes A1-3-4 
(16) Twenty-one covariates with larger samples     Yes** A1-3-4 
Spatial 
Dependency 
(17) Control for neighbors’ average of destruction   Yes* A1-4-1 
(18) Control for neighbors’ average of construction   Yes* A1-4-1 
(19) Control for neighbors’ average of violence Yes A1-4-1 
(20) Standard errors clustered at a DS division level   Yes* A1-4-2 
(21) Standard errors clustered at a district level   Yes* A1-4-2 
(22) Standard errors clustered at a province level   Yes* A1-4-2 
Specification 
and 
Estimation 
(23) 2SLS estimates Yes A1-5-1 
(24) LIML estimates of the overidentified model   Yes* A1-5-1 
(25) OLS estimates of the reduced form Yes A1-5-1 
(26) Ordered probit model Yes A1-5-2 
(27) Multinomial probit model Yes A1-5-2 
(28) Separate IV probit models Yes A1-5-2 
(29) Separate rare-event logit models Yes A1-5-2 
* Significant at a 10 percent level. 
** Significant only with the sample of GN division up to 10 km away from the coast. 
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alternative dataset.34 The Reconstruction and Development Agency (RADA) made DAD Data 
Report 2nd edition on 15 May 2006, which contains the numbers of housing units at four stages: 
(1) an original Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was made (planned), (2) the MoU was 
actually signed (signed), (3) the housing units were under construction (started), and (4) the 
construction was completed (completed). One shortcoming however is that the RADA dataset is 
available only at the level of DS divisions (third administrative level) and thus the number of 
observations is very limited (86 DS divisions).35 To check the validity of ∆𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, which 
is available at the level of GN divisions, I regress the RADA indicators on ∆𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛. The 
results show that not only all of the four indicators are positively associated with ∆𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
but also the coefficients for started and completed are more than three times larger than those for 
planned and signed and they are statistically significant. The latter result is consistent with the fact 
that the signature of MoU does not necessarily entail housing construction, while starting 
construction almost certainly means the completion of the project. 
Second, the tsunami wave heights may not be perfectly random and therefore may correlate 
with some confounders. In particular, as shown in Figure A1-3-1 in SI 1-3, the tsunami height 
correlates with demographic, ethnic, religious, and geographic variables. One way to address this 
concern is to limit the comparison within a specific group, presuming that the GN divisions within 
                                                          
34 See Table A1-2-19 in SI 1-2. 
35 Because the instrumental variable analysis requires a sufficient number of observations (the 
estimators are consistent but biased), and also because the outcome variable does not have a large 
variation, the instrumental variable analysis is biased and inefficient if I use the RADA dataset. 
For this reason, I use the 2012 housing census as a primary data source.  
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a group are homogeneous. Then I add fixed effects for the districts (the second administrative 
units) and provinces (the first administrative units), and demographic and geographic covariates 
respectively (Tests 11 to 13 in Table 2).36 These methods substantially reduce the variability of the 
variables, and if the results hold, it should provide strong support for the hypotheses. Once I 
include either of the fixed effects or the DS-level covariates, however, both of the coefficients 
become statistically indistinguishable from zero. 
This result may be due to the reduced efficiency in the estimators or to the presence of 
unknown confounders. To diagnose this, I increase the sample size by including the GN divisions 
up to five or ten kilometers away from the coast. If the regional fixed effects and demographic 
covariates reduce the efficiency of the estimates without causing biases, the increased sample size 
should address the problem. In contrast, if the fixed effects and covariates would represent 
confounding variables, they should alter the estimates and p-values regardless of the sample sizes. 
After I increase the sample size, nearly all of the coefficients regain statistical significance (Test 
14 to 16 in Table 2). Moreover, in all cases, the coefficient values for ∆𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 are within 
                                                          
36 See Table A1-312 and A1-3-3 in SI 1-3. The demographic covariates are derived from the 1981 
Census and hence available only at a Division Secretary (DS) division level (the third 
administrative units). I also add geographic covariates as well as night light densities, which are 
available at the GN division level. Table A1-3-1 in SI 1-3 provides descriptive statistics of the 
covariates. 
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the confidence interval of the main estimate.37 Therefore, the best possible empirical data provide 
no evidence for substantial bias due to the covariate imbalance. 
Third, in order to account for spatial dependency, I retest the hypothesis by adding 
neighbors’ averages of the explanatory and outcome variables (Test 17 to 19 in Table 2). The 
results are similar to the main analyses, though the inclusion of neighbors’ average of housing 
construction modestly increases the standard errors of the coefficients. In addition, the standard 
errors become only modestly larger even when I cluster it by the DS divisions, districts and 
provinces respectively, though still statistically significant at a 10 percent level (Test 20 to 22 in 
Table 2). 
Fourth, the results are robust to alternative model specifications and estimations. Following 
the advice of Angrist and Pischke (2009), I retest the hypotheses with the 2SLS estimation, the 
limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimation of the overidentified model (the 
standard deviation of the wave heights as an additional instrument), and the OLS estimation of the 
reduced form (Test 23 to 25 in Table 2). In the overidentified model, I use the standard deviation 
of wave heights in a GN division as an additional instrument. The 2SLS and LIML estimates are 
quite similar to those of the GMM estimates. In addition, in the overidentified model, the Sargan 
test of exclusion restriction does not reject the validity of the instruments at a 5 percent significance 
level. The reduced-form regression also produces similar results. The results are also robust to 
non-linear specifications (Test 26 to 29 in Table 2), such as ordered and multinomial probit models 
                                                          
37 See Table A1-3-4 in SI 1-3. Only when I use the sample of the GN divisions up to 5 km away 
from the coast, the coefficient in the regression with the covariates has a p-value 𝑝 = 0.133. This 
is due to the missing values in the covariates and the small sample size. 
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with the two stage residual inclusion technique (2SRI; Terza, Basu, and Rathouz 2008), separate 
instrumental-variable probit models, and separate rare-event logit models with 2SRI (King and 
Zeng 2001). 
Finally, because the primary purpose of this paper is the construction of a theoretical model 
and the identification of the causal effect, and due to space constraints, I leave the brief qualitative 
assessment to SI 1-6, in which I investigate the disproportionate distribution of disaster relief, 
possible effects of post-tsunami reconstruction on tax revenues and military expansion, and the 
failure of bargaining over reconstruction. Although the analysis only probes the plausibility of the 
quantitative results, the qualitative evidence provides further support for the argument of this paper. 
CONCLUSION 
I presented a theoretical logic and empirical analysis of the disaster-conflict nexus, introducing 
post-disaster reconstruction as a crucial explanatory variable. Bargaining theory implies that post-
disaster reconstruction causes a commitment problem and thus incentivizes parties to fight for the 
location of active reconstruction, while destruction does not exclude the possibility for a peaceful 
settlement. The empirical analysis of Sri Lanka provides robust support for the hypotheses; the 
statistical results hold in the 26 out of 29 robustness tests. 
We need to be cautious about generalizing the case of Sri Lanka. The existence of the 
ceasefire prior to the tsunami distinguishes the case from some countries ongoing civil wars and 
those without previous wars, though the relatively long duration of the ceasefire means the Sri 
Lanka case can resemble the onset of civil war in other cases. Furthermore, although I argue that 
it is extremely difficult for the government and international donors to allocate reconstruction 
materials without causing a commitment problem, very careful post-disaster policies might 
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successfully open a way to a negotiated conflict settlement. Such a dynamic might explain, for 
instance, the peaceful outcome of the 2004 tsunami in the Aceh conflict in Indonesia.38 
Despite these limitations, this research implies that considering the role of reconstruction 
and humanitarian responses more broadly is the first step to address the “disparate” (Salehyan 
2014, 1) findings in previous studies. Several previous studies, including a widely-cited article by 
Brancati (2007), found that frequent natural disasters were associated with a larger number of 
conflict events. Although the authors argue that a natural disaster causes scarcity and violent 
competition for resources, natural disasters can entail ample emergency aid, which in turn may 
disturb the extant power balance and lead to violent conflicts. Therefore, without considering post-
disaster reconstruction, we cannot decide whether it is destruction or reconstruction that really 
underlies in the empirical estimate. 
Finally, this study has both bad and good news for post-disaster peace policies. The bad 
news is that reconstruction can exacerbate violence. Post-disaster reconstruction can destabilize 
the extant power balance and thus induce violence. This finding, however, does not necessarily 
mean that we should abandon all efforts for reconstructing societies devastated by natural disasters. 
Instead, this analysis suggests that even with urgent humanitarian needs immediately after a 
disaster, we need to carefully consider the bargaining environments and how reconstruction can 
potentially affect the strategic calculation of the local actors. 
                                                          
38 Beardsley and Brian (2009) qualitatively compare the cases of Sri Lanka and Indonesia after the 
2004 tsunami, focusing on the incentives of the rebel organizations. The within-group analysis 
supplements the inter-group bargaining framework of this paper. 
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Some good news is that reconstruction is manipulable and thus ultimately depends on the 
decisions of policy makers. In the theory section, I maintained that the rival parties cannot credibly 
commit to a peaceful settlement due to fear of a weaker future bargaining position. The 
international community, however, can alter this strategic conundrum by stabilizing the shift in 
the power balance after a natural disaster and assuring the enforcement of reconstruction for both 
parties. Although in the case of Sri Lanka the government possessed larger control over the 
allocation of aid, international organizations could have played a larger role in post-disaster 
reconstruction so as to keep the power balance between the government and rebel group stable at 
the post-tsunami level. In this sense, a natural disaster never automatically abolishes or bolsters 
peace; we can change the trajectories of conflicts. Future research could fruitfully examine the 
interactions of environments, human responses and civil war, and develop more effective post-
disaster peace policies. 
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Chapter 3. The Drowning-out Effect: Voter Turnout, Uncertainty, and Protests 
On 31 March 2006, when the government of West Bengal, led by the Left Front, announced 
a deal with an Indonesian conglomerate, Salim Group, to set up a chemical hub spread over 10,000 
acres in the town of Nandigram, it raised tensions between the government and the local residents 
who would be displaced from their land. Two weeks after the agreement, the West Bengal State 
Assembly Election appeared to confirm broad-based support for the government. Over 81 percent 
of eligible voters turned out in the election, in which the Left Front obtained 78 percent of the seats. 
With the landslide victory, which was “beyond all our expectations” (Outlook India 2006) even 
for the party leader, the government announced the expansion of the project on 18 May, now 
promising further 10,000 acres of the land in the nearby town of Singur to Tata Motors. The 
announcement, however, triggered a protest by more than 3,000 people on 1 June. The protest soon 
escalated into a series of demonstrations and riots that continued for years. Retrospectively, a 
witness states that “the poll outcome was wrongly interpreted as a popular support in favour of the 
path followed by the LF [Left Front] for industrialisation” (Dinda 2013, 28). Indeed, it is widely 
believed that the government’s failure was one of the major reasons that put an end to the 34-year 
rule of the leftist government in the following election (Roy 2009).  
What are the effects of electoral participation on protests? Our conventional wisdom 
suggests that high turnout in a free and fair election would be laudable; it might mean better 
representation of people’s opinions, which could allow a government to identify and address social 
discontents and hence mitigate the risks of protests. The case of West Bengal, however, casts doubt 
on this intuition, implying an alternative, or even opposite, possibility; high turnout may make a 
government overconfident in its popularity, and hence make it even more difficult to resolve the 
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conflict efficiently. Does high turnout really help to resolve social conflict without invoking 
protests? If not, what is the underlying logic?  
In this paper, by combining a bargaining model of conflict with a behavioral model of 
voting, I argue that high turnout indeed increases the risk of post-election protest. Even though 
high turnout may make an election more indicative of the average citizen’s preferences, it does 
not necessarily reflect the intensity of a minority’s dissatisfaction with a government’s policies. 
Indeed, in the contemporary world, a majority of people are not strongly interested in politics or 
do not participate in protests, often prioritizing their private lives (World Values Survey 2016). 
When those people happen to turn out, the vote shares are less representative of those who are 
motivated enough to protest. The resulting uncertainty can result in the bargaining failure and 
inefficient outcomes, such as protest. Thus, rather counterintuitively, high turnout is predicted to 
increase the risk of protests. 
Testing this hypothesis, however, raises empirical challenges. As an overwhelming number 
of electoral studies indicate, voter turnout is endogenous to various electoral strategies, including 
policy stances, clientelism, and pre-election protest and violence. Drawing on American voter 
scholarship (Hansford and Gomez 2010), I address the problems by using election-day rainfall 
deviation as an instrumental variable (IV or instrument) for turnout and applying it to a new 
constituency-level dataset of Indian local elections. I also extend a new near-far matching approach 
to the IV analysis (Baiocchi et al. 2010; Keele and Morgan 2016), which can address weak-
instrument bias and, perhaps more importantly, make the causal comparison more explicit and less 
dependent on parametric assumptions. Consistent with the theoretical expectation, the analysis 
shows that electoral participation raises the risk of protests after the elections.  
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The finding provides one rational for the idea that electoral democracy is imperfect as a 
conflict resolution mechanism even in its ideal form. Although conflict studies tend to focus on 
the problems of electoral fraud and rigging, an election itself may have inherent limitations. As 
long as all citizens, whether they are interested in politics or not, have rights to vote, elections may 
not reflect the opinions of real dissenters. This gap can create room for strategic miscalculations 
and inefficient outcomes. Instead, this study implies that free and fair elections must be 
complimented with the freedom of assembly so that citizens can efficiently signal the intensity of 
their preferences and discontents to policymakers.  
LITERATURE REVIEW: ELECTION AND CONFLICT 
A common explanation about the effect of elections on conflicts can be found in so-called 
sore-loser effects, which posit that competitive elections create “sore” losers and drive them to 
pursue options outside the political system, including violent protests and armed conflicts (Collier 
2011). This explanation however does not account for why a winner of the election does not 
accommodate or make concessions to the sore losers. In fact, from the perspective of bargaining 
theories (Fearon 1995), since having a protest is potentially costly (Pierskalla 2010; Little, Tucker, 
and LaGatta 2015),1 the incumbent is better off by offering peaceful conflict resolution and hence 
avoiding the unnecessary risks of facing protestors. Thus, even if elections create sore losers, it 
                                                 
1 The costs include a lower likelihood of victory in the next election (Madestam et al. 2013), 
potential escalation to armed conflict (Little, Tucker, and LaGatta 2015), and lower stock market 
evaluation on the firms associated with the incumbent (Acemoglu, Hassan, and Tahoun 2018). 
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does not eliminate the possibility of an efficient conflict settlement. For a complete explanation, 
we therefore need to explain the failure of peaceful conflict resolution. 
One possible explanation for the bargaining failure is informational uncertainties (Fearon 
1995). 2  In the presence of asymmetric information, a government and opposition can have 
conflicting views about the strength of their support bases. The government can underestimate the 
popularity of the opposition and thus propose a conflict resolution that is unacceptable to its 
opponents. The opposition rejects such an offer and initiates protests to compel their preferred 
policies (Londregan and Vindigni 2006; Cheibub and Hays 2017) or, more realistically, to signal 
the strength of their support base (Little, Tucker, and LaGatta 2015).  
From this perspective, an election is considered as an institutional medium though which 
people express their discontent. It is possible that free and fair elections would reveal the public 
support for each party, prevent strategic miscalculations, and thus lessen the need for violent 
actions (Przeworski 1991; Londregan and Vindigni 2006; Little, Tucker, and LaGatta 2015; 
Cheibub and Hays 2017). Contrariwise, as a number of recent studies show (Magaloni 2010; 
Daxecker 2014; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2016; Wig and Rød 2016; Knutsen, Nygård, 
and Wig 2017), fraud and rigging can make the election a biased signal of popular opinion, which 
can create a risk of misunderstandings and hence incentivizes dissidents to take extra-institutional 
means, such as violent and non-violent protests. The unconsolidated democratic culture, including 
parochial or ethnicized politics (Varshney 2003; Wilkinson 2006), the lack of democratic 
                                                 
2 The other possible avenue is the logic of commitment problems (Fearon 1995; Powell 2006), 
which has been applied to the cases of post-conflict elections (Walter 1999; Chacón, Robinson, 
and Torvik 2011; Brancati and Snyder 2011, 2013). 
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experience (Salehyan and Linebarger 2015), and post-conflict instabilities (Brancati and Snyder 
2013), can also undermine respect for electoral outcomes and result in inefficient outcomes.  
What is missing in these studies, however, is a possibility that elections can be inherently 
imperfect as a signaling mechanism; since elections by themselves can only provide information 
about aggregated vote counts, they may not reflect the distribution of preference intensity. For 
example, Little et.al (2015) and Cheibub and Hays (2017) incorporate this possibility into their 
formal models, in which elections provide varying qualities of information about popular opinion 
and thus result in different likelihoods of protests or violent conflicts. These studies, however, treat 
the quality of the revealed information as exogenous parameters and thus do not explain why some 
elections provide precise information while others do not. 
One potential answer to the question lies in electoral participation. Intuitively, one might 
argue that elections could accurately represent public opinion only when a large number of, and if 
possible all, citizens cast votes. For instance, Fearon (2011), who examines the roles of elections 
in collective actions against a ruler, assumes that all people cast either Yes or Nay votes for an 
incumbent. With this assumption, the elections are expected to reveal people’s opinions, allow the 
citizens to coordinate their collective actions, and hence incentivize the ruler to appease the citizens. 
Similarly, Londregan and Vindigni (2006) also assume that voting is costless, and thus that every 
individual (at least weakly) prefers voting to abstention. This central feature of the model ensures 
that the elections provide precise information about parties’ support bases, reduce the risks of 
strategic miscalculation, and hence allow peaceful conflict resolution.  
Although the unanimous-turnout assumption in these studies is useful for their own 
purposes, it does not deny the importance of analyzing the strategic consequences of electoral 
participation. In fact, a large fraction of people in contemporary democracies are not strongly 
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interested in politics, elections, or protest. According to the World Value Survey (2016),3 52.5% 
of the 69,553 respondents says they are not interested in politics, 47.6% of them have never and 
will never join any political activities, and 14.7% answered that they have never voted either 
national or local elections. Even among those who have casted votes, 45.3% said they would never 
participate in political actions. That is, for ordinary citizens, political issues have only secondary 
importance, and even those who turn out in elections may not be interested in protests or other 
political activities. If these disinterested citizens turn out in elections, does it help or hinder the 
information revelation mechanism? In the next section, I answer the question by incorporating a 
simple behavioral model of voting to a bargaining model. 
THEORY: THE DROWNING-OUT EFFECT  
Suppose two groups, winner (W) and loser (L) parties of an election, who have a dispute 
over a political issue. The issue can be local (such as the land appropriation in the case of the 
Nandigram-Singur conflict) or broader. Consistent with the literature (Little, Tucker, and LaGatta 
2015; Fearon 2011), I consider a two-candidate majoritarian system. The winner has an 
opportunity to make a settlement offer to the loser, but she does not know the exact power of the 
loser: that is, she does not know how many people would take to the streets if the loser calls for a 
protest. If a large number of people would join the protest, the winner would be forced to accept 
                                                 
3 Non-responses are dropped. 
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their demand, while the winner could easily ignore minor protest.4 The winner therefore faces a 
dilemma; if she makes a conciliatory offer, it risks making too large a concession to a weak loser, 
while an unsatisfactory offer could potentially trigger massive protest.  
Importantly, this model also involves 𝑛 citizens (𝑖 ∈ {1,… , 𝑛}) who are assumed to be 
shortsighted and thus non-strategic; they make decisions only based on their immediate payoffs. 
In elections, voters are supposed to compare the immediate benefits and costs of voting while 
ignoring its possible strategic consequences. This modeling approach is not unconventional as seen 
in the median-voter theorem (Downs 1957) and audience-costs model (Fearon 1994), but I believe 
this extension is still a substantial departure from previous studies, which consider elections as 
exogenous parameters (Little, Tucker, and LaGatta 2015; Cheibub and Hays 2017) or assume 
unanimous turnout (Londregan and Vindigni 2006; Fearon 2011). Empirical studies indeed show 
that individual voting behaviors are often determined by their desire to express the opinions and 
even retrospective utility considerations (Achen and Bartels 2004; Healy and Malhotra 2009; 
Healy, Malhotra, and Mo 2010). Although this certainly does not mean that people solely rely on 
expressive utilities in reality or that we can ignore the continuing debate about the instrumental 
and expressive voting behaviors (Ashworth and Mesquita 2014), I believe the shortsighted-citizen 
assumption is at least not unreasonable and makes the model tractable.  
The shortsighted-citizen assumption is also applied to their participation in a protest. This 
model choice is somewhere between Londregan and Vindigni (2006) and Cheibub and Hays 
                                                 
4 This win-or-lose specification is instrumental; in fact, without altering the main results, one can 
easily extend the following model such that a protest signals the size of protestors and thus allows 
a negotiated settlement with extra costs for protest. See Fearon (1995, 1997) and Little et al. (2015).   
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(2017), who do not incorporate individual participation, and Fearon (2011) and Little et. al (2015), 
who analyze n-player coordination games. Although participation in organized conflicts, such as 
civil war and revolution, are often motivated by public goals, people can join protests just for 
expressive purposes even without considering possible strategic consequences. This view is also 
consistent with previous studies that emphasize the psychological factors and expressive benefits 
of individual participation (Kuran 1991; Chen, Zachary, and Fariss 2017). Thus, while it is a 
fruitful avenue for future studies to relax these assumptions,5  I believe it provides analytical 
leverage and parsimony without losing generalizability.  
The game starts with the generation of citizens’ relative attitudes toward the candidates, 
which are independently drawn from a cumulative distribution function 𝐹𝜃 with the support of 
both negative and positive values. The negative 𝜃𝑖 means a negative attitude towards L, and vice 
versa. Neither W nor L knows the exact value of 𝜃𝑖. In an election, citizens cast votes for W or L 
if their attitudes towards the loser are sufficiently negative or positive, and otherwise they abstain;  
𝑢𝑖,𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = {
−𝛼𝜃𝑖 − 𝑐 if 𝑖 votes for W
0 if 𝑖 abstains
𝛼𝜃𝑖 − 𝑐 if 𝑖 votes for L
, 
where 𝛼 > 0 represents the expressive value of voting and 𝑐 > 0 is to the costs of voting. By the 
shortsighted-voter assumption, citizens decide their voting behaviors only based on 𝑢𝑖,𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 . 
Each citizen votes for W if 𝜃𝑖 < −𝜏𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 , abstains if −𝜏𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 ≤ 𝜃𝑖 ≤ 𝜏𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 , and votes for L if 
                                                 
5 Note that relaxing the assumption usually requires other assumptions. For instance, while Little 
et.al (2015) model citizens as fully strategic actors, the model is tractable only when citizens’ 
preferences are normally distributed.  
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𝜏𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 < 𝜃𝑖, where 𝜏𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 =
𝑐
𝛼
 is the threshold value for voting. After the election, the aggregated 
turnout rates and L’s vote share 𝒗 = (𝑣𝑇 , 𝑣𝐿|𝑇) are publicly announced, where 𝑣𝑇 is the turnout 
rate and 𝑣𝐿|𝑇 is the fraction of loser votes in total votes. Thus, even though W and L cannot observe 
individual voting behaviors, the election provides new information of aggregated vote counts. 
The election follows a standard bargaining protocol (the top of Figure 1). The winner first 
proposes an offer 𝑥 ∈ [0,1], which the loser either accepts or rejects. If L accepts the offer, W and 
L receive 1 − 𝑥 and 𝑥 respectively, and the game ends. The loser’s rejection, by contrast, entails 
his call for protest. Each citizen joins the protest if 𝑢𝑖,𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽𝜃𝑖 − 𝑑 > 0, where 𝛽 represents 
the expressive value of joining the protest and 𝑑 > 0 is the cost of participation. Let 𝑖’s threshold 
value for joining protest and the number of protestors be 𝜏𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 =
𝑑
𝛽
 and 𝑚 respectively. If the 
number of protestors is greater than or equal to a “tipping point” 𝜎𝑛, where 𝜎 ∈ [0, 1], the protest 
succeeds, forcing W to accept the demand. This gives the payoffs (𝑢𝑊, 𝑢𝐿) = (0, 1 − 𝑔), where 
𝑔 ∈ [0, 1] is L’s costs for coordinating protest. When the participants are fewer than the threshold, 
the protest fails, giving payoffs (𝑢𝑊, 𝑢𝐿) = (1,−𝑔). The bottom of Figure 3-1 summarizes the 
citizens’ decision rules. 
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Finally, I make several assumptions on substantive grounds. First, there should be a non-
zero probability that there is at least one potential protestor: 1 − 𝐹𝜃(𝜏𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡) > 0 , which is 
equivalent to saying that the citizens’ costs for protest participation are sufficiently small 𝑑 <
𝛽𝐹𝜃
−1(1). Otherwise, there would be no protest simply because joining a protest is too costly. This 
assumption is consistent with previous studies (Londregan and Vindigni 2006; Fearon 2011; Little, 
Figure 3-1. Election, Bargaining, and Protest 
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NOTE: The extensive form of the game (top) and citizens’ decision rule (bottom). Individual 
citizens’ attitudes to the loser 𝜃{𝑖;1,…,𝑛} are drawn from a cumulative density function 𝐹𝜃. In an 
election, citizens cast votes for W or L, or abstains, based on 𝜃{𝑖;1,…,𝑛} and a threshold value 
𝜏𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 =
𝑐
𝛼
. After voting, the electoral outcomes 𝒗  (vote shares and turnout) are publicly 
announced. The winner, who does not know the exact values of 𝜃{𝑖;1,…,𝑛} but can observe the 
electoral outcomes, then decides an offer 𝑥 to the loser. If the loser accepts the offer, the 
game ends with a negotiated settlement. If the loser rejects the offer, he calls for a protest by 
paying coordination costs 𝑔. Individual citizens join the protest if their 𝜃{𝑖;1,…,𝑛} values are 
greater than a threshold 𝜏𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 =
𝑑
𝛽
. If the number of protestors 𝑚 is larger than or equal to 
a threshold value 𝜎, the protest succeeds, and otherwise, the protest fails. 
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Tucker, and LaGatta 2015) and useful to limit the scope to substantively interesting cases. Second, 
I assume that L knows the number of potential protestors 𝑚 while W does not. That is, parties 
usually have better information about its own core constituencies. This setup is also consistent 
with previous studies (Cheibub and Hays 2017; Londregan and Vindigni 2006). Third, I assume 
that the citizens’ threshold for joining protest is higher than the threshold for voting for L: 𝜏𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 ≤
𝜏𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡. This assumption reflects the idea that joining a protest is physically more costly than just 
casting a vote.  
Analysis 
The game has a Bayesian perfect equilibrium that yields a positive probability of protest; 
 
Proposition (Protest Equilibrium). When 𝑔 ≤ 𝐹𝑚|𝒗(𝜎𝑛) , the following set of 
strategies are a part of a unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. W offers 𝑥∗ = 0, 
which L accepts if 𝑚 < 𝜎𝑛 and otherwise rejects. The probability of protest given 
electoral outcomes 𝒗 is; 
1 − 𝐹𝑚|𝑣(𝜎𝑛) ≈ 1 − Φ
(
 
(𝜎 − 𝑣𝑇𝑣𝐿|𝑇𝛿)𝑛 
√𝑛𝑣𝑇𝑣𝐿|𝑇𝛿(1 − 𝛿))
  
where 𝛿 =
1−𝐹𝜃(𝜏𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡)
1−𝐹𝜃(𝜏𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒)
. See SI 2-1 for proof. 
 
That is, when the costs for initiating a protest (𝑔) are relatively small, the winner needs to make a 
very large concession 𝑥 = 1 − 𝑔  in order to satisfy the loser. Instead, the winner chooses a 
hardline offer 𝑥 = 0, which the loser accepts only if he cannot gather a sufficient number of 
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protestors. The winner’s gamble, however, fails if 𝑚 ≥ 𝜎𝑛 so that a sufficient number of people 
are actually ready to protest against the winner.  
Under this equilibrium, protest occurs when the winner is optimistic but the loser is actually 
able to gather 𝜎 or more protestors. The probability of protest given the electoral outcomes 𝒗 is 
therefore Prob(𝑚 ≥ 𝜎𝑛|𝒗) = 1 − 𝐹𝑚|𝑣(𝜎𝑛) . Importantly and rather counterintuitively, the 
protest probability increases with the turnout rate; 
 
Proposition 2 (The Relationship between Turnout and Protest). Under the protest 
equilibrium, the probability of protest given 𝒗 increases with the turnout rate 𝑣𝑡. 
See SI 2-1 for proof. 
  
When the turnout rate is high, it increases the variance of the distribution of 𝑚; the loser vote share 
𝑣𝐿|𝑇 is now composed of a mixture of citizens of 𝜃𝑖 > 𝜏𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 (protestors) and those of 𝜏𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 <
𝜃𝑖 ≤ 𝜏𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡  (non-protestors who vote for L), which creates uncertainty about the number of 
protestors. Since the right tail of the probability distribution is increasing with its variance, the 
probability of protest Prob(𝑚 > 𝜎𝑛) = 1 − 𝐹𝑚|𝒗(𝜎𝑛) is also increasing with the turnout rate. Put 
simply, high turnout means noisy voices from disinterested people, which in turn “drowns out” the 
voices of the potential protestors, making it difficult for the winner to precisely estimate the 
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number of protestors (that is, W has a less informative posterior belief).6 Thus, an observable 
implication is; 
 
Hypothesis (Drowning-out Effect of Turnout). When the costs for protests are 
sufficiently small, elections with higher turnout result in higher probabilities of 
protest relative to those with lower turnout. 
 
To facilitate our understanding, consider a stylized example of a village of 100 people. If 
more than 20 people protest, the chief must accept their demand. When voting costs are as large 
as those for protest, only those 20 villagers vote for the opposition, while the rest will vote for the 
chief or abstains. Thus, the chief can simply count the number of opposition votes in order to 
obtain the precise number of the protestors. With the precise estimate, the chief can make a 
satisfactory offer to the 20 dissidents so that they can avoid the protest. By contrast, when voting 
costs are much smaller than those for joining the protest, other villagers turn out and can potentially 
cast votes for the opposition. As a result, the chief can no longer simply count the opposition votes; 
she needs to make a guess about the number of protestors. When the chief understates the number 
of protestors, she will make an unsatisfactory offer, which in turn triggers a protest. The high 
turnout therefore drowns out the voices of the 20 dissidents and creates a probability of protest.  
                                                 
6 Precisely speaking, turnout has another effect, which I call a mean-shift effect; high turnout 
means a larger number of government and opposition supporters, which in turn can increase the 
risk of protests. See SI 2-1 for detail.  
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Note that the drowning-out hypothesis pertains to the variation within the protest 
equilibrium. That is, the scope is limited to the cases in which the costs for protests (𝑔) are 
sufficiently small such that 𝑔 ≤ Φ(
(𝜎−𝛿)𝑛
√𝑛𝛿(1−𝛿)
),7 including democracies and perhaps anocracies but 
almost certainly excluding autocracies. When 𝑔 is larger, the equilibrium can be different. With 
the large costs for protest, the winner can easily accommodate the loser by offering a relatively 
small concession of 1 − 𝑔. Thus, when a losing candidate receives a large number of votes and 
hence post-election protest is imminent, the winner rather opts to make a small concession and 
hence to eliminate any risk of protest. Since this prediction is not particularly new and indeed 
analyzed by previous studies (Pierskalla 2010; Bell and Murdie 2016), this paper examines a case 
of democracy so as to fix the value of 𝑔 and hence to analyze the variation within the protest 
equilibrium. In the later section about causal mechanisms, I also investigate possible variation 
within the democracy. 
It is also worthwhile to mention that the drowning-out hypothesis can hold even if one 
accounts for alternative signaling strategies, such as pre-election protests, letter writing, and phone 
calls. Pre-election protests are usually less than an optimal; as far as protests are relatively costlier 
than elections (even though costs for protests are small in absolute terms), opposition parties have 
incentives to wait and see the outcome of elections, and then, only if necessary, take to the streets 
(Little, Tucker, and LaGatta 2015). Moreover, although letter writing and phone calls might be 
effective, these signals are noisy as well; opposition parties can buy people to write letters or make 
phone calls, and given this incentive, these signals can be biased and thus cannot tell the exact size 
                                                 
7 This inequality ensures that equilibrium condition 𝑔 ≤ 𝐹𝑚|𝒗(𝜎𝑛) is satisfied regardless of 𝑣𝑇. 
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of opposition supporters. Although this certainly does not mean that these signals do not provide 
any useful information or have no effect on protests, unless they could eliminate any uncertainty 
over the size of protestors, elections and turnout can still affect the remaining uncertainties.  
In the model, I deliberately omit any strategic dynamics behind voting decisions, such as 
candidates’ policy positions (Mayer 2007), clientelism and vote buying (Bratton 2008; Nichter 
2008; Gans-Morse, Mazzuca, and Nichter 2014), voter intimidation (Klopp and Zuern 2007; 
Robinson and Torvik 2009; Kibris 2011), and pre-election violence (Blattman 2009; Dunning 
2011; Koch and Nicholson 2016; Harish and Little 2017). Although this is a useful simplification 
(Clarke and Primo 2007) unless voting decisions would be completely determined by those 
endogenous factors, it still poses an empirical challenge; without identifying exogenous variations 
in voter turnout, we can hardly isolate the effects of turnout from the endogenous relationships. 
RESEARCH DESIGN: AN INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE ANALYSIS WITH THE 
NEAR-FAR MATCHING 
Given the concerns with endogeneity, a critical question is how we can make the test closer 
to an ideal experiment. One way is to find an as-if randomly assigned variable, called an 
instrumental variable, that affects turnout. By restricting the variation of turnout to such exogenous 
variation, I can isolate the causal effect from any endogenous relationship. As an instrumental 
variable for turnout, American voting scholars use election-day rainfall deviation, measured as the 
amount of rainfall on an election day minus the average rainfall on the same day but in different 
years (Hansford and Gomez 2010). As widely recognized both in conflict and electoral studies, 
rainfall deviation can be considered as-if random and hence provides an opportunity for a natural 
experiment (Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti 2004; Afzal 2007; Ritter and Conrad 2016; Vanden 
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Eynde forthcoming). Importantly, because the instrument is election-day rainfall deviation, its 
variation cannot be explained by regional or seasonal conditions (Hansford and Gomez 2010).8 
There is also a theoretical reason for using the instrumental variable approach. Consistent 
with the drowning-out effect, which is concerned of the turnout of less motivated citizens (those 
of 𝜃𝑖 ∈ [−𝜏𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡, 𝜏𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡]), the IV estimators are known to be local to the units whose turnout 
rates are sensitive to election-day rainfall deviation (“compliers”). As long as those weather-
sensitive citizens are less interested in politics, the IV approach provides a theoretically relevant 
quantity than global estimators.  
The instrumental variable analysis, however, does not yield the estimates of the causal 
effect without additional assumptions. One possibility is that rainfall deviation would affect the 
onset of protest except for its effect via turnout, and thus that we could not easily isolate the effect 
of turnout from the circumventing effects. In fact, rainfall deviations are shown to affect a variety 
of phenomena, including economic production (Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti 2004; Afzal 2007; 
Vanden Eynde forthcoming) and conflict itself (Ritter and Conrad 2016). Given these findings, it 
might be hard to assume that rainfall deviation would have no circumventing effects (the 
assumption called exclusion restriction).  
                                                 
8 Because the rainfall deviation is a function of normal rainfall, one might think that the instrument 
is confounded by normal rainfall. Although this might be true for a particular observation, the 
expected value of rainfall deviation is independent of normal rainfall, as E[𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡] = 0 
for any 𝑖. Indeed, in the following analysis, the average rainfall deviation is near zero (0.006 mm/h), 
and the correlation between the rainfall deviation and normal rainfall is 0.009 (𝑝 = 0.32). 
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At this point, Hansford and Gomez’s approach is distinguished from other applications of 
rainfall instruments and perhaps offers something new to conflict studies.9 Instead of using annual 
or monthly rainfall deviation, they propose election-day rainfall deviation as an instrumental 
variable. While rainfall deviation in general has broad effects, the effects of rainfall deviation on 
a very particular day should be fairly limited and thus less likely to violate the exclusion restriction. 
For instance, while excessive annual rainfall can substantially affect agricultural production, which 
can, in turn, affect protest risks, rainy weather on an election day cannot have such a large impact. 
Although election-day weather might directly affect protest on the polling day (Ritter and Conrad 
2016), election-day protests are usually prohibited in democracies, and indeed they are extremely 
rare in the case of India.10  
The other possibility is that election-day rainfall has no tangible effect on turnout. If this 
were the case, the instrumental variable would be irrelevant and could tell us nothing about the 
effect of turnout. Furthermore, even when an instrument has a statistically significant effect but 
the predictive power is weak, the weak instrument still produces large bias and makes the 
conventional estimator (two-stage least square: TSLS) extremely sensitive to small errors.11 A 
                                                 
9 A potential exception would be Ritter and Conrad (2016), who use daily, but not election-day, 
rainfall as an instrument for violence and estimate the effect of violence on repression in African 
provinces. Moreover, their rainfall variables are absolute amounts of daily rainfall and its 
percentage share in annual rainfall.  
10 I also conduct placebo tests. See the later section about robustness checks.  
11 The other required assumptions include the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) 
and the monotonicity (Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin 1996). The monotonicity assumption can 
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powerful instrument, by contrast, is robust to minor violations of non-random assignments 
(Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin 1996; Stock, Wright, and Yogo 2002).    
The weak instrument however can be a real problem for the election-day rainfall instrument. 
From one perspective, election-day rainfall appears to increase the physical costs of voting and 
hence depress turnout rates (Hansford and Gomez 2010). The shift in voting costs however may 
be negligible (Persson, Sundell, and Öhrvall 2014). On the other hand, election-day rainfall can 
also decrease the opportunity costs of voting; people may have fewer things to do on a rainy day, 
or they may leave work early. People can spend the extra hours voting (Lind 2014, 2015; Kang 
2015). In fact, recent findings differ across countries (Artés 2014; Arnold and Freier 2016; Meier, 
Schmid, and Stutzer 2016). Although this paper is not intended to settle this dispute in electoral 
studies, these studies do provide theoretical reasons to suspect that the rainfall instrument is 
actually weak. 
Methodological Challenge: Strength – Clarity Tradeoff 
Given the potential for weak-instrument problems, one might resort to using flexible 
regression functions at the first stage so as to strengthen the predictive power of the instrument 
(Newey and Powell 2003; Chesher and Rosen 2017). This approach, however, usually makes the 
estimate sensitive to the specification of functional forms and requires additional, often highly 
                                                 
potentially be violated in this study, but the assumption can be relaxed (de Chaisemartin Clément 
2017). Regarding the SUTVA and spatial correlation, see the later subsection Instrumental 
Variable. 
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demanding, assumptions (Marshall 2016). Moreover, the regression approaches can blur the 
subjects of comparison; we are not sure which units we are really comparing to which units.12   
A common solution to the functional-form dependency is matching (Ho et al. 2007). 
Combining matching and an instrumental variable analysis is, however, not as straightforward as 
one might expect. In fact, matching can actually worsen the very problem of weak-instrument bias. 
Conventional matching methods restrict the comparison to similar units, but these units tend to 
have similar values in an instrumental variable as well. Furthermore, while many applications of 
instrumental variables involve continuous instruments, most matching algorithms can only be 
applied to binary treatment.  
Method: Near-far Matching for Instrumental Variable Analysis 
A recent refinement of an instrumental variable design, proposed by Baiocchi et al. (2010, 
2012) in statistics and more recently Keele and Morgan (2016) in political science, provides a 
design-based solution to the weak instrument problems. Their insight is that we can explicitly 
incorporate the strength of an instrumental variable into the framework of matching and hence to 
optimize both the instrument strength and covariate balance. Because the method is based on 
matching (Ho et al. 2007), it not only enhances the predictive power of an instrument but also 
makes the causal comparison more explicit and less reliant on functional form assumptions 
(Baiocchi et al. 2010, 2012; Keele and Morgan 2016). Furthermore, since the matching method is 
                                                 
12 I also use TSLS with flexible first-stage regressions in a robustness check. See the later section 
about robustness checks. The main analysis does not use this approach. 
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built upon a non-bipartite matching algorithm (Lu et al. 2011), it can fully accommodate a 
continuous instrumental variable and thus can be used in a greater variety of applications.  
An intuition behind the method is that instead of comparing all units at once, it is better to 
compare units that are similar in covariate values but different in the values of an instrumental 
variable.13 Because they are different in the values of the instrument, their turnout rates are also 
expected to be different as well, indicating a more powerful comparison. The near-far matching 
creates those pairs by “penalizing” units that have similar values in the instrument. In particular, 
the matching is done with a penalized distance metric; 
𝑤𝑖𝑗
∗ = {
𝑤𝑖𝑗 + 𝑐𝑒
−|𝑑𝑖𝑗| if |𝑑𝑖𝑗| ≤ 𝜏
𝑤𝑖𝑗 otherwise
, 
where 𝑖, 𝑗 denotes two units in a sample, 𝑤𝑖𝑗  is the rank-based Mahalanobis distance, which is 
robust to outliers (Rosenbaum 2009; Keele and Morgan 2016), and 𝑑𝑖𝑗 is the difference in the 
values of an instrumental variable. The size of penalty 𝑐  is usually set to a large integer 
(Rosenbaum 2009; 𝑐 = 1000 in this study), and the fraction of the penalized units 𝜏 is selected by 
a grid-search (in this study, 𝜏 = 0.3).14 Using the penalized distance metric 𝑤𝑖𝑗
∗ , a non-bipartite 
                                                 
13 Keele and Morgan (2016) applies the method to replicate Hansford and Gomez (2010). To my 
best knowledge, I am not aware of other studies in political science that apply the near-far matching. 
14 For the detail of the grid-search, see SI 2-6. Note that as far as the penalty function is sufficiently 
flexible, nearfar matching is robust to the specifications of the function (Rosenbaum 2009).  
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matching algorithm (Lu et al. 2011) creates pairs that minimize the distances.15 Once the matching 
is done, we assign a “treatment” status 𝑇𝑖 = 1 if its rainfall deviation is larger than its counterpart 
in a pair, and otherwise give a “control” status 𝑇𝑖 = 0.
16  
Because the matching creates a dichotomous instrumental variable (𝑇𝑖 ), we can use a 
variety of estimators that are more powerful and robust, and require fewer assumptions than the 
TSLS and its cousins.17 Following the literature (Andrews and Marmer 2008; Baiocchi et al. 2010; 
Keele and Morgan 2016), I use a Hodge-Lehmann (HL) non-parametric estimator, which is more 
powerful than the Anderson-Rubin semi-parametric estimator (1949) commonly used in 
economics (Andrews and Marmer 2008). Intuitively, the HL estimator is derived from a series of 
hypothesis tests regarding a causal quantity 𝜆: 
(𝑌𝑖:𝑇𝑖=1 − 𝑌𝑖:𝑇𝑖=0) = 𝜆(𝐷𝑖:𝑇𝑖=1 −𝐷𝑖:𝑇𝑖=0), 
where 𝑌𝑖:𝑇𝑖=1 and 𝑌𝑖:𝑇𝑖=0 are the outcome variables (the onset of protest) when unit 𝑖 is treated and 
not treated respectively, and 𝐷𝑖:𝑇𝑖=1  and 𝐷𝑖:𝑇𝑖=0  are the corresponding explanatory variables 
(turnout rates). The parameter 𝜆 denotes the causal effect. Under the set of the assumptions which 
I described above, the causal quantity is estimated by ?̂?; 
                                                 
15 The algorithm drops several outlier observations that can potentially worsen the quality of 
covariate balance. The fraction of the dropped observations (𝜌) is another tuning parameter that 
requires a grid-search (in this study, 𝜌 = 0.1). See SI 2-6. 
16  Although dichotomizing an instrumented variable (turnout) can introduce biases (Marshall 
2016), such biases do not arise when we coarsen an instrumenting variable (rainfall deviation). 
17 In the later robustness check, I also report the TSLS estimates. 
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(𝑌𝑖:𝑇𝑖=1 − 𝑌𝑗:𝑇𝑗=0) = ?̂? (𝐷𝑖:𝑇𝑖=1 − 𝐷𝑗:𝑇𝑗=0), 
where 𝑖, 𝑗 are treated and control units that are paired by the matching. The point estimate ?̂? and 
its confidence interval are obtained by conducting a series of the non-parametric tests for ?̂? = 𝜆0 
(Wilcoxon signed-rank sum tests) and retaining the value of 𝜆0 that is not rejected with the highest 
p-value or those not rejected at a 5% significance level. The non-parametric estimator is 
particularly advantageous for this study as the outcome is binary and hence linear models are 
“worrisome” if not misleading (Baiocchi et al. 2010, 1293). Note also that the HL estimate is 
concerned with pairwise differences, which are analogous to having 
𝑛
2
 pair-specific fixed effects 
in a linear regression model. 
CASE AND MEASUREMENT 
I apply the near-far matching IV method to the case of Indian State Assembly elections. 
India is one of the quintessential examples in which long-standing democracy and violent and non-
violent protests coexist. Given the availability of data about the protest, rainfall, and covariates, 
the sample includes all assembly elections between 2000 and 2015.18 Although I could conduct a 
similar analysis for the National Parliamentary elections, the area size of the parliamentary 
constituency is relatively large, and thus the sample size is fairly limited (around 500 units). The 
following analysis therefore consists of over 4,300 constituencies19 in the 94 State Assembly 
elections between February 2000 and November 2015. A majority of the states have two or three 
                                                 
18 The geocoded census data are available only after 2000, and the latest data for the other variables 
are available until 2015.  
19 4,375 and 4,369 constituencies before and after the 2008 delimitation respectively. 
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elections in an interval of five years.20 The overall sample includes 12,597 election-constituency 
observations (before matching).21  
In the period of 2000 – 2015, the Indian economy experienced rapid growth, and the 
political situation in the central government had been relatively stable. The elections in this period 
are generally free and fair backed by the long history of democracy. In fact, the Election Committee 
of India is believed to be one of the most competent public institutions in India (Banerjee 2007). 
The State Assembly elections are held under the first-past-the-post rule. The Election Committee 
of India decides polling dates one to three months ahead of an election. Depending on the size of 
a state, they create one to seven groups of constituencies and assign a different polling date to each 
group. All polls are usually done within a month. Due to heavy rain in the monsoon season (June 
– September), a majority of the elections are held in dryer months. Note that although these 
selection processes may indicate a non-random assignment of rainfall amounts, this study uses 
election-day rainfall deviation as the instrument, which is beyond the control of the election 
                                                 
20 Because the interval between elections is long and the dataset is a wide but short panel, I consider 
the dataset is as-if cross-sectional. Clustering the standard errors for each constituency does not 
change the results. See SI 2-8.  
21 Because the sample size is large and thus it is computationally too expensive to apply the near-
far matching algorithm to the entire sample, following Rosenbaum (2009), I subset the sample to 
groups of elections that were held at the same period, apply the matching within each group, and 
pool the matched observations. I apply the matching to each election group instead of each election, 
as some states, including Tripura, Mizoram, Meghalaya, Sikkim, and Union Territories, are too 
small for the matching. Table A2-5-1 in SI 2-5 is the list of the election groups. 
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committee.22 In fact, the IV design is particularly useful for the case of India, in which clientelism, 
parochialism, and vote buying are persistent and hence turnout is hardly exogenous. 
Outcome Variable 
The outcome variable is the onset of protests after an election, which is derived from the 
Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS; Boschee et al. 2015). The ICEWS dataset is a 
machine-coded event data based on over 38 million multilingual (including Hindi) news stories all 
over the world. The ICEWS dataset is even accredited as “the current gold standard for event data” 
(Metternich et al. 2013, 901).23 Moreover, the ICEWS dataset has finer classification of protest 
types, including demonstration, hunger strikes, strikes, obstruction, and riots, which allows me to 
test underlying causal mechanisms (see the later section about causal mechanisms). My outcome 
variable takes a value of 1 if there is at least one event of a protest within one-year after a polling 
day (excluding the polling day) but not one-year before the polling.24 Since ongoing protest and 
its cessation are conceptually different from the onset of new protests,25 following the standard 
                                                 
22 The postal votes are limited to service and other special voters (less than 1%) and repolling is 
also extremely rare. 
23 For details of the ICEWS dataset, refer to O’Brien (2010).  
24 I also use different time windows. See the later section about robustness checks. 
25 Although my model assumes the existence of conflict of interests before an election, it considers 
the situation in which the conflict is not yet materialized to protest before the election. 
68 
 
definition of “onset” (Sambanis 2004), I exclude the observations of pre-election protest. In total, 
the sample contains 529 onsets of protests (4.20% of the sample; before matching).26 
It is worthwhile to note that alternative datasets of protests are limited in the case of India. 
Currently, Varshney-Wilkinson dataset about Hindu-Muslim riots (Varshney 2003; Wilkinson 
2006) are available only up to 2000 at the level of districts. For this period, Indian democracy is 
not always stable, and the rainfall data are unavailable. Furthermore, given the potentially large 
costs of participation in riots, including the risks of arrest and detention, riots are unlikely to be 
suitable for testing my hypothesis (as the scope of the hypothesis is limited to protest with 
relatively small costs; see the later section about causal mechanisms). Similarly, the Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program Georeferenced Event Dataset (Sundberg and Melander 2013) has data 
about violent events but not non-violent protests. The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data 
(Raleigh et al. 2010) has records about protests and riots in India but only after 2016, for which 
period the rainfall and covariates are not available. They also do not distinguish violent and non-
violent protests. Finally, the Social Conflict Analysis Database (Salehyan et al. 2012) or 
Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013) dataset has no 
data for India.  
Another issue is a potential for reporting biases (Weidmann 2016). Because the outcome 
variable (ICEWS) rests on media reports and hence is susceptible to reporting biases, the 
instrumental (not explanatory) variable must be free from such errors. Otherwise, if both outcome 
and instrumental variables would be contaminated by reporting biases, the causal estimate could 
                                                 
26 The data summary and their map are in SI 2-4. 
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also be biased.27 The satellite-based data of rainfall, which are obtained regardless of media 
coverage, provides a way to guard against such a possibility. In a later robustness check, I also 
conduct a placebo test to assure that the main findings are not explained by reporting biases. 
Explanatory Variable 
The explanatory variable is the turnout rate, measured as the total number of votes divided 
by the total number of eligible citizens. The data are scraped from the Statistical Report on General 
Election published by the Election Committee of India. The average turnout rate is high (0.69) in 
India. The dataset also contains other fine-grained information, including polling dates, valid votes, 
gender ratios in each vote count, and the number of polling stations. 
Instrumental Variable 
The instrumental variable is the polling-day rainfall deviation, which comes from the 
Climate Prediction Center Morphing technique (CMORPH) satellite images. The images are 
available every thirty minutes from 1 January 2000 to 2015 at a spatial resolution of eight-by-eight 
kilometers. The CMORPH products are created from sensors of multiple satellites (Xie et al. 2011; 
Joyce et al. 2004).28 The normal rainfall is estimated by the average rainfall amounts five days 
around the date of a polling day but in different years.29 The polling-day rainfall deviation is the 
difference between the observed and normal rainfall amounts. The average rainfall deviation is, as 
                                                 
27 See SI 2-11 for detailed discussion. 
28 For details of the rainfall measurement and possible alternative data sources, see SI 2-2.  
29 See SI 2-2 for details. 
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expected, near zero (0.006 mm/h). To be sure, there is no observation of extreme rain that would 
cause floods or other natural disasters. 
A possible issue for the rainfall deviation measure is spatial correlation (Hansford and 
Gomez 2010). This study guards against such a possibility both by design and method. Because 
the polling dates are different even within a single State Assembly election in India, rainfall 
deviations should be less correlated even within a state. Furthermore, the near-far matching and 
the HL estimator exploit the variation within matched pairs. Since the matched pairs are expected 
to have different values in the rainfall deviation, they are unlikely to be neighboring constituencies. 
Thus, the near-far matching not only strengthens the instrument but also provides a non-parametric 
way to address spatial dependency. 
Covariates 
The covariates are selected by using Keele and Morgan (2016) as a baseline and 
considering unique characteristics of India. They include logged population, the proportion of 
Muslims, scheduled tribes and castes,30 urban population, and farmers31 recorded in the 2001 
Census of India.32 Although these covariates are not always necessary for making a valid inference, 
                                                 
30 The scheduled castes and tributes are groups that are historically disadvantaged and hence 
protected by the Constitution of India. 
31 I include the indicator of farmers to account for rural non-farmers (e.g. livestock raiser). 
32 For detail of the covariates, see SI 2-3.  
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they provide additional power to the analysis and guard against possible violations of the IV 
assumptions.33 
RESULTS 
The following table (Table 3-1) shows the estimates of the effect of turnout rates on the 
onset of protest and its 95% confidence intervals. Consistent with the drowning-out hypothesis, 
the result shows that turnout indeed increases the risk of protest in the subsequent period. The point 
estimate 1.54 indicates that if a turnout rate increases by 1%, it increases the probability of 
subsequent protest by 1.54%. Given the rarity of protest (only 4.20% of the sample), the effect size 
is not small; compared to the sample average, a unit has 1.37 times higher probability of protests 
if its turnout rate is 1% higher.  
 
As reported in SI 2-7 (Table A2-7-1), the near-far matching improves both the covariate 
balance and the instrument’s strength, giving further credence to the above finding. While the 
covariates are somewhat imbalanced without the near-far matching, probably due to finite-sample 
errors, the near-far matching properly adjusts the remaining imbalances. Furthermore, even though 
the power of the instrument measured by the first-stage F statistic is 2.5 before matching, the near-
far matching raises it to 28.4, which is far above the conventional criterion of 10 (Stock, Wright, 
                                                 
33 The summary of the data is provided in Figure A2-4-1 in SI 2-4. 
Table 3-1. The Effect of Turnout on the Onset of Protest 
Point Estimate 95% Confidence Interval 
1.54 [0.45, 3.15] 
NOTE: The Hodge-Lehmann estimate. In the near-far matching, 10% 
of observations are discarded for the purpose of better balance. 𝑛 =
10,330. 
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and Yogo 2002). The covariate balance and stronger instrument mean that the above finding is 
robust to subtle violations of the random-assignment assumption. 
On average, an upward deviation in election-day rainfall has an effect to increase turnout 
rates. 34  The treated observations have a 0.8% higher average turnout rate than the control 
observations (with a corresponding confidence interval [0.3%, 1.3%] ). While this finding is 
contradictory to the explanations based on physical costs (Hansford and Gomez 2010), it is 
consistent with those based on opportunity costs (Kang 2015; Lind 2015, 2014). That says, this 
paper is not intended to evaluate these explanations in electoral studies. Since the existing findings 
are different across countries, future studies may need to look at multiple countries and explore 
institutional and cultural conditions.  
CAUSAL MECHANISMS AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
Although rigorously testing every step of the bargaining model is difficult and, generally 
speaking, testing a theoretical model is impossible (Clarke and Primo 2007), it is still important to 
examine possible causal mechanisms. To this end, I theoretically consider possible alternative 
explanations and test their observable implications. In supporting information, I also conduct a 
focused case study of the Singur protest in West Bengal to illustrate, if not test, the causal 
mechanism.35  
                                                 
34 On average, the treated observations have 0.077 mm/h more precipitation than their normal 
amounts, while the control units have 0.055 mm/h less precipitation than usual.  
35 See SI 2-14. 
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Causal Mechanisms I: Coordination or Enthusiasm? 
While my theory is primarily concerned with inter-group strategic dynamics, there may be 
alternative mechanisms that are based on within-group and individual-level dynamics. First, it 
might be possible that active electoral participation would reduce the opposition’s costs for 
coordinating protest. If more people turn out in elections, it might allow the opposition groups to 
communicate with those voters without costs for travelling. Moreover, the opposition groups may 
also learn their dire electoral prospect from high-turnout elections, making the mobilization for 
extra-electoral means relatively cheap. Formally, high turnout might reduce the coordination costs 
(𝑔 in my model), which in turn makes the protest equilibrium more likely. From this viewpoint, 
high turnout is expected to have particularly strong effects on protests that require greater efforts 
of coordination in normal circumstances, such as strikes and obstruction. Only when the 
opposition groups have difficulties to coordinate protests, electoral participation could possibly 
alleviate the problems and hence alter the likelihood of protests. Strikes require collective actions 
for preventing strikebreakers, and obstruction also requires detailed planning for effective 
deployment of members and barricades. Only when opposition groups is capable of coordinating 
individual actions, these types of protest can serve to their purposes.  
Second, at an individual level, active electoral participation might wake up the public to 
politics and even create political enthusiasm, which in turn might result in an intense atmosphere 
and uncontrollable momentum of escalation (Letsa 2016). More formally, the enthusiasm can be 
conceptualized as an emotional force that makes individual people dismissive about the physical 
costs of joining protests. From this perspective, high turnout might reduce people’s subjective 
costs for joining protests (𝑑 in my model), which in turn might increase the probability of protest. 
If this could explain the result, we should therefore see similar or even stronger effects on protests 
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that are physically costlier for participants, such as riots and hunger strikes. Only when joining a 
protest is physically costly, the enthusiasm can alter people’s decisions; otherwise, people would 
always or never join the protest. In India, rioters can be arrested for the offence against public 
tranquility or for injury (Chapter VIII in Indian Penal Code). Fasting for several days or even 
months is also not something physically tolerable for ordinary citizens. 
By contrast, the scope of my hypothesis is limited to the cases in which the costs for 
coordination and participation are relatively small. As I mentioned in the theory section, only when 
the opposition group can relatively easily coordinate protest, buying off the opposition becomes 
too expensive for the government such that she is rather willing to take a risk of protests 
(equilibrium condition).36 Moreover, my model also assumes that the individual costs for joining 
protests are fixed and affordable for at least one citizen; otherwise, protests do not occur simply 
because none will join the protests. Thus, I expect that the drowning-out effect is particularly 
relevant to protests that do not require large costs for coordination or participation, such as 
demonstration. In democracy, the freedom of assembly warrants the political right for participating 
in non-violent protest without fear of arrest or repression. Moreover, demonstration requires 
relatively small costs for coordination; in many circumstances, people attend demonstration for 
their own purposes (such as expressing their opinions) even without much organizational 
coordination. 37  Thus, although organizational support might be helpful for sustaining 
                                                 
36 See the theory section for details. 
37 For instance, in the Singur conflict, the first protest (1 June 2006) occurred before the Krishji 
Jami Raksha Committee, an organization of the opposition groups, was formed (3 June 2006). 
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demonstration, it is not a necessary condition for its onset. The following figure (Figure 3-2) 
summarizes the causal mechanisms and their predictions.  
 
As seen in Table 3-2, the empirical results are supportive for the drowning-out hypothesis 
but not for the coordination or enthusiasm mechanism. Not only are the effects of turnout on strikes, 
hunger strikes, obstruction, and riots weaker than that of demonstration, their effect sizes are very 
small; the point estimates are less than one-tenth of the main estimate, and even their upper bounds 
Figure 3-2. Causal Mechanisms and Protest Types 
larger costs
for coordination
Drowning-out Enthusiasm
Coordinationstrikes
hunger strikes
demonstration
riots
obstruction
smaller costs
for coordination
larger costs
for participation
smaller costs
for participation
 
NOTE: The figure shows the causal mechanisms and corresponding types 
of protest. The vertical and horizontal axes indicate the opposition group’s 
costs for coordinating a protest (𝑔 in my model) and the individual costs 
for participating in a protest ( 𝑑  in my model) respectively. The 
intersection of the axes is not an origin. The bold letters are the labels of 
causal mechanisms. The italic letters are the polar values in the vertical 
and horizontal axes. The non-bold letters are the types of protests. The 
position of each protest type in the figure should be considered as its 
mean value. I put strikes in the category of small participation costs as the 
labor right of collective action is guaranteed in democracy. I put 
obstruction in the category of large participation costs as participants can 
potentially be arrested. These classification however does not alter the 
argument of this paper.  
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are less than a half of the main estimate. In my theory, these results are not surprising as 
participants of strikes, hunger strikes, obstruction, and riots (such as unions, politicians, tribes, and 
ethnic minorities) are usually well predictable even before elections, and hence there is less 
uncertainty that turnout could possibly change. By contrast, the effect on demonstration is very 
similar to that on protest in general (1.54). Thus, even though the within-group and individual-
level explanations can be useful in other contexts such as civil war (Letsa 2016), they do not 
explain the main finding of this paper. 
 
Causal Mechanisms II: Party Victories 
Yet another explanation can be electoral victories. That is, since different parties have 
different policies, if turnout would alter the winning probabilities of parties, it might also influence 
the risks of post-election protests. As seen in Table 3-3, however, I do not find any evidence that 
high turnout affects the winning probabilities of the two major parties’ or other minor parties’ 
victories in India. Although this does not indicate that turnout has “no” effect on winning 
probabilities, the party victories do not explain the main results of this paper. 
 
Table 3-2. The Effects of Turnout on the Onsets of the Different Types of Protest 
 demonstration strike obstruction riot hunger strike 
Point estimate 1.52 0.10 0.07 0.00 -0.13 
95% CI [0.53, 2.97] [-0.45, 0.70] [-0.37, 0.56] [-0.55, 0.56] [-0.51, 0.21] 
NOTE: The second row presents the Hodge-Lehmann estimates of the effects of turnout rates on the 
outcomes denoted at the first row. The third row shows the corresponding 95% confidence intervals. 
𝑛 = 10,330. 
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Causal Mechanisms III: Loser’s Electorate Share 
Finally, although this paper is substantively interested in the effects of electoral 
participation, my formal model also predicts that 𝑣𝐿|𝑇  (loser’s vote share) and 𝑣𝑇𝑣𝐿|𝑇  (loser’s 
electorate share) affect the risk of protests as well. Not only high turnout per se but also a larger 
number of votes for a loser make it difficult for the winner to sort out uncommitted citizens from 
committed dissidents who can potentially protest. Although the effect of 𝑣𝐿|𝑇 alone is not easily 
identifiable as neither rainfall deviation nor other instrumental variables of which I am aware can 
explain this term, rainfall deviation can affect 𝑣𝑇𝑣𝐿|𝑇  (rainfall deviation affects 𝑣𝑇  and hence 
𝑣𝑇𝑣𝐿|𝑇 as well).
38 Thus, as an additional analysis, I replace the explanatory variable by 𝑣𝑇𝑣𝐿|𝑇 and 
re-estimate the instrumental variable model. The following table (Table 3-4) indeed shows that the 
higher the loser’s electorate share is, the more likely the post-election protests are. On average, if 
𝑣𝑇𝑣𝐿|𝑇 increases by 1%, it increases the probability of a subsequent protest by 2.68%, which is 
even larger than the effect of turnout on protests. 
 
                                                 
38 To be clear, 𝑣𝑇𝑣𝐿|𝑇 is not an interaction term.  
Table 3-3. The Effects of Turnout on Party Victories 
 INC victory BJP victory Other’s victory 
Point estimate -1.13 0.98 0.15 
95% CI [-3.57, 0.88] [-0.73, 3.13] [-2.00, 2.30] 
NOTE: The second row presents the Hodge-Lehmann estimates of the effects of turnout rates on 
the outcomes denoted at the first row. The third row shows the corresponding 95% confidence 
intervals. INC: Indian National Congress. BJP: Bharatiya Janata Party. 𝑛 = 10,330. 
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Robustness Checks I: Exclusion Restriction 
I also conduct a series of robustness checks. First, if an upward deviation of polling-day 
rainfall were to increase the risks of protest on the same day, and if the protest risks are positively 
autocorrelated over time, it would violate the exclusion restriction and thus invalidate the causal 
inference.39 However, polling-day protest is prohibited in India and hence extremely rare (only 5 
cases: <0.001% of the sample). In fact, a falsification test provides no discernible relationship 
between the treatment and the onset of polling-day protest.40  
Similarly, if rainfall deviations positively correlate over time, and if rainfall would increase 
the risks of protest after elections, it would also create a spurious relationship. To explore this 
possibility, I analyze the effects of turnout on protests in different post-election periods. Since a 
rainfall deviation in a single day is unlikely to predict a rainfall deviation several months later, I 
would be more confident if turnout has impacts on protests several months after polling. I find the 
similar effects for the periods from the three to nine months after elections, and the effects are 
statistically indistinguishable from zero in the other periods. Theoretically, this result makes sense 
                                                 
39 If upward rainfall deviations would decrease protest risks, the estimate would be biased towards 
negative, and hence the true causal effect would be even stronger. 
40 See Table A2-9-1 in SI 2-9. 
Table 3-4. The Effect of Loser’s Electorate Share on the Onset of Protest 
Point Estimate 95% Confidence Interval 
2.68 [0.76, 6.64] 
NOTE: The Hodge-Lehmann estimate. In the near-far matching, 10% 
of observations are discarded for the purpose of better balance. 𝑛 =
10,330. The first-stage F statistic is 14.59.  
79 
 
because it will take several months until a government devises new policies, and also because the 
information revealed by the elections will also become obsolete as the time passes.41 
Robustness Checks II: Reporting Bias 
If both the protest and rainfall measures would be contaminated by reporting biases, it 
could bias the causal estimate. Although I do not find compelling reasons for reporting biases in 
the satellite-based rainfall data, I also conduct a falsification test by regressing the incidence of 
protests one-year before polling on election-day rainfall deviation. If there is no systematic 
reporting biases in the rainfall data, there should be no relationship between rainfall and past 
protests. By contrast, if anomalous rainfall would be associated with reporting biases, we should 
see a correlation between election-day rainfall and pre-election protests. The placebo test however 
shows no association between the instrument and pre-election protests.42 
Robustness Checks III: Miscellaneous 
First, I use a count of post-election protests as an outcome variable to account for the effect 
of turnout on the intensity of protests, finding that a high turnout rate also increases the number of 
post-election protests.43 Second, because the sample includes several states that are distinct in 
many respects, such as Jammu and Kashmir, Bihar, and Arunachal Pradesh, I conduct an analysis 
                                                 
41 See Figure A2-10-1 in SI 2-10. In SI 2-14, I also qualitatively examine whether three to nine 
months are reasonable estimates.  
42 See Table A2-11-1 in SI 2-11 
43 Unfortunately, the ICEWS does not have information about the number of protestors. 
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while dropping each of the states in India. The results are robust to the omission of each state.44 
Third, I also find similar results when I drop several constituencies that have large values in the 
average rainfall deviation. 45  Fourth, I also estimate the causal effects, using the TSLS and 
Anderson-Rubin estimators with and without the nearfar matching. Although the results of the 
regression-based methods are sensitive to functional-form specifications, I find consistent 
results.46 Fifth, I also conduct the near-far matching with the second best tuning parameters, which 
entails the omission of 40% of the observations. Despite the large number of discards, the main 
results hold.47 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I argue that high turnout in free and fair elections has an adverse effect on 
efficient conflict resolution. A simple extension of bargaining theory indicates that high turnout 
can drown out the voices of potential protestors, make it difficult for the government to precisely 
estimate the size of the dissenters, and thus create a positive probability of protest. Because turnout 
is considered to be endogenous to protest, I use election-day rainfall deviation as a source of 
exogenous variation and apply the near-far matching IV method to make a more explicit and robust 
causal comparison. The analysis shows that higher turnout indeed increases the risks of protest 
after the elections. 
                                                 
44 See Figure A2-12-1 in SI 2-12. 
45 See Figure A2-13-1 in SI 2-13. Also refer to SI 2-4. 
46 See Table A2-8-1 to A2-8-4 in SI 2-8. 
47 See the end of SI 2-6. 
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Does this finding imply that democracy is imperfect as a conflict resolution mechanism? 
The answer is unfortunately yes if democracy refers only to electoral democracy, which is 
characterized by free and fair elections. As long as universal suffrage warrants every eligible 
citizen, whether they are interested in politics or not, to cast ballots, the vote counts may not reflect 
the preferences of potential dissenters. The gap between the preferences of the electorates as a 
whole and those of motivated minorities can lead to socially inefficient outcomes, such as protest.  
This however does not necessarily mean that democracy in general is undesirable as a 
conflict resolution mechanism. In fact, although this paper does not explicitly incorporate, it is 
possible that protest allows people to non-violently express their opinions and demonstrate their 
leverage, and hence that protest has an effect to mitigate violent outcomes. This implies that even 
though high-turnout elections imperfectly reflect the preferences of motivated minorities and lead 
to periodic social disturbances, such disturbances may help to compensate for the elections’ 
deficiencies and lead to policies that better address the needs of what would otherwise be under-
represented populations. Thus, even though elections are imperfect as a conflict resolution 
mechanism, the freedom of assembly can compensate the electoral imperfection. It is a task of 
future studies to extend the current framework to armed conflicts and hence to provide further 
insights about democracy and conflict. It is also a promising avenue for future research to extend 
the current analysis to different electoral systems, such as proportional representation.  
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Chapter 4. It Never Rains But It Storms: Armed Conflict and Maritime Piracy as 
Strategic Substitutes 
On November of 2016 when the monsoon storms finally left the Gulf of Guinea, the 
Nigerian Delta insurgents—who had engaged in battles, looting, and violence against civilians 
during the summer—returned to the ocean. While the number of reported pirate attacks per month 
decreased by two thirds from the spring to the summer,1 the attacks doubled at the end of the year 
(Coggins 2012). The resurgence of piracy, however, contrasted with the lull of violence in the 
Nigerian Delta; although 13 armed conflict events (2.36 per month) were reported in the summer 
of 2016, the violence ceased in the following months. Seeing the seasonal patterns, a witness 
mentioned an “inverse correlation” between the violence and piracy; “at the tactical level, the 
‘attackers’, when not employed in militancy, oil theft, illegal bunkering or gang warfare, engage 
in piracy to cover some of their funding needs” (Center for International Maritime Security 2017). 
The case of the Nigerian Delta insurgents suggests that weather conditions can affect 
conflicts in different spaces. The ocean climate may affect not only maritime piracy, but also the 
use of political violence on the ground. The potential for the cross-spatial effects casts doubt on 
conventional approaches that analyze the effects of weather conditions on armed conflict and 
piracy separately. If ocean weather would affect parties’ choices over armed conflict and maritime 
piracy, and if the ocean and ground weather conditions correlate with each other, we need to 
                                                 
1 The reported attacks per month are 3.11 for the period of 2016-01-01 to 2016-05-14 (14 attacks 
in total), 1.09 for the period of 2016-05-15 to 2016-10-31 (6 attacks in total), and 2.00 for the 
period of 2016-11-01 to 2016-12-31 (4 attacks in total). The spring, summer, and winter periods 
are based on Center for International Maritime Security (2017).  
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analyze their effects on armed conflict and piracy with a single framework. Otherwise, as I argue 
in this paper, the separate analyses can suffer the problems of omitted variable biases. 
The problem of correlating weather is not limited to conflict studies, but it can potentially 
be relevant to any study that exploits weather as a source of exogeneity, such as those in electoral 
studies (Hansford and Gomez 2010) and economics (Dell, Jones, and Olken 2012). Rather 
counterintuitively, when correlating weather conditions can affect outcomes of interest, a 
seemingly valid regression of an outcome on a weather condition can yield a bias without 
accounting for the inter-weather correlations. This means that we need to theoretically and 
empirically consider whether correlating weather conditions affect our outcomes. In this paper, I 
examine the problem in case of the effects of rainfall shocks and ocean wind speed on armed 
conflict and maritime piracy, which have drawn increasing attention from scholars (Hsiang, Meng, 
and Cane 2011; Axbard 2016).  
In fact, theories of strategic substitution (Most and Starr 1984; Morgan and Palmer 2000; 
Palmer, Wohlander, and Morgan 2002; Clark and Reed 2005; Clark, Nordstrom, and Reed 2008) 
imply that the inter-weather correlation does matter. When violent actions and maritime piracy 
constitute strategic substitutes, rebels compare their relative costs and benefits to decide their 
actions. Thus, it is quite possible that windy ocean inhibits rebels from engaging in piracy, makes 
violent activities on ground relatively more attractive, and thus changes the likelihoods of both 
violence and piracy. Similarly, rainy weather can increase the costs for violent activities, make 
maritime piracy relatively cheaper, and hence affect both violence and piracy. Even though the 
mere existence of the substitutions may not prevent us from conducting separate analyses about 
wind-piracy and rain-violence links, as I demonstrate in this paper, the substitution coupled with 
the inter-weather correlations can induce biases in causal inference.  
90 
 
Theories of substitution, however, are not free from limitations. Previous studies rather 
narrowly focus on the presence or absence of substitution, without distinguishing different types 
of substitution. Building on a formal model, I argue that understanding types of substitution is 
critical and that there exist at least three different types of substitution. When piracy is an upward 
substitute for violence, piracy is more profitable than violence. In this case, it is shown that rebels 
engage in piracy whenever piracy is low cost (calm ocean), while they resort to violence only when 
piracy is infeasible (rough ocean) and violence is relatively cheap (sunny weather). By contrast, 
the situation is reversed when piracy is expected to yield less profit than violence and hence piracy 
is a downward substitute for violence. That is, while the incidence of violence depends only on its 
own costs (ground weather), the incidence of piracy is conditional on its own costs (ocean weather) 
and the costs for its alternative strategy (ground weather). Finally, when the returns from the two 
options are similar, piracy becomes an equivalent substitute for violence. In this case, the 
incidences of piracy and violence depend on the relative costs of these strategies and hence are 
affected by both ground and ocean weather conditions. Thus, depending on which type of 
substitution exists, we expect different empirical patterns. 
I test these predictions by analyzing a daily panel of armed conflict, maritime piracy, ocean 
wind speed, and ground rainfall for the period of 2001-2016 in 30 coastal conflict countries. The 
results are the most consistent with the upward substitution hypothesis; while windy weather 
somewhat lowers the likelihood of piracy events and the effect does not depend on ground weather 
conditions, rainy weather decreases the likelihood of violent events on the ground only when the 
ocean weather is windy. Robustness checks lend further credence to these findings. 
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MOTIVATION: CORRELATING-WEATHER BIASES 
Before stepping into a specific substantive topic, it is useful to consider the problem in a 
more generic sense: under what conditions does correlation among weather conditions matter for 
our analysis? The following figure (Figure 4-1) is a directed acyclic graph (DAG; Pearl 2009) in 
which our main interest is in the effect of a weather condition 𝑋1 on a certain outcome 𝑌. The 
weather variable, however, correlates with the other weather condition 𝑋2 due to an unobserved 
common cause 𝑍, which can be best considered as a complex climate system.2 Although in a few 
cases a weather variable can causally affect another weather variable (for example, rainfall lowers 
temperature), in most cases, the correlation between weather variables is an outcome of a complex 
climate system. Rainy weather, for instance, often coincides with gale, but this does not mean that 
the rain would cause the wind. The coincidence reflects a natural phenomenon known as a “storm.” 
 
                                                 
2 For simplicity, I consider only two correlating weather variables, but the argument can be easily 
extended to multiple weather variables. 
Figure 4-1. Generic Diagram 
1X
2X
Y
Z
 
NOTE: The figure shows a directed acyclic graph (DAG) of two 
weather variables (𝑋1 and 𝑋2), an outcome (𝑌), and a common 
cause (𝑍) that generates the two observed weather variables. 
We are interested in the effect of 𝑋1 on 𝑌. 
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An obvious but important insight is that in the presence of the unobserved common cause 
𝑍, the effect of 𝑋1 on 𝑌 cannot be estimated without accounting for 𝑋2. Without controlling for 𝑋2, 
we cannot identify the causal effect 𝑋1 → 𝑌  from the backdoor path 𝑋1 ← 𝑍 → 𝑋2 → 𝑌 . For 
instance, we cannot distinguish whether rainfall affects conflict (𝑋1 → 𝑌) or rainfall correlates with 
windy weather, which in turn affects conflict (𝑋1 ← 𝑍 → 𝑋2 → 𝑌). This means that a seemingly 
valid regression of 𝑌 on 𝑋1 suffers from an omitted variable bias. Note that transformations of the 
weather variables (such as using rainfall deviation) or conventional regression techniques (such as 
fixed effect) cannot solve the problem. The problem here is not in generic geographical or climate 
conditions, but they are in the instantaneous coincidence of multiple weather phenomena.  
This does not mean that inter-weather correlation would always bias our causal estimates; 
it depends on our theory and empirical evidence. In fact, when a correlating weather 𝑋2 has no 
effect on an outcome of interest 𝑌, we can still validly infer the causal effect 𝑋1 → 𝑌 even without 
accounting for the inter-weather correlation. Thus, the problem hinges on whether 𝑋2 affects 𝑌. 
Since there is no one-size-fits-all answer to this question, we need to assess the problem case-by-
case based on substantive and empirical knowledge. To this end, I now turn to the problem in a 
specific context: the effects of ground and ocean weather on violence and piracy. 
LITERATURE: VIOLENCE, PIRACY, AND SUBSTITUTION 
The potential for the correlating weather bias is mostly dismissed in the literature about the 
effects of weather conditions on conflicts. Although there are diverse studies on this topic,3 
                                                 
3 I do not provide an extensive survey of the literature. For a more extensive review of the literature, 
see Daxecker and Prins (2017a) and Axbard (2016) for maritime piracy, and Hsiang, Meng, and 
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including those about the effects of climate shocks on armed conflict (Hsiang, Meng, and Cane 
2011; 2013, 2014; Buhaug et al. 2014; Sarsons 2015), the effects of weather conditions on tactical 
choices and electoral violence (Condra et al. 2018), the effects of ocean wind speed on maritime 
piracy (Percy and Shortland 2013), and the effects of plankton abundance on piracy (Flückiger and 
Ludwig 2015; Axbard 2016), these studies analyze either one of ground and ocean climates 
without justifying the assumption that ground (ocean) weather conditions would affect only armed 
conflict (maritime piracy). This raises a question: do we have any reason to believe that armed 
conflict and maritime piracy depend on both ground and ocean weather conditions? 
Theories of strategic substitution (Most and Starr 1984; Morgan and Palmer 2000; Palmer, 
Wohlander, and Morgan 2002; Clark and Reed 2005; Clark, Nordstrom, and Reed 2008) provide 
one reason to believe that the answer is positive. Since rebels can allocate only a finite amount of 
resources (such as money, military personnel, weaponry, logistics, and even time) to piracy or 
armed conflict, they need to compare the relative costs and benefits of those options. This means 
that if ground weather conditions would affect the payoffs from violent activities, it also changes 
the relative costs and benefits of piracy. Similarly, if rough ocean prevents rebels from going to 
seas, the rebels may alternatively resort to violence. Thus, from the perspective of substitution, it 
is a real possibility that ground and ocean weather conditions affect both armed conflict and piracy. 
In this regard, the most relevant study is Jablonski and Oliver (2013), who examine how 
labor market opportunities, instrumented by monthly rainfall deviation on the ground, can affect 
                                                 
Cane (2011; 2013) for the effect of climate or weather on conflict. For the purpose of this paper, 
it is sufficient to state that to my best knowledge no conflict studies account for the possible 
correlations between ground and ocean weather conditions. 
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the number of piracy events. Thus, in a reduced form, they effectively analyze the effect of monthly 
rainfall on maritime piracy. Their analysis, however, does not account for rainfall’s effect on armed 
conflict or possible correlation between ground rainfall and ocean wind speed. As a result, if rainy 
weather coincides with windy ocean, and if windy ocean decreases the number of piracy events as 
demonstrated by Percy and Shortland (2013), their instrumental variable can be associated with 
their outcome variable through the climatic correlation. This implies a possible violation of 
independence or exclusion restriction, crucial assumptions in instrumental variable analysis. 
Another relevant study is Daxecker and Prins (2017a), who analyze the effect of maritime 
piracy on armed conflict. They argue that maritime piracy can provide armed groups with funding 
opportunities, and hence that piracy and armed conflict have a complementary relationship. Their 
empirical analysis indicates that conflict events tend to coincide with piracy events. However, the 
positive association does not necessarily mean that armed conflict and piracy would constitute a 
complementary relationship. In fact, as Morgan and Palmer (2000) state, the positive association 
can be attributed to an increase in the overall amount of available resources. With more resources, 
rebels may undertake more armed conflict and piracy, creating a positive association. Furthermore, 
even though armed conflict and piracy might be in a complementary relationship in the long term 
(Daxecker and Prins 2017a), they can still be in a substitutive relationship in the short term. In fact, 
as Most and Starr (1984) argue, unless actors possess infinite resources and time, there almost 
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always exists some substitution in the short term. Thus, even though my argument can be extended 
to a complementary relationship, I focus on the short-term substitutive relationship.4 
More importantly, a theoretical problem common to these studies and substitution theories 
in general is that they focus on the presence or absence of a substitutive or complementary 
relationship, without differentiating different types of substitution. As I detail in the next section, 
this void of knowledge is critical because even if an empirical finding indicates the absence of a 
particular type of substitution, it does not necessarily mean that there does not exist any type of 
substitution. Thus, without understanding the types of substitution and their differences, we may 
misinterpret our empirical findings.  
THEORETICAL MODEL: A TYPOLOGY OF SUBSTITUTION 
I argue that there are at least three types of substitution that predict different empirical 
patterns. When piracy is an upward substitute for violence, piracy is assumed to be substantially 
more profitable than violence. Thus, rebel groups conduct piracy activities whenever it is low cost 
(calm seas), while they engage in violence only when piracy is costly (rough seas) and violence is 
low cost (sunny weather). This means that piracy depends only on ocean weather conditions, but 
violence is affected by both ground and ocean weather conditions. By contrast, when piracy is a 
downward substitute for violence, the situation is reversed; piracy is less profitable, and thus rebels 
engage in violence whenever its costs are relatively cheap, while they conduct piracy only when it 
                                                 
4 Since the complementary relationship predicts opposite directions of coefficients, my empirical 
analysis can test them as well. Due to word limits, I cannot elaborate typologies or predictions of 
the complementary relationship. 
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is low cost and violence is costly (rainy weather). This implies that only ground weather conditions 
affect piracy, while both ground and ocean weather influences violence. Finally, when piracy is an 
equivalent substitute for violence, piracy is as profitable as violence. Thus, piracy or violence 
occurs when it is lower cost than its alternative. This means that both violence and piracy depend 
on ground and ocean weather conditions.  
To formalize this notion, consider an armed rebel group that can allocate a finite amount 
of resources 𝑟 > 0 (such as funding, military personnel, weaponry, and even time) to ground 
military and maritime piracy activities. The amounts of resources devoted to military and piracy 
activities are denoted by 𝑦𝐺 , 𝑦𝑀 > 0. By spending resources to a certain activity, the rebel group 
receives returns 𝑏∙(𝑦∙) , including tactical controls of territories and navigation or monetary 
opportunities (looting and ransom), while they also need to incur costs for the activity 𝑐∙(𝑦∙). Thus, 
the rebels’ generic payoff is 𝑢 = 𝑏𝐺(𝑦𝐺) − 𝑐𝐺(𝑦𝐺) + 𝑏𝑀(𝑦𝑀) − 𝑐𝑀(𝑦𝑀)  with a resource 
constraint of 𝑦𝐺 + 𝑦𝑀 ≤ 𝑟. As Morgan and Palmer (2000) note, the resource constraint is the key 
element that creates a substitutive relationship. That is, exactly because rebels do not possess an 
infinite amount of resources, they need to compare and substitute their available options.5  
I assume a quadratic profit function 𝑏∙(𝑦∙) = (𝑏∙ − 𝑦∙)𝑦∙ and a linear cost function 𝑐∙(𝑦∙) =
𝑐∙𝑦∙ with 𝑏∙, 𝑐∙ > 0, which are commonly used in formal analysis (Osborne 2003). The quadratic 
profit function, which has an inverted U shape, reflects the notion that allocating a certain amount 
                                                 
5 Conceptually, my model is analogous to the “one-goods-two-inputs” model in Morgan and 
Palmer (2000). The “goods” is the utility 𝑢, and the “inputs” are military and piracy activities. This 
implies that despite the differences in the mathematical expositions, my conceptualization is 
essentially consistent Morgan and Palmer (2000) and Most and Starr (1984). 
97 
 
of resources to military or piracy activities allows the rebel group to acquire more tactical or 
monetary gains, but excessive effort for an activity causes backlash and associated risks, such as 
government repression (Young 2012), anti-piracy patrolling (Daxecker and Prins 2017b), and 
avoidance by commercial vessels (Bensassi and Martínez‐Zarzoso 2012). The parameter 𝑏∙ 
represents the marginal profit when 𝑥∙ = 0 (initial marginal returns). In general, the larger 𝑏∙ is, 
the more profitable the option is. The linear cost function represents the loss of a certain amount 
of resources that would have been used for other purposes. When the parameter 𝑐∙ takes a larger 
value, the activity require more resources (larger operational costs), or those resources could be 
used for other more profitable activities (larger opportunity costs). With these parameterizations, 
the utility function becomes: 𝑢 = (𝑏𝐺 − 𝑦𝐺)𝑦𝐺 − 𝑐𝐺𝑦𝐺 + (𝑏𝑀 − 𝑦𝑀)𝑦𝑀 − 𝑐𝑀𝑦𝑀. 
I assume that the cost 𝑐∙ is affected by weather conditions (I am not assuming that the costs 
would depend only on weather conditions). As commonly acknowledged by military experts and 
historians (Ochmanek 2003; Meier 2015), rainy weather poses special challenges in a military 
operation, including marching on muddy ground, maintenance of supply lines, and lower morale, 
indicating larger tactical costs.6 In addition, as Percy and Shortland (2013) argue, windy ocean 
makes piracy activities potentially deadly endeavors; a majority of contemporary rebel groups or 
                                                 
6 One might argue that stormy weather would provide favorable conditions for guerrilla tactics. In 
this case, storms must increase the levels of violent activities on the ground. However, this is not 
consistent with my empirical findings in the later sections. In addition, although rainy weather 
might affect the agricultural production and hence 𝑏𝐺 (Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti 2004), this 
study is concerned with day-to-day weather variation, and the later analysis accounts for it by 
controlling for long-term rainfall amounts. 
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pirates do not possess large-scale armored ships, mostly relying on speedboats, fishing vessels, or 
even handmade wooden boats, which are especially vulnerable to rough waters (Murphy 2009). 
Quantities of interest are the effects of the costs 𝑐𝐿  and 𝑐𝑆  on the incidences of rebels’ 
violence and piracy, 𝑌𝐺 = I(𝑦𝐺 > 0)  and 𝑌𝑀 = I(𝑦𝑀 > 0) , where I  is an indicator function. 
Although the continuous effort levels 𝑦𝐺  and 𝑦𝑀 may also be of interest, dichotomous outcomes 
are more useful for deriving a typology of substitution. Furthermore, the effort levels are 
complicated non-linear functions of 𝑐𝐺  and 𝑐𝑀 , and hence empirical analysis can only weakly 
identify the theoretical relationship.7 Finally, as I later mention, the dichotomous variable is less 
sensitive to the aggregation problems, allowing us to conduct an empirical analysis at an 
aggregated level. 
Notes on the Model 
Note that the model does not assume that a rebel group would always consider piracy as 
an open option. Even though contemporary piracy usually does not require high skills or strong 
naval capabilities (Murphy 2009), rebel groups might not even think of piracy as their choice. In 
my model, this is equivalent to setting the costs for piracy 𝑐𝑀 to a very large value. With a very 
large 𝑐𝑀, rebels never engage in piracy activities, and hence the likelihood of rebels’ violence only 
depends on its costs 𝑐𝐺. Thus, if piracy would be out of rebels’ choices, ocean weather conditions 
should have no effect on violence or piracy, and only ground weather conditions would affect 
violence. 
                                                 
7 In a later robustness check, I also conduct an analysis with continuous outcome variables. 
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Relatedly, although the model assumes a unitary rebel-pirate actor, this assumption should 
be considered as an imprecise but useful construct (Clarke and Primo 2012). In several cases, such 
as the Nigeria Delta insurgents, rebel groups indeed conduct pirate activities. In other countries, 
including Somalia, rebel groups do not directly engage in piracy but collect various forms of taxes 
and fees from pirates (Murphy 2009; Percy and Shortland 2013; Shortland and Varese 2016). 
Nonetheless, even in those cases, there are substantial overlaps and labor mobility between the 
members of rebel and piracy groups (ibid). Thus, even in absence of a unitary command system, 
weather conditions can affect individual soldiers’ decisions over fighting on the ground or pirating 
on the ocean. Importantly, if it were not for any overlap or labor mobility, violence and piracy 
would be independent processes, and thus violence (piracy) would depend only on the ground 
(ocean) weather conditions. 
Finally, as I mentioned, if rebels have third choices, such as negotiated settlements, exile 
to foreign countries (exit strategy; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006) and nonviolent contestation 
(Cunningham 2013), it increases the opportunity costs for violence and piracy, indicating larger 
values of 𝑐𝐺 and 𝑐𝑀. If the third choices are far more attractive than piracy and violence, piracy 
and violence would not occur. Similarly, if the third choices are far less attractive than violence 
and piracy, they do not alter any results of my model. If the third choices are as profitable as 
violence or piracy, the groups may choose the third strategy even when my model predicts that 
they should choose violence or piracy. Although this would not bias the causal estimates (as 
weather conditions are not affected by the availability of the third choices), the existence of third 
choices can add noise and hence lower the power of analysis. This makes my empirical analysis a 
hard test for the substitution hypotheses. 
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Optimal Outcomes 
Since the model has a unique optimum that can take seven different forms, I focus on the 
effects of the weather conditions on the incidences of rebels’ violence and piracy activities, leaving 
the details of the optima and their conditions to supporting information.8 As summarized in Figure 
4-2, it turns out that the effects of ground and marine weather conditions (𝑐𝐺  and 𝑐𝑀) on the 
incidences of violence and piracy (𝑌𝐺 and 𝑌𝑀) are different, depending on the profits from those 
options (𝑏𝐺 and 𝑏𝑀). 
 
                                                 
8 See SI 3-1. 
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Figure 4-2. Comparative Statistics 
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NOTE: The figures show the incidences of piracy and violence with respect to their costs. The 
parentheses in each pane are the incidences of piracy and violence ( Y𝑀 , Y𝐺 ). The vertical and 
horizontal lines indicate the incidences of violence (Y𝐺 = 1) and piracy (Y𝑀 = 1) respectively. I put gray 
shade to the areas in which 𝑐𝑀 and 𝑐𝐺 interactively affect Y𝑀 or Y𝐺 . The panes, (a), (b), (c), and (d) 
correspond to the cases in which piracy is not a substitute for violence, piracy is a downward substitute 
for violence, piracy is an upward substitute for violence, and piracy is an equivalent substitute for 
violence. 
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No Substitution 
When neither option is sufficiently lucrative (pane a. of Figure 4-2), the rebels’ decision is 
affected little by resource constraints. That is, the rebels independently assess the costs and benefits 
of each option and allocate resources until it causes substantial backlash. This confirms Morgan 
and Palmer (2000)’ claim that if it were not for a resource constraint, there would be no incentive 
to compare or substitute available options. With no substitution, the incidence of violence depends 
only on 𝑐𝐺, and the incidence of piracy depends only on 𝑐𝑀 (baseline null hypothesis).  
Downward Substitution 
By contrast, when military activities are sufficiently profitable relative to piracy activities 
(piracy is a downward substitute for military actions; pane b. of Figure 4-2), rebels’ choices are 
constrained by the resource availability. In this case, when costs for these actions are cheap, rebels 
would like to spend more than 𝑟 resources on military actions and a few resources on piracy. 
However, the resource constraint forces them to compare the relative payoffs and optimally 
allocate the finite resources. While rebels always spend some resources on the military actions 
unless the costs are enormous ( 𝑐𝐺 ≥ 𝑏𝐺 ), they engage in the less lucrative option―piracy 
activities―only when piracy activities provide a positive profit (𝑐𝑀 < 𝑏𝑀) and they are profitable 
compared to its alternative (𝑏𝑀 − 𝑐𝑀 > 𝑏𝐺 − 𝑐𝐺 − 2𝑟). This means that while the incidence of 
rebels’ violence depends only on its costs 𝑐𝐺 (and thus ground weather conditions), the incidence 
of piracy attacks depends on both 𝑐𝐺 and 𝑐𝑀 (both ground and ocean weather conditions).  
Upward Substitution 
The situation is opposite when piracy is an upward substitute for military actions (pane c. 
of Figure 4-2). When piracy activities are sufficiently more profitable than military activities, 
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rebels have incentives to spend some amount of resources on piracy activities as far as they are 
affordable (𝑐𝑀 < 𝑏𝑀). However, since military activities are much less lucrative, they are willing 
to allocate their finite resources to military actions only when military actions provide positive 
returns (𝑐𝐺 < 𝑏𝐺) and they provide a better payoff than continuing piracy activities under strong 
backlash (𝑏𝐺 − 𝑐𝐺 > 𝑏𝑀 − 𝑐𝑀 − 2𝑟). Thus, when piracy is an upward substitute for violence, the 
incidence of piracy depends only on its costs 𝑐𝑀 (and thus ocean weather conditions), while the 
incidence of rebels’ violence depends both on 𝑐𝐺  and 𝑐𝑀  (both ground and ocean weather 
conditions). 
Equivalent Substitution 
Finally, when both ground military and maritime piracy activities are sufficiently lucrative 
(pane d. of Figure 4-2) and hence they constitute equivalent substitutes, the results become the 
mixture of the upward and downward substitutions. That is, because both options are potentially 
lucrative, rebels can easily substitute one option for the other. As a result, rebels weigh the relative 
costs and benefits of military and piracy activities, and they decide the allocation of their resources. 
This implies that rebels employ military activities only when that option provides a positive return 
and the alternative option is not predominantly lucrative, and vice versa. Thus, as seen in pane d 
of Figure 4-2, neither 𝑐𝐺 nor 𝑐𝑀 alone could perfectly predict the incidences of violence or piracy. 
Only when we consider 𝑐𝐺  and 𝑐𝑀 jointly, we are able to precisely predict the outcomes. This 
suggests that ground and ocean weather conditions interactively affect the incidences of violence 
and piracy. 
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EMPIRICAL MODEL AND OBSERVABLE IMPLICATIONS 
With the formal analysis, I am now able to specify the causal diagram presented in Figure 
4-1. The following figure (Figure 4-3) presents the specified version of the DAG, where 𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 
and 𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 are the incidences of rebels’ ground and marine violent activities, 𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 and 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑 are 
the amount of ground rainfall and the speed of ocean wind, and 𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 refers to an 
unobserved system of climate. The dotted arrow exists under the downward and equivalent 
substitution, and the dashed arrow exists under the upward and equivalent substitution. 
 
The DAG corresponds to a series of equations;9 
𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 𝑓𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛, 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑); 
𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 = 𝑓𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦(𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛, 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑), 
                                                 
9 For readability, I omit the functions of rain and wind with respect to climate system. 
Figure 4-3. Specified Diagram 
violence
piracy
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NOTE: The figure shows a directed acyclic graph (DAG), in which 
ground rainfall (𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛) and ocean wind speed (𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑) affect the levels 
of rebels’ ground and marine military activities ( 𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 and 
𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦). The dotted arrow exists under downward and equivalent 
substitution, and the dashed arrow exists under upward and 
equivalent substitution. 
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where 𝑓∙ is a generic function. With a linear approximation proposed by Hsiang, Burke, and Miguel 
(2013)10 and adding interaction terms, the equations are converted to empirical counterparts; 
𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜃𝑖𝑑𝑡 + 𝜙ℎ(𝑡) + 𝜖𝑖𝑡; 
𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾4𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜈𝑖 + 𝜗𝑖𝑑𝑡 + 𝜑ℎ(𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , 
where 𝑖 is a coastal conflict country, 𝑡 is a date, 𝑑𝑡 is a month-day of a given date. The outcome 
variables 𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 and 𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 are the incidences of rebels’ violence and piracy events. The 
explanatory variables 𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 and 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 are the amount of ground rainfall and the speed of ocean 
wind. The column vector 𝑥𝑖𝑡  includes covariates with corresponding row vectors of the 
coefficients 𝛽4  and 𝛾4 . The model also includes country-specific intercepts 𝜇𝑖  and 𝜈𝑖 , which 
account for climatic differences across countries, country-month-day-specific fixed effects 𝜃𝑖𝑑𝑡  
and 𝜗𝑖𝑑𝑡, which account for country-specific seasonality, and cubic splines of time trends 𝜙ℎ(𝑡) 
and 𝜑ℎ(𝑡), which control for long-term trends of the event data and climate changes (Beck, Katz, 
and Tucker 1998).11 
                                                 
10 For the purpose of causal inference, linear models are fully meaningful (Angrist and Pischke 
2009; Hsiang, Burke, and Miguel 2013). The generalized linear models with fixed effects usually 
require the control function approach (simply adding dummies causes incidental parameter biases; 
Wooldridge 2005), which are reliant on parametric assumptions, numerically unstable, and 
computationally expensive. 
11 Note that as I later mention having the country-month-day-specific intercepts are equivalent to 
subtracting each variable by its country-month-day averages. Thus, using rainfall or wind speed 
deviations (measured as the observed rainfall or wind speed minus the average rainfall or wind 
speed on that day) is mathematically the same as the above specification. 
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I use coastal countries as spatial units because there is no data about the geographical 
locations of rebel groups and hence we cannot easily assign the values of the climate variables to 
rebel groups. Since this might cause problems of ecological inference, it is useful to theoretically 
consider the problems. From the standpoint of my theory, if a rebel group attempts activities, it 
can cause backlash and thus decrease the marginal returns from the activity, which in turn can 
disincentivize other groups from engaging in the same activity. This implies that there might be a 
negative externality and correlation among groups, which can cause a bias toward zero in an 
empirical analysis with aggregated units (King, Tanner, and Rosen 2004). Furthermore, the 
outcomes are dichotomous variables that take one if even a single group engages in military or 
piracy activities. As a result, even though the counts of those events might be subject to the 
abovementioned biases, the dichotomous variables are less affected by the problem. In fact, the 
theoretical predictions about the dichotomous variables hold even when I extend the model to the 
aggregated incidences of violence and piracy with two rebel groups.12  
Predictions 
The following table (Table 4-1) summarizes the predicted directions of the interactive 
effects (𝛽3 and 𝛾3 in the above equations). First, in the absence of substitution (first row of Table 
4-1), there is no interactive effect; the incidence of violence depends on ground weather conditions, 
while the incidence of piracy depends on ocean weather conditions. Thus, the coefficients of the 
interaction terms are predicted to be zero, constituting a baseline null hypothesis. Second, when 
piracy is an upward substitute for violence (the second row of Table 4-1), violence occurs only 
                                                 
12 The full description and solution of the game-theoretic model is provided upon request. 
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when it is more beneficial than piracy, while piracy can happen whenever it is profitable for its 
own sake. This suggests that ground and ocean weather conditions interactively affect violence 
and that the interactive effect is negative, while the incidence of piracy depends only on ocean 
wind.  
 
Third, by contrast, when piracy is a downward substitute for violence (the third row of 
Table 4-1), the situation is reversed. While violence can happen whenever it is profitable for its 
own sake, piracy occurs when it is more profitable than violence. This indicates a negative 
interactive effect of ground and ocean weather conditions on the incidence of piracy, while only 
ground weather conditions will affect the incidence of violence. Finally, when piracy is an 
equivalent substitute for armed conflict (the bottom row of Table 4-1), rebels weigh the returns 
from the ground and marine military activities, and hence ground and ocean weather conditions 
interactively affect both violence and piracy. Since violence occurs when violence is more 
profitable than piracy and vice versa, the directions of the interactive effects are predicted to be 
negative. With these predictions, I now turn into the measurement of the variables. 
Table 4-1. Predicted Directions of the Interactive Effects 
Outcome 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡 𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 
Coefficient 𝛽3 𝛾3 
No Substitution 0 0 
Upward Substitution − 0 
Downward Substitution 0 − 
Equivalent Substitution − − 
NOTE: The table summarized the predicted directions of the interactive effects of ground 
rainfall and ocean wind speed on the incidence of violent events (𝛽3) and the incidence of piracy 
events (𝛾3). “−” and “0” indicate a negative and zero coefficient value respectively. 
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DATA AND METHOD 
The sample includes coastal areas of 30 conflict countries for the period of 2001-2016, 
including 131,831 coastal country-day observations.13 The time period is selected on the basis of 
data availability.14 Since piracy activities are physically infeasible for rebels in inland countries, 
following Daxecker and Prins (2013), I limit the countries to those along the coast. Furthermore, 
because my theory assumes the existence of armed rebel groups, I drop non-conflict countries and 
periods (Themner 2012).15 Finally, among the remaining 44 coastal conflict countries, I drop 
countries that have zero variance of the outcome variables.16 The resultant 30 countries are Algeria, 
Angola, Bangladesh, Colombia, the Republic of the Congo (Congo), the Democratic Republic of 
                                                 
13 For detailed description of the sample, see SI 3-2. 
14 Satellite images are available only after 2000. Because I take a one-year lag of the predictors 
(see later subsection Controls), the first year is 2001. The latest version of piracy event data is 
available up to 2016. 
15 The conflict countries are the countries that have at least one episode of armed conflict in the 
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Themner 2012). 
16 The dropped countries are Levant countries (Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey), where 
piracy is near-impossible due to EU’s military commitment, the former-CIS countries (Georgia, 
Russia, and Ukraine), where the frozen or inland seas inhibit pirates, Cameroon and China, where 
only the states’ violence against civilians are reported in the coastal areas, Pakistan, where the 
United States had heavy naval presence for the Afghanistan War, and Sudan, where the northern 
coastal areas are politically stable and far less influenced by the southern turmoil. Finally, I also 
drop the United States. In a later robustness check, I also conduct an analysis with these countries. 
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the Congo (DRC), Egypt, Eritrea, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, 
Libya, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Yemen. This middle-N approach with careful case 
selection allows us to limit the cases to a comparable set of countries, provides a guard against 
extrapolation, and hence makes the estimates more valid and meaningful “average” effects.17 
Outcome Variables 
The outcome variables are the incidences of rebels’ violence and piracy. The event data of 
armed conflict come from the UCDP GED (Sundberg, Lindgren, and Padskocimaite 2010), a 
standard dataset of conflict events.18 Since rebels can put its efforts towards any types of ground 
military activities, I include any violent events in which at least one of the participants is a rebel 
group. Since my theory relates to aggregated outcomes of rebels’ behaviors, events that do not 
involve rebels are omitted. Finally, to select conflict events that are relevant to piracy, I limit the 
                                                 
17 Strictly speaking, OLS with a continuous treatment does not provides an average treatment 
effect, but the estimates can be considered as a kind of an weighted average effect (Angrist and 
Pischke 2009). 
18 The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) is available only for African countries 
(Raleigh, Linke, and Dowd 2014) and hence is not used in this paper. In a robustness check, I also 
use the Global Terrorism Database (GTD; LaFree and Dugan 2007). 
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events that occurred within 100 kilometers from the coast lines.19 The outcome variable 𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 
takes 1 if there is any rebels’ violent event on a day 𝑡 within 100 kilometers from the territorial 
seas of a country 𝑖.  
The piracy data come from the updated version of the Maritime Piracy Dataset (MPD 
version 2.5; Coggins 2012). The dataset relies on the reports of piracy attacks submitted to the 
International Maritime Bureau (IMB). Maritime piracy is defined as “an act of boarding or 
attempting to board any ship with the apparent intent to commit theft or any other crime and with 
the apparent intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of that act” (Coggins 2012, 606). 
Although Daxecker and Prins (2013) also develop an alternative dataset, the Maritime Piracy 
Event and Location Dataset (MPELD), the following analysis uses the MPD as a primary source. 
While the MPELD contains information about the countries closest to piracy events, the MPD has 
records about the country origin of pirate attackers, which is crucial for the analysis of this paper. 
For instance, even though there are many piracy attacks in the Gulf of Aden, this does not mean 
that all of the pirates come from Yemen (most of them come from Somalia). Thus, without the 
information about attackers’ origins, we may misclassify the event locations. 20  The variable 
                                                 
19 Without this criteria, for instance, the conflict events near Lake Tanganyika in the DRC must be 
considered something relating to piracy activities in South Atlantic Ocean. In later robustness 
checks, I also conduct analyses with thresholds of 50 and 200 kilometer coastal distances. 
20 In a robustness check, I also use the MPELD. Note that the MPD and MPELD both primarily 
rely on the IMB’s reports (though the MPELD includes a few other reports as well).   
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𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 takes 1 if there is any piracy event on a day 𝑡 in which at least one of the attackers come 
from a country 𝑖.21 
Although both of the event datasets are based on reports of media or international 
organizations and hence subject to reporting biases, “as long as the measurement error is 
uncorrelated with the independent variables, measurement error in the dependent variable is not 
particularly problematic in a standard regression framework other than increasing the uncertainty 
around the estimates we obtain” (Weidmann 2016, 208). As I detail in the next subsection, my 
predictors, 𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 and 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 are based on satellite images, which are not subject to systematic 
reporting biases. Although the precision of satellite images can be different across locations, the 
errors are unlikely to be systematically different across countries, and the fixed effects can readily 
account for the country-specific and seasonal biases. 
Explanatory Variables 
The data of ground rainfall amounts are derived from the Tropical Rainfall Measuring 
Mission (TRMM; Huffman et al. 2007) dataset, which is available for every three hours in every 
0.25-degree by 0.25-degree grid cells (2.8-kilometer by 2.8-kilometer cells at the equator).22 The 
                                                 
21 If attackers’ origins are not available, the MPD assumes that the pirates come from the closest 
littoral sea. This approximation is used for about 10% of the events (Coggins 2012).  
22  Other data sources, such as NOAA CPC Morphing Technique (CMORPH), Precipitation 
Estimation from Remotely Sensed Information using Artificial Neural Networks (PERSIANN), 
and Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS) products, have either shorter 
temporal coverage, lower spatial or temporal resolution, or a large number of missing values.  
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TRMM is a joint mission by NASA and Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency, and the 
precipitation data is based on the cross-validation and aggregation of multiple satellite radar and 
weather sensors. The variable 𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 is the average amount of ground rainfall (millimeter per hour) 
on a day 𝑡 within 100 kilometers from the coast of a country 𝑖.23  
The data of ocean wind speed come from the Cross-Calibrated Multi-Platform (CCMP; 
Atlas et al. 2010) gridded surface vector wind dataset, which is available daily at a spatial 
resolution of 0.25-degree by 0.25-degree grid cells.24 The CCMP project is based on and funded 
by NASA’s research programs. The CCMP products are cross-calibrated from multiple satellite 
data so that the wind measures are consistent over time. The variable 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 is the average speed 
of ocean wind (meters per second) on a day 𝑡 within 100 kilometers from the lands of a country 
𝑖.25 Both of the weather variables are based on satellite images, and hence they are not affected by 
the problems relating to weather station data (Schultz and Mankin Forthcoming). 
Control Variables 
The covariates include past-one-year (𝑡 − 1, … , 𝑡 − 365) averages of ground rainfall and 
ocean wind speed and their interactions.26 Because long-term rainfall may affect daily rainfall (due 
                                                 
23 In a robustness check, I also rerun the analysis with 50 and 200 kilometer thresholds. 
24 Other data sources, such as QuikSCAT, Blended Sea Wind, and MODIS datasets, have either 
shorter temporal coverage, lower temporal resolution, or a large number of missing values. 
25 In a robustness check, I also rerun the analysis with 50 and 200 kilometer thresholds. 
26 I use the past-one-year average as it includes growing seasons regardless of seasonality or 
countries. In a robustness check, I also use past-one-week and month averages. 
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to autocorrelation) and it may also have long-term consequences, such as the effects on agricultural 
production (Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti 2004), it is necessary to control for the long-term 
precipitation. Similarly, long-lasting rough seas can reduce income opportunities of fishery-related 
sectors, which in turn might affect maritime piracy. By controlling for the long-term ocean wind 
speed, I can mitigate possible biases due to the endogeneity. 
I do not include other political, economic, or social covariates, such as democracy indexes 
and GDP per capita. Because these factors are unlikely to affect the weather variables, it is 
unnecessary and even harmful to control for those variables. In fact, as Hsiang, Burke, and Miguel 
(2013) state, these factors can be affected by the weather conditions, and thus controlling for these 
variables can cause posttreatment control biases. Note also that the geographical and seasonal 
factors, such as average rainfall and monsoon seasons, are already accounted for by the country 
and country-month-day fixed effects, and hence that they are not included in the analysis. In 
addition, even if the covariates change over time, most of them are available only at a yearly level. 
Thus, country-year fixed effects can account for those time-variant covariates as well.27 
A remaining concern would be other weather variables that correlate with ground rainfall 
or ocean wind speed. For instance, temperature might also be an outcome of a climate system and 
affect conflict events (Hsiang, Meng, and Cane 2011; 2013). If this were the case, there would 
exist an unaccounted backdoor path, 𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 ← 𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 → 𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 → 𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒. On 
the other hand, rainfall can also causally affect temperature; precipitation and resultant evaporation 
can lower surface temperature. As a result, controlling for temperature can cause a posttreatment 
control bias. Given this tradeoff, my strategy is to report the main results without controlling for 
                                                 
27 See later robustness checks. 
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temperature (prioritizing parsimony over complication), while also reporting the results with 
control for temperature in a robustness check.28 
Estimator 
The linear regression models are estimated with ordinary least squares (OLS). Note that 
even though the error terms of the two regressions 𝜖𝑖𝑡 and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 may correlate, the variables in the 
right hand sides of the equations are exactly the same, and hence seemingly unrelated regression 
and corresponding feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) are numerically equivalent to OLS 
(Greene 2011).29 The standard errors are clustered for each country. Since the cluster standard 
errors with a relatively small number of units can over-reject the null (Cameron and Miller 2015), 
I use a conservative degree of freedom, 30 − 8 = 22. Although this provides a guard against over-
rejection, it lowers the power of the analysis, and it thus may favor the “no substitution” hypothesis. 
Since the calculation of the clustered standard errors becomes numerically unsolvable with 30 +
                                                 
28 I do not include ocean wave height as it cannot affect ocean wind, but it is affected by ocean 
wind speed (thus, controlling for wave height risks posttreatment control bias). Other weather 
variables, such as cloud cover, humidity, and air pressure, might be relevant. However, accounting 
for all weather conditions is infeasible (the number of interaction terms explodes as I include more 
variables). In this point, my strategy is similar to traditional observational studies: referring to the 
literature (Hsiang, Burke, and Miguel 2013), selecting weather variables that are shown to be 
relevant to conflict, and complying with Achen (2005)’s rule for parsimony. 
29 Note that even when the right-hand-side variables are different, OLS is still consistent, even 
though it becomes less efficient than FGLS.  
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30 ∗ 365 − 2 = 10,978  dummies of fixed effects, I transform the fixed effect models by 
subtracting each variable by its country average (de-meaning) and then by its country-month-day 
average (de-seasoning). The resultant variables are the deviations from the averages in a country 𝑖 
on a day 𝑡. 
RESULTS 
The following table (Table 4-2) shows the estimated values of the coefficients. 
 
Without accounting for the cross-space effects of the weather conditions (column 1 and 3 in Table 
4-2), there is weak evidence that ground rainfall halts rebels’ military activities (𝑝 = 0.077), while 
the effect of ocean wind speed on maritime piracy is negative but not distinguishable from zero 
(𝑝 = 0.258). These results are not surprising as these models ignore the interactive effects and are 
thus underspecified. 
When the interaction terms are included (column 2 and 4 in Table 4-2), the results indicate 
that the empirical patterns are the most consistent with the upward substitution hypothesis; the 
Table 4-2. OLS Estimates 
 1 2 3 4 
Outcome 𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 
𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 
-0.0064 
[-0.0135, 0.0001] 
-0.0046 
[-0.0116, 0.0025] 
 0.0026 
[-0.0008, 0.0060] 
𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 
 -0.0031 
[-0.0124, 0.0062] 
-0.0035 
[-0.0099, 0.0028] 
-0.0046 
[-0.0101, 0.0010] 
𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 
 -0.0043 
[-0.0068, -0.0018] 
 0.0060 
[-0.0022, 0.0142] 
NOTE: The table shows the OLS estimates of the standardized coefficients. The first and third columns 
show the effects of ground rainfall or ocean wind speed on the incidence of rebels’ violent events or 
piracy events respectively. The second and fourth columns add interactions and their lower terms. The 
95% confidence intervals (based on clustered standard errors and corrected degrees of freedom) are 
in brackets. The models include country fixed effects, country-month-day fixed effects, cubic splines of 
common time trends. The control variables for model 1 and 3 are the past-one-year average of ground 
rainfall and ocean wind speed respectively. The control variables for model 2 and 4 are the past-one-
year averages of ground rainfall and ocean wind speed, and their interaction. 𝑛 = 131,831  with 30 
coastal conflict countries for 2001-2016 period.  
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effect of ground rainfall on violent events depends on the ocean wind speed, while such an 
interactive effect is not statistically discernible for the incidence of piracy events. While the 
coefficient of 𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 in a regression of violent events is negative and statistically significant 
(𝑝 = 0.0021), the corresponding coefficient is not significant and even positive for piracy (𝑝 =
0.1450). Although this does not necessarily mean that there is “no” interactive effect as the upper 
bound of the confidence interval is large, the lower bound of the confidence interval is close to 
zero (−0.0022), indicating that the interactive effect is unlikely to be negative. These results 
contradict the no, downward, and equivalent substitution hypotheses and are best explained by the 
upward substitution hypothesis.30 
Substantively, when ocean wind speed takes an average value, an increase of rainfall by 
one standard deviation (6.49 millimeter per hour) decreases the probability of rebel’s violent 
events by 0.0046 with a corresponding interval of [−0.0116, 0.0025]. By contract, when ocean 
wind speed is above average by one standard deviation, the effect size is nearly doubled; a one-
standard-deviation increase of rainfall lowers the probability of violent events by 0.0089 with a 
confidence interval of [−0.0152, −0.0025]. Regarding piracy, when ground rainfall takes an 
average value, an increase of ocean wind speed by one standard deviation (1.435 meters per 
second) decreases the probability of piracy events by 0.0046  with a confidence interval of 
[−0.0116, 0.0025]. In contrast, when ground rainfall is above average by one standard deviation, 
                                                 
30 Since I use a linear model, I do not present the marginal effect plots. In fact, as Hainmueller, 
Mummolo, and Xu argue (2018), the marginal effect plots can be misleading (especially in the 
case of 𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡). See SI 3-14 for details. 
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the effect becomes positive: 0.0014 with a confidence interval of [−0.0067 0.0095]. Again, these 
results are the most consistent with the upward substitution hypothesis. 
Because the coefficients of the control variables―the past-one-year averages of the rainfall 
and ocean wind speed, and their interaction―are not directly relevant to my theory or cannot be 
directly interpreted as causal effects (Blackwell and Glynn 2018), I do not report the estimates in 
Table 4-2. Nevertheless, even with a proper method,31 none of the estimated coefficients are 
statistically significant. Although this does not mean that there is “no” long-run relationship (the 
confidence intervals are relatively large), the findings do not provide much meaningful inference 
about the long-run effects. This can be attributed to the relatively small number of countries and 
the conservative degrees of freedom. 
Correlating-weather Biases? 
These results provide support for the upward substitution hypothesis, indicating that both 
ground and ocean weather conditions affect the incidence of violent events. Does this mean that if 
we omit ocean weather conditions from the regression and hence ignore the backdoor path 𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 ←
𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 → 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑 → 𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 , our estimate about 𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 → 𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 would be heavily 
biased? The following table (Table 4-3) indicates that the answer is negative; the results are similar 
whether I account for correlating-weather or not. Thus, it is unlikely that the naïve estimates would 
suffer large correlating weather biases, which is not surprising given a statistically significant but 
relatively weak correlation of 𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 and 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 (𝑟 = 0.0053 with 𝑝 = 0.0270). 
                                                 
31 Structural nested mean models (Blackwell and Glynn 2018). 
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Although these results imply that the correlating-weather bias is not large in this study, we 
must be careful about generalizing these results to different samples or weather variables. While 
𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 and 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 are only weakly correlated in this study and hence the size of the correlating 
weather bias is small, depending on the magnitude of inter-weather correlations, it is possible that 
a separate regression would suffer a large bias. It is therefore recommended for future studies to 
check correlations among relevant weather variables, and if the correlations are large, to include 
the correlating weather variables and their interactions in a regression. Also note that even when 
separate regressions suffer minor biases, it does not mean that the estimated causal effect has 
theoretical interpretations or substantive meanings. Indeed, for the purpose of testing the 
substitution types, the models without interaction terms provides little theory-relevant information. 
Robustness Checks 
I also conduct a series of robustness checks. The following table (Table 4-4) summarizes 
the robustness checks, their results, and corresponding sections in the supporting information. As 
Table 4-3. Average Effects 
 1 2 3 4 
Outcome 𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 
𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 
-0.0064 
[-0.0135, 0.0001] 
-0.0046 
[-0.0112, 0.0021] 
  
𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡  
  -0.0035 
[-0.0099, 0.0028] 
-0.0046 
[-0.0098, 0.0006] 
Correlating 
weather 
omitted included omitted included 
NOTE: The table shows the sample averages of the effects of 𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 on 𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 (model 1 and 2) and 
the effects of 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡  on 𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡  (model 3 and 4). The results about model 1 and 3 show the OLS 
estimates when correlating weather variables (𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 and 𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 respectively) are omitted. The results 
about model 2 and 4 show the average marginal effects when the correlating weather variables and its 
interactions with the main weather variables (𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡  and 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡  respectively) are included. The 95% 
confidence intervals are in brackets. The models include country fixed effects, country-month-day fixed 
effects, cubic splines of common time trends. The control variables for model 1 and 3 are the past-one-
year average of ground rainfall and ocean wind speed respectively. The control variables for model 2 
and 4 are the past-one-year averages of ground rainfall and ocean wind speed, and their interaction. 
𝑛 = 131,831  with 30 coastal conflict countries for 2001-2016 period.  
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seen in the table, my main findings hold in most of the robustness checks. First, I use 50- and 200-
kilometer thresholds to identify the coastal lands and seas (which are used to calculate the 
incidence of violent events and the weather variables). Although the statistical significance 
becomes somewhat lower for 𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡  with a 200 kilometer threshold—perhaps because 
𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡  now includes events that occurred in inland areas and hence were less relevant to 
pirates—the other results are similar to the main results.  
 
Second, I use the Global Terrorism Database (GTD; LaFree and Dugan 2007) as an 
alternative measure of rebels’ violence. This does not alter the results. Third, I use the MPELD 
(Daxecker and Prins 2013, 2017a) as alternative data of piracy events. With the alternative measure, 
the coefficient of the interaction term for 𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 becomes positive and statistically significant, 
Table 4-4. Robustness Checks 
  Coefficient of an interaction term 
SI 
  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡 (?̂?3) 𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡  (𝛾3) 
1 50 kilometer coastal distance − null SI 3-3 
2 200 kilometer coastal distance   −† null SI 3-3 
3 Alternative measure of 𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 (GTD) −  SI 3-4 
4 Alternative measure of 𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 (MPELD)  + SI 3-4 
5 Controlling for maximum and minimum 
temperature 
− null SI 3-5 
6 Controlling for past-one-week averages of 
𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡, and their interaction 
− null SI 3-6 
7 Controlling for past-one-month averages of 
𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡, and their interaction 
− null SI 3-6 
8 Controlling for country-specific trend 
variables 
− null SI 3-7 
9 Controlling for country-year fixed effects − null SI 3-8 
10 Analysis with all coastal conflict countries   −† null SI 3-9 
11 Count variables null   +† SI 3-10 
12 Leave-one-country-out tests − null SI 3-11 
NOTE: The table shows the results of the robustness checks. The first column shows the robustness 
checks. The second and third columns show the directions of ?̂?3  and 𝛾3  (the coefficients of the 
interactions terms in regressions of 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡  and 𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 ). “ − ” indicates a negative value of a 
coefficient, “+” indicates a positive value, and “null” indicates a null result. The daggers † indicate the 
results with statistical significance of 0.05 < 𝑝 ≤ 0.1 . The last column shows the indexes of the 
supporting information. 
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indicating that windy ocean tends to increase piracy events when it is rainy in the coastal areas. A 
key to interpret this result is the fact that the MPELD does not identify the origins of pirates; 
instead, the outcome includes pirate attacks that occurred within 100 kilometers from coastal lines 
of a country 𝑖.32 One possible explanation therefore would be that while rebels in country 𝑖 are less 
or no more likely to engage in neither ground nor marine military activities with stormy weather, 
it actually invites even a larger number of foreign pirates who try to exploit the void, resulting in 
an increase in the reported piracy events. Since formally establishing this argument or rigorously 
testing the hypothesis is beyond the scope of this paper, I leave it to future studies. For the purpose 
of this paper, it suffices to state that the information about pirates’ origins is crucial for the present 
analysis. 
Fourth, as I previously mentioned, I add controls for the maximum and minimum 
temperature. The results are robust to the inclusion of these control variables. Fifth, I also control 
for past-one-week or past-one-month, instead of past-one-year, averages of 𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 and 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡, and 
their interaction. These do not change the results. Sixth, I also control for cubic splines of country-
specific trend variables in order to account for time-varying heterogeneities within countries. The 
results are robust to the inclusion of the country-specific trend variables. Likewise, seventh, I also 
include country-year fixed effects and find similar results. This implies that the results are robust 
to the inclusion of country-year covariates, such as GDP per capita and democracy indexes. 
                                                 
32 When I use the MPD and include the events that occurred within 100 kilometer from coastal 
lines, the results are similar to those with the MPELD-based measure. This means that the 
difference lies not in the coding rules or data sources of the MPD and MPELD but in the ways to 
calculate 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡. 
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Eighth, I conduct analysis with additional 14 coastal conflict countries that have zero 
variance in 𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡  or 𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡  and thus are omitted in the above analysis. Although the 
inclusion of the zero-variance cases decreases the within-country variances in the outcome 
variables and hence lowers the statistical significance, the main results hold even with those 
countries. Ninth, I use the counts of violent events and piracy attacks as outcome variables. As I 
mentioned in the theory section, the typology of substitution is based on to the dichotomized 
outcomes, and since the interactive effects on continuous or count outcome variables can take 
complicated non-linear functions, it is difficult to empirically identify the interactive effects. 
Consistent with these theoretical expectations, I find only weak evidence for the linear interactive 
effect when I use the count variables. Tenth, I also check the influence of outliers by dropping 
each country and re-estimating the models. The results are mostly robust to the omission of those 
countries. In addition, while not listed in Table 4-4, I also check multicollinearity and non-linearity, 
and find no indication of these problems.  
Causal Mechanisms 
An alternative explanation would be fishing (Hendrix and Glaser 2011; Flückiger and 
Ludwig 2015; Axbard 2016); rainfall decreases rebels’ violence especially when ocean is windy, 
because rough seas mean limited opportunities for fishery industries. That is, when the ocean is 
rough, there might be more people who are willing to join rebels’ violent activities, and hence 
ground rainfall could substantially affect the levels and incidence of violence. Although I am 
skeptical of this view as switching from non-violent (fishing) to violent activities (violence) is 
usually more difficult than switching between violent activities (piracy and violence), I conduct 
an additional analysis. I collect data on the phytoplankton absorption coefficient, which is a 
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measure of phytoplankton abundance in the ocean (Flückiger and Ludwig 2015). Since 
phytoplankton abundance is a predictor of fish abundance and does not affect piracy’s operational 
costs, I can exclude this alternative explanation if the above results hold with the phytoplankton 
abundance control. The phytoplankton data are derived from the MODIS Aqua products. The 
analysis shows that the main results hold even after controlling for phytoplankton abundance, and 
that it does not have a statistically significant effect on piracy or violence.33 
One may also be interested in whether the substitution is driven by tactical or monetary 
incentives. As I mentioned in the theory section, the “profits” that the rebels receive can be the 
tactical control of territory and navigation or the monetary gains from looting and ransom. I test 
the causal mechanisms by disaggregating the types of rebels’ violence and piracy attacks. The 
analysis, which is detailed in SI 3-13, provides evidence for the tactical explanation; that is, the 
interactive effects exist on rebels’ attacks relating to tactical objectives but not on those relating to 
monetary gains. These results imply that there exists an upward substitution in rebels’ tactical 
choices over ground and ocean military activities.  
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I have developed a series of hypotheses about the effects of ground and ocean 
weather conditions on armed conflict and maritime piracy. A formal analysis indicates that the 
interactive effects can be different, depending on relative utilities of alternative strategies, namely 
whether maritime piracy is a downward, equivalent, or upward substitute for violence. The 
regression analysis shows that the empirical patterns are the most consistent with the upward 
                                                 
33 See SI 3-12. 
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substitution hypothesis. A series of robustness checks provide further credence to the empirical 
findings. 
An important implication of this study, which can go beyond the field of conflict studies, 
is that a simple regression on a weather variable can suffer the classical problems of omitted 
variable biases, and that conventional statistical techniques are not perfect remedies of those 
problems. For instance, although it is well known that election-day rainfall decreases voter turnout 
(Hansford and Gomez 2010), a potential backdoor path is that the rainy weather may coincide with 
lower temperature and freezing weather, which might in turn lower the voter turnout. In the 
presence of the backdoor path, we may overstate the effect of rainy weather on turnout rates. 
Regression techniques, such as controlling for average rainfall or including fixed effects, do not 
account for the backdoor path. Although the size of the correlating weather bias can be small as in 
this study, we need to carefully consider how climate conditions relate with each other, and 
whether correlating weather conditions would affect outcomes of interest. 
For conflict studies, an implication is that the relationship between armed conflict and its 
alternative strategies can crucially depend on the type of substitution. Although recent studies 
examine the roles of alternative strategies, such as non-violent contestation (Cunningham 2013) 
and refugees as an exit strategy (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006), they tend to presume a certain 
relationship of substitution. Cunningham (2013), for instance, argues that non-violent contestation 
does not require large-scale mobilization and hence is less costly than violent conflict. However, 
an interesting question is how the interpretation of the empirical findings would change if the 
relationship were revered and non-violent contestation became a downward or equivalent 
substitute for violent conflict. It is a task of future studies to expand the theory of substitution and 
to shed further light on the roles of alternative strategies in armed conflict.  
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Appendix I. Supporting Information for “Post-disaster Reconstruction as a Cause of 
Intrastate Violence: An Instrumental Variable Analysis with Application to the 2004 
Tsunami in Sri Lanka” 
SI 1-1 DATA DESCRIPTION 
The table and figure (Table A1-1-1 and Figure A1-1-1) show the descriptive statistics of 
the main variables. The outcome variable, violence, has a highly skewed distribution with an 
inflated number of zeroes. Reflecting the fact that the sample includes the unaffected coastal 
divisions, more than 60 percent of the GN (Grama Niladhari) divisions have zeroes in the 
proportion of destroyed homes. Because the distribution of housing construction is also highly 
skewed to the right, and because this variable is an outcome variable in the first-stage regression, 
I take a natural logarithm of the housing construction values. As seen in the figure, the sample 
distribution of logged construction is approximately normal, though there is a relatively large 
number of zero values. The average wave heights range from 0 to 8 meters with only a few 
outliers. Because of the relatively small range, I do not transform the variable into a logarithmic 
form. Finally, the proportion of affected people has a similar distributional form as destruction, 
and these two variables have a very high correlation (r = 0.833).  
 
Table A1-1-1. Summary Statistics 
Variables Observations Mean Median 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
violence 3138 0.091 0 0.941 0 28 
destruction 1569 0.213 0 0.317 0 0.998 
construction 3134 19.28 11.6 26.19 0 590 
wave 1569 3.247 3.336 2.164 0 8.048 
affected 1569 0.105 0 0.215 0 0.998 
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The following figure (Figure A1-1-2) is the map of Sri Lanka. The colored regions are 
the coastal GN divisions that are used in the analysis, while the white regions are not used. 
Although the number of coastal divisions is very small relative to the number of inland divisions, 
it is important to keep the sample confined to the coastal region, as the inland divisions never 
suffer tsunamis and thus the inference cannot be extended to the inland divisions. It is 
substantively meaningless to estimate the effect of the tsunami and reconstruction in regions that 
have no possibility of suffering a tsunami. 
 
Figure A1-1-1. Scatter Plots and Histograms 
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Note: The non-diagonal panels are scatter plots of variables. The diagonal panels are 
histograms of variable. 
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Figure A1-1-2. Map of Sri Lanka 
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SI 1-2 MEASUREMENT 
Because this research uses an original, rather than an off-the-shelf, dataset, there may be 
some doubts on reliability. 
Violent events 
First, I check whether the outcome variable, a count of violent events, is sensitive to 
inclusion and exclusion of certain event categories. I also diagnose whether reporting bias in the 
conflict dataset may influence the results. To this end, following Weidmann (2016), I conduct a 
robustness check by dropping low-intensity violence (reported number of deaths is less than or 
equal to 15), as these events are more sensitive to media coverage and thus susceptible to 
systematic bias.  
In the main analysis, I use the dataset of violent events. Table A1-2-1 provides a quick 
overview of the data source. I use a total count of events, which are classified as “Battle” or 
“Violence against Civilians” between 1 April 1995 and 26 December 2004 and between 1 
January 2006 and 1 June 2009 respectively.  
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The following table (Table A1-2-2) shows the results when I exclude the “Violence 
against Civilians” event category, when I include the “Rioting/Protesting” event category, and 
when I drop low-intensity violence. The outcome variables are labelled as battle, unrest, and 
massive, respectively. As seen in Table A1-2-2, the exclusion and inclusion of the event 
categories only result in negligible changes in the coefficient estimates and standard errors, 
suggesting that the main findings are robust to the changes in the event categories. Although the 
coefficients become smaller when I drop low-intensity violence, possibly because post-disaster 
reconstruction relates to low-intensity violence, the coefficient value is still statistically 
significant. 
 
Table A1-2-1. Review of Violence Data 
Variable name violence 
Dataset name Sri Lankan Civil War dataset 
Dataset provider Yuichi Kubota 
Primary data sources Lexis Nexis Academic News (Associate Press and United Press) 
Coding details Compliant on ACLED (Raleigh, Linke, and Dowd 2014) 
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I also examine the sensitivity of the results to the time periods of the violent events. In the 
main analysis, I exclude any events in 2004 and 2005 from the post-disaster period in order to 
avoid endogeneity with regards to post-disaster reconstruction. Violent events during the period 
of reconstruction might affect the allocation of the disaster relief, and thus compound this 
endogeneity problem. Nonetheless, the omission of the violent events may also raise the problem 
of selection bias. I then retest the hypotheses, extending the post-tsunami period to 27 December 
2004 through 1 June 2009. In addition, I exclude violent events during the peace talk (22 
February 2002 – 26 December 2004) so that the comparison is based on the two civil wars, and 
not the two periods before and after the tsunami. Because the lengths of the pre- and post-
tsunami periods are different, I also standardize the number of violent events within each period 
and then take the difference. In this way, I can estimate the effect of reconstruction on the 
changes in the relative distribution of violent events. As seen in Table A1-2-3, the estimates are 
very similar to those in the main analysis, indicating the inclusion, exclusion, and standardization 
of the violent events do not alter the main findings in the paper. If an alternative violence dataset 
Table A1-2-2. Estimates with Exclusion and Inclusion of the Event Categories 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Outcome ∆battle ∆unrest ∆massive 
∆ln(construction) 
0.556** 0.590** 0.277* 
(0.28) (0.28) (0.15) 
destruction 
-0.437** -0.482** -0.236** 
(0.20) (0.21) (0.12) 
affected 
-0.108 -0.111 -0.003 
(0.25) (0.26) (0.13) 
Constant 
-0.272* -0.282* -0.143* 
(0.15) (0.15) (0.08) 
Observations 1567 
Instrument wave 
* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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were available, I could examine the reliability of the violence data more explicitly. Because no 
such datasets are currently available, I cannot conduct further analyses.  
 
 
Housing destruction  
Second, I check the measurement of housing destruction. The following table (Table A1-
2-4) is a brief overview of the variable and data sources. In the main analysis, I use four 
indicators in the first report of the census to construct the composite index: numbers of houses 
classified as “completely damaged” (level 3), “partially damaged and cannot be used” (level 2), 
“partially damaged and can be used” (level 1), and “not damaged” (level 0). I take a sum of the 
former three indicators and then divide it by the sum of the four indicators. I interpolate zero for 
the GN divisions that were not enumerated in the Tsunami Census.1 This calculation, however, is 
                                                          
1 The Tsunami Census enumerated the GN divisions in which at least one housing unit was 
affected by the tsunami (Department of Census and Statistics 2005). The census covered most of 
Table A1-2-3. Estimates with Different Event Periods and a Standardized Outcome 
  (3) (4) (5) 
outcome ∆violence ∆violence ∆violence 
∆ln(construction) 
0.568** 0.582** 0.492* 
(0.28) (0.28) (0.27) 
destruction 
-0.487** -0.494** -0.435** 
(0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
affected 
-0.099 -0.096 -0.094 
(0.26) (0.26) (0.22) 
Constant 
-0.261* -0.268* -0.197 
(0.15) (0.15) (0.14) 
Observations 1567 
Instrument wave 
* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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implicitly based on the assumption that the extent of housing destruction does not matter for 
operationalizing the concept of destruction. This assumption may be overly simplistic because 
heavier destruction may increase the costs of violence and therefore the rival parties may have 
less incentive to engage in fighting. 
 
 
I take two approaches regarding this problem. First, I decompose the variable into three 
variables: proportion of housing units that suffered each of three levels of destruction. Second, I 
use three different weightings for operationalizing the concept of destruction. Specifically, I use 
the three combinations of weights described in Table A1-2-5. The first approach requires no 
assumption about the weights but discards the prior information that the indicators represent the 
same concept, while the second approach requires parametrization of the weights. The table 
(Table A1-2-6) shows the results. As seen in Table A1-2-6, the estimate related to the housing 
construction is fairly robust to the measurement of housing destruction. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the costal divisions including the North except the northwestern coast, in which few sufferings 
are reported. 
Table A1-2-4. Review of Housing Destruction Data 
Variable name destruction 
Dataset name The Tsunami Census 
Dataset provider Department of Census and Statistics, Government of Sri Lanka 
Primary data sources Door-to-door survey 
Coding details See Department of Census and Statistics (2005) 
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Table A1-2-5. Weightings for Housing Destruction  
Weighting 1 destruction 1 = 1.0*level 3 + 0.75*level 2 + 0.50*level 1 
Weighting 2 destruction 2 = 1.0*level 3 + 0.50*level 2 + 0.25*level 1 
Weighting 3 destruction 3 = 1.0*level 3 + 0.75*level 2 + 0.25*level 1 
 
Table A1-2-6. Estimates with Different Measures of Housing Destruction 
  (4) (5) (6) (7) 
∆ln(construction) 0.542* 0.545** 0.513** 0.518** 
 (0.32) (0.27) (0.26) (0.26) 
level 1 
-0.421*       
(0.24) 
   
level 2 
-0.300 
   
(0.57) 
   
level 3 
-0.632 
   
(0.44) 
   
destruction 1  
-0.533** 
  
 
(0.24) 
  
destruction 2   
-0.551** 
 
  
(0.26) 
 
destruction 3    
-0.545** 
   
(0.25) 
affected 
0.005 -0.029 0.012 0.005 
(0.46) (0.29) (0.31) (0.31) 
Constant 
-0.256 -0.261* -0.253* -0.254* 
(0.16) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) 
Observations 1567 
Instrument wave 
* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Housing construction I 
Third, I examine the sensitivity of the results to the measurement of the housing 
construction. In the main analysis, I use the average number of constructed houses from 2000 to 
2004 for a pre-tsunami period and a number of construction houses in 2005 for a post-tsunami 
period. The following table (Table A1-2-7) provides a quick description of the variable. Since 
the data of housing construction in 2006 is also available, I conduct additional analyses using the 
alternative data as well as the average of 2005 and 2006 years. To avoid endogeneity, I exclude 
violent events in 2006 as well as 2004 and 2005 from the post-tsunami period. The coefficient of 
the alternative housing construction variable becomes relatively smaller, though the result of the 
statistical test is the same. 
 
Table A1-2-7. Review of Housing Construction Data 
Variable name construction 
Dataset name The 2012 Census 
Dataset provider Department of Census and Statistics, Government of Sri Lanka 
Primary data sources Door-to-door survey 
Coding details See (Department of Census and Statistics forthcoming) 
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Housing construction II 
Another issue regarding the housing construction data is its validity as a measurement of 
re-construction. Furthermore, it is important to demonstrate that the housing construction data, 
which are available at the GN division level, represent re-construction even after controlling for 
the extent of housing destruction. Although the number of houses that are reconstructed in the 
post-tsunami recovery programs are not available at the level of GN divisions (fourth 
administrative level), they are available at the level of DS (Divisional Secretariat) divisions (third 
administrative level). The post-tsunami housing reconstruction effort was driven by donor-driven 
and owner-driven housing construction (DHC and OHC respectively) programs (see SI 1-6 for 
details). The DAD Data Report 2nd edition that was made by the Reconstruction and 
Development Agency (RADA) on 15 May 2006 reports the progress status of the DHC programs 
Table A1-2-8. Estimates with Alternative Housing Construction 
  (8) (9) 
∆ln(construction 2006) 
0.460**  
(0.22)  
∆ln(construction 2005-06) 
 0.520** 
 (0.25) 
destruction 
-0.388** -0.426** 
(0.17) (0.19) 
affected 
-0.363 -0.372 
(0.34) (0.34) 
Constant 
-0.135 -0.219* 
(0.08) (0.12) 
Observations 1567  
Instrument wave  
* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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at the DS divisions (third administrative units).2 In particular, the report contains the numbers of 
units at four stages: (1) an original Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was made, (2) the 
MoU was actually signed, (3) the housing units were under construction, and (4) the construction 
was completed. Based on the report, I create four corresponding variables: planned, signed, 
started, and completed. Note that these variables are not mutually exclusive. For example, 
planned is the sum of signed, started, and completed plus those whose MoU was created but not 
yet signed. Because these variables are available only at the DS-division level, I also recalculate 
the differences in the numbers of constructed houses (∆construction), which is recorded in the 
2012 census, and the proportions of destroyed houses (destruction), which is available in the 
2004 Tsunami Census, at the level of DS divisions. I then separately regress ∆construction to 
planned, signed, started, and completed with control for destruction. 
If ∆construction measures housing reconstruction even after controlling for housing 
destruction, the coefficients of planned, signed, started, and completed should be positive. In 
addition, because ∆construction captures only the houses that were planned and actually 
constructed, it should have a stronger relationship with the reconstruction variables as 
construction progresses from the initial plan to completion. 
                                                          
2 The information on the OHC programs, which were managed by the Sri Lankan government, is 
not available even at the DS level. In the next section of this SI, I examine the possible effect of 
the OHC programs on conflicts.  
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The results in Table A1-2-9 are congruent with these expectations. Even though the 
sample size is very small ( ), most of the coefficients are statistically significant and 
positive. Furthermore, the coefficient values increase as housing reconstruction proceeds from 
the MoU to completion. There is a large gap in the coefficient values between signed and started. 
This reflects the fact that the signature of MoU does not necessarily entail housing construction, 
while starting construction almost certainly means the completion of the project. Although the 
coefficient values are not substantively large because ∆construction includes housing 
construction unrelated to the tsunami, the results strongly support the validity of the 
measurement. Note also that because the number of observations is very limited, I cannot apply 
the instrumental variable analysis—which has a large bias in a small sample—to the DS-division 
level. 
Table A1-2-9. Regression of Housing Construction on Housing Reconstruction 
  ∆construction 
planned 
0.194*    
(0.12)    
signed  
0.166   
 
(0.12)   
started  
 0.636**  
 
 (0.29)  
completed 
   0.772* 
   (0.44) 
destruction 
193.7 234.2 319.4 395.3** 
(233.7) (227.8) (194.1) (176.5) 
constant 
249.5** 263.3** 224.0** 240.2*** 
(49.5) (51.3) (52.2) (50.6) 
Observations 86 
* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Housing construction III 
A remaining issue regarding the housing construction data is that even though my housing 
construction measure is associated with the number of houses that were reconstructed by the 
DHC (Donor-driven Housing Construction) programs, we are still unclear about the effect of the 
OHC (Owner-driven Housing Construction) programs. Because the benefits distributed by both 
programs tended to favor the government-held regions and can potentially shift the power 
balance (as I explain in SI 1-6), they are equally relevant to my theory. Furthermore, one may 
think that the donors are more concerned with the balance of power while the Sri Lankan 
government, which managed the OHC programs, may favor its constituencies. If this is the case, 
the OHC and DHC programs may have different or even opposite effects on conflicts.  
To account for possible heterogeneity, I conduct two robustness checks. In the first model, 
I use ln(∆construction) that is unexplained by the DHC programs. In particular, I first run a 
regression: 
 
where  and i refer to the GN and DS divisions respectively, and planned, signed, started, and 
completed are the variable related to the DHC programs (see the previous subsection for details). 
Using the residuals in this regression—which are intuitively interpreted as the variation of 
 that is not explained by the DHC housing construction—as an explanatory 
variable, I estimate the instrumental variable regression. In the second model, I add planned, 
signed, started, and completed as additional control variables in order to account for the effects 
of the DHC programs.  
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As seen in Table A1-2-10, the main results are maintained. The first column shows the 
effect of the residuals (non-DHC) on the conflict risk, while the second column shows the model 
with the additional controls for the DHC programs. In both regressions, the explanatory variables 
(non-DHC construction and ∆ln(construction)) are instrumented by the tsunami wave heights. 
The results suggest that the adverse effect of reconstruction is not limited to the DHC programs, 
and that the other housing construction, including that done by OHC programs, also has a similar 
impact on the conflict risk. 
Tsunami wave heights 
I also rerun the analysis with different data of the wave heights. In the main analyses, I 
use the simulated data of wave heights provided by Garcin et.al (2008). The potential data 
sources for wave heights are either numerical simulations or field observations (Wijetunge 2009; 
Goff et.al 2006; Liu et.al 2005). Although field observations are potentially useful, they only 
provide information about runup and inundation, and their geographic coverage is limited. I 
Table A1-2-10. Estimates with Controls for the DHC programs  
  (10) (11) 
non-DHC ∆ln(construction) 
1.007* 
 
(0.54) 
 
∆ln(construction) 
 
0.651* 
 
-0.35 
destruction 
-0.647** -0.550** 
(0.31) -0.24 
affected 
-0.173 -0.094 
(0.32) -0.27 
Constant 
0.124* -0.294* 
(0.06) -0.17 
Observations 1567 
Instrument wave 
Controls for DHC programs No Yes 
* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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requested data access from six authors who conducted wave height simulations (Poisson, 
Oliveros, and Pedreros 2009; Garcin et.al 2008; Grilli et.al 2007; Titov et.al 2005; Tomita et.al 
2006; Imamura 2004).3 Out of the six authors, Garcin and Imamura kindly provided the data 
from their wave high simulations. Because the Garcin at.al (2008) provide data of higher 
geographical resolution, I use their wave height estimation as a primary data source, and the data 
from Imamura (2004) in a robustness check. 
The grid resolution of Garcin et.al (2008) is 540 meters. In order to capture the elevation 
of the first wave, I only use the data cells surrounding the Ceylon Island, trimming cells in the 
outer sea. Then, I calculate the average wave heights of a GN division within the surrounding 
five kilometers. The polygon data of the administrative boundaries are derived from the Office 
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA; 2015). The following table (Table A1-2-
11) is a summary of the data. 
                                                          
3 The six studies are the all of the studies which I could find that simulated the maximum 
amplitudes of the 2004 tsunami in Sri Lanka. 
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For checking the robustness of the main results, I estimate the same regression models 
but use different data for the wave heights. The alternative data for the wave heights are obtained 
from Imamura (2004). While the data of Garcin et.al is available at 540 meter grid resolution, the 
resolution of Imamura’s simulation is 2 minute grids, approximately 4 kilometer grids, which 
may lower the explanatory power of the instrumental variable. As seen in Table A1-2-12, the 
robustness of the result to the wave height data. In fact, the effect size of the housing 
construction becomes even larger. Furthermore, contrary to my expectation, the alternative 
instrument also has high explanatory power (the F statistics of weak instruments is 35.3). Thus, it 
appears that the findings are robust to the measurement of the wave heights. 
Table A1-2-11. Review of Tsunami Wave Height Data 
Variable name wave 
Dataset name Integrated Approach of Coastal Hazard and Risk in Sri Lanka 
Dataset provider Manuel Garcin 
Primary data sources Estimated seismic source (Grilli et al. 2007; Vigny et al. 2005) 
Bathymetry (U.S. Department of Commerce 2006) 
Sources provided by Survey Department of Sri Lanka and 
National Hydrographic Office (references are not provided) 
Wave simulation: Modified GEOWAVE (Watts et al. 2001) 
Coding details See Garcin et al. 2008 
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GN divisions up to 5 or 10 kilometers away from the coast 
Finally, to confirm the findings’ robustness to sample selection, I include GN divisions 
within 5 and 10 kilometers away from the coast (the analysis in the main paper uses GN 
divisions that are within one kilometer from the coastline). As shown in Table A1-2-13, the large 
sample size increases the statistical significance, while the coefficient values do not change 
substantially. These findings indicate that the results are robust to the selection of GN divisions. 
 
Table A1-2-12. Estimates with Different Wave Height Data 
  (11) 
∆ln(construction) 
0.503** 
(0.23) 
destruction 
-0.438** 
(0.21) 
affected 
-0.080 
(0.23) 
Constant 
-0.237*** 
(0.12) 
Observations 1567 
Instrument wave 
* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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SI 1-3 ADDITIONAL CONTROL VARIABLES 
The tsunami wave heights, the instrumenting variable, are not perfectly random and 
therefore may violate the independence assumption of the instrumental variable analysis. In 
particular, if the wave heights correlate with some confounders, it could result in substantial bias 
in the estimates. To examine this possibility, I collect various pre-treatment covariates which are 
available in the 1981 Census and GIS data sources. The 1981 Census is the last census before the 
onset of the Eelam III War, and provides a wide range of demographic information across the 
country. I choose all entries that are available at a DS division level (the third administrative 
level). I supplement the demographic data with geographic variables, which are derived from 
GIS sources. I also add the number of destroyed houses in the Tsunami Census. The following 
table (Table A1-3-1) is the description of the covariates, and Figure A1-3-1 shows the correlation 
terms and scatter plots of the wave heights with the covariates. The wave heights correlate with 
several covariates; the waves tended to be particularly high in the locations with lower Hindi and 
Catholic populations, fewer Tamil and greater Moor ethnicities, and large areas with a higher 
Table A1-2-13. Estimates with Larger Sample Sizes 
  (12) (13) 
∆ln(construction) 
0.566*** 0.432*** 
(0.19) (0.16) 
destruction 
-0.481** -0.420** 
(0.20) (0.19) 
affected 
-0.099 -0.049 
(0.24) (0.23) 
Constant 
-0.263*** -0.189*** 
(0.09) (0.07) 
Maximum distance from the coast 5 km 10 km 
Instrument wave 
Observations 3067 4241 
* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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elevation. If these covariates could also relate to the outcome variable, differences in the counts 
of violent events before and after the tsunami, then the estimates would be biased. 
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Table A1-3-1. Summary of the Covariates 
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To explore this possibility, I add fixed effects of the districts (the second administrative 
level) and provinces (the first administrative level), and many observed covariates respectively. 
This approach can be effective because potential confounders may be accounted for by the fixed 
effects or control variables. The cost of this approach is that the explanatory variables may also 
have less variation and therefore diminish the precision of the estimation. Hence, if the results 
hold even after including the fixed effects, it should be considered to be equally strong support 
for the hypotheses, though the lack of statistical significance may be either due to potential 
confounders or due to lower statistical power. 
Figure A1-3-1. Scatter Plots of Wave Heights and Covariates 
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Note: Each panel shows a scatter plot and a fitted line of a covariate and the wave height variable. 
The correlation coefficient is also shown at the top of each panel. 
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As seen in Table A1-3-2, once I include either of the fixed effects in the main models 
(Table 1-1 Model 4 in the paper), the coefficient for housing construction becomes 
indistinguishable from zero. The standard errors are very large relative to the coefficient values. 
Even worse, the coefficients of housing construction are opposite to the main result. Thus, the 
models of the regional fixed effects do not provide any additional evidence for the main findings. 
The results in Table A1-3-2 also show that the addition of the covariates also makes the p-value 
above the conventional threshold level ( ). Note that 61 observations are omitted due to 
missing data. 
 
Table A1-3-2. Estimates with the Regional Fixed Effects 
  (1) (2) 
∆ln(construction) 
-0.333 -0.186 
(0.23) (0.43) 
destruction 
-0.045 -0.097 
(0.17) (0.18) 
affected 
0.244 0.123 
(0.20) (0.28) 
Constant 
0.235* 0.230 
(0.14) (0.30) 
Fixed Effects 13 Districts 4 Provinces 
Instrument wave 
Observations 1567 
* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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A question is therefore whether the loss of statistical significance is due to potential 
biases in the estimates or losses in the power of analysis. At first glance, the observed covariates 
only cause efficiency loss. In fact, only one of the 21 variables is near the conventional threshold 
of statistical significance, which is not surprising considering the nature of multiple hypothesis 
Table A1-3-3. Estimates with the Observed Covariates 
  
(3) 
∆ln(construction) 0.558 (0.39) 
destruction -0.656 (0.32)* 
affected 0.026 (0.31) 
urban 0.118 (0.09) 
female -2.109 (2.35) 
youth 2.017 (1.75) 
hindu 0.042 (0.41) 
muslim 0.048 (2.56) 
catholic 0.141 (0.22) 
christian -2.593 (2.52) 
other religion 1.393 (10.29) 
sri lankan tamil -0.206 (0.40) 
indian tamil 2.421 (1.24)* 
moor -0.280 (2.64) 
burgher 11.110 (11.39) 
malay -0.163 (4.59) 
other ethnicity -6.794 (9.14) 
ln(population) 0.021 (0.03) 
ln(area) -0.072 (0.04) 
lowland 0.244 (0.33) 
coast 0.573 (0.71) 
enumerated -0.017 (0.14) 
night light 
-0.001 (0.01) 
non-house 0.152 (0.26) 
Constant 0.624 (1.77) 
Instrument wave 
Observations 1506 
* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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testing. Moreover, the covariates not only individually, but also jointly (p = 0.71), have no 
statistically significant association, suggesting redundancy of these covariates. 
To further examine this problem, I conduct an additional analysis. I increase the sample 
size by including GN divisions up to 5 or 10 kilometers away from the coast. If the fixed effects 
and additional covariates cause efficiency losses but do not bias the estimates, a larger sample 
size should address the problems. In contrast, if the fixed effects would represent confounders, 
they should bias the estimates and p-values regardless of the sample sizes. As Table A1-3-4 
shows, in most cases, the coefficients for ∆ln(construction) regain statistical significance. Only 
when I use the 5 km threshold and include the observed covariates does the statistical 
significance fall below the conventional criterion ( ). This is because the missing 
values in the covariates do not allow the sample to increase to a sufficient size. Furthermore, all 
coefficient values are within the confidence interval of the main estimates. Taken together, the 
results imply that the increased power of analysis is sufficient to recover the main estimates. 
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Additional Controls 
One possibility is that the tsunami wave heights affect forms of development other than 
housing reconstruction. Furthermore, the locational changes of violent events and housing 
construction may correlate with the early movements of the armed forces. Although these 
variables are unlikely to correlate with tsunami wave heights and hence to bias the estimates in 
the instrumental variable analysis, it is nevertheless prudent to conduct an additional analysis. I 
therefore include the changes in the night light densities, the number of destroyed non-housing 
units, and the number of violent events in 2005 as additional control variables. The differences in 
the night light densities are supposed to capture the development other than housing 
reconstruction. Because I am using the difference in the numbers of violent events before 2004 
and after 2006, the early violent events can capture the location changes of the armed forces in 
Table A1-3-4. Estimates with Controls and Larger Sample Sizes 
  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
∆ln(construction) 
0.213* 0.291** 0.313 0.224* 0.295** 0.348* 
(0.11) (0.13) (0.21) (0.12) (0.12) (0.21) 
destruction 
-0.356** -0.293* -0.507* -0.436** -0.308* -0.568* 
(0.16) (0.17) (0.29) (0.18) (0.17) (0.30) 
affected 
0.178 -0.029 0.117 0.270 -0.016 0.140 
(0.20) (0.22) (0.27) (0.23) (0.22) (0.28) 
Constant 
-0.065 -0.107* 2.571 -0.073 -0.129** 2.522 
(0.04) (0.06) (2.03) (0.05) (0.06) (2.00) 
Controls District FE Province FE Covariates District FE Province FE Covariates 
Distance from 
the coast 
5 km 10 km 
Instrument wave 
Observations 3067 2488 4241 2784 
* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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the tsunami’s immediate aftermath.4  As seen in Table A1-3-5, the results are robust to the 
inclusion of the additional control variables. Since early violence positively correlates with later 
violence, it is not surprising that the coefficient for early violence is positive and statistically 
significant. 
 
 
                                                          
4 I suspect that one of the additional controls, early violence, is potentially detrimental. Because 
my theory predicts that early violent events are also endogenous to housing construction and 
tsunami wave height, the inclusion of early violence will introduce endogeneity biases in the 
estimates. It is thus theoretically and methodologically untenable to include early violence as an 
exogenous variable, which is why I did not use this variable in the above long regression. 
Table A1-3-5. Night Light Densities, Non-housing Destruction, and Early Violence 
  (10) (11) (12) 
∆ln(construction) 
0.551** 0.595** 0.562** 
(0.27) (0.28) (0.27) 
destruction 
-0.604** -0.486** -0.601** 
(0.27) (0.21) (0.27) 
affected 
-0.099 -0.113 -0.103 
(0.26) (0.26) (0.26) 
∆night light 
0.007  0.009 
(0.01)  (0.01) 
non-house 
0.164  0.164 
(0.24)  (0.24) 
early violence 
 1.843*** 1.836*** 
 (0.20) (0.19) 
Constant 
-0.269* -0.284* -0.283* 
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Observations 1567 
Instrument wave 
* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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SI 1-4 SPATIAL DEPENDENCE 
Spatial dependence poses another threat to causal inference. To mitigate this issue, I separately 
include averages of the explanatory and outcome variables in neighboring locations as control 
variables. I do not include the neighbors’ average of the instrumental variable, for it highly 
correlates with the instrument and the collinearity substantially lowers the instrument’s 
explanatory power. As seen in Table A1-4-1, inclusion of the neighbors’ variables results in 
point estimates that are farther from zero, though the standard errors also tend to be larger. In the 
first two models, the effect sizes of housing construction become larger, though they fail to reach 
the conventional threshold of statistical significance (p = 0.091 and 0.084) probably due to the 
collinearities to the spatial variables. Because neither of the two spatial controls has a statistically 
significant association with the outcome variable, I consider these variables to be redundant. 
Admittedly, the specifications of the spatial dependence here are primitive and I leave further 
exploration of the spatial dependence to future analyses. 
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I also check the estimates of clustered standard errors to account for the effect of spatial 
dependence on the standard error estimates. As shown in Table A1-4-2, the results hold whether 
I cluster the standard error by the DS divisions, districts, or provinces. 
Table A1-4-1. Estimates with Neighbors’ Averages 
  (1) (2) (3) 
∆ln(construction) 
0.926* 0.849* 0.611** 
(0.55) (0.49) (0.30) 
destruction 
-0.450** -0.688** -0.507** 
(0.23) (0.32) (0.22) 
affected 
-0.250 -0.155 -0.107 
(0.35) (0.31) (0.26) 
neighbors' destruction 
-0.566 
  
(0.46) 
  
neighbors' 
∆ln(construction) 
 
-0.092 
 
 
(0.07) 
 
neighbor's ∆violence   
0.120** 
  
(0.06) 
Constant 
-0.367 -0.123 -0.294* 
(0.22) (0.10) (0.16) 
Observations 1567 
Instrument wave 
* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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SI 1-5 SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION 
Due to the nature of the data and identification strategy, the model specifications and 
estimations can take several alternate forms. 
Linear models 
First, I re-estimate the linear models with different specifications and estimations 
following the advice of Angrist and Pischke (2009). In particular, I report the two-stage least 
square (2SLS) estimates, limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimates with an 
additional instrumental variable, and ordinary least square (OLS) estimates of the reduced form. 
The GMM estimate, which is reported in the main analysis, is asymptotically consistent and 
efficient in the presence of non-constant error variance, while the 2SLS estimate is unbiased but 
less efficient. The LIML estimate is less precise than the 2SLS but robust to the finite sample 
bias. In addition, the LIML estimate of the overidentified model allows for a validity test of the 
instruments, assuming either one of the instruments is valid. I use the standard deviation of the 
Table A1-4-2. Estimates with Clustered SE 
  (1) (2) (3) 
∆ln(construction) 
0.577* 0.577* 0.577* 
(0.33) (0.35) (0.32) 
destruction 
-0.487*** -0.487** -0.487* 
(0.09) (0.21) (0.27) 
affected 
-0.104 -0.104 -0.104 
(0.29) (0.24) (0.20) 
Constant 
-0.269 -0.269 -0.269 
(0.19) (0.20) (0.17) 
Clustered SE DS District Province 
Instrument wave 
Observations 1567 
* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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wave heights as an extra instrument. Finally, the OLS estimate of the reduced form is unbiased 
and proportional to the LATE. The following table (Table A1-5-1) provides a summary of these 
estimates. 
 
As shown in Table A1-5-1, both the 2SLS and LIML estimates are similar to those of the 
GMM reported in the main paper. In the first stage of the LIML estimates of the overidentified 
model, the mean of the wave heights is still positively associated with the housing construction 
variables (p < 0.001), while the standard deviation of the wave heights negatively correlates with 
the explanatory variable (p = 0.051). Theoretically, this could be due to people judging the 
locations with lower wave height variance to be safer and moving there. The predictive power of 
these instruments is lower than that of the just-identified model but still beyond the conventional 
criteria (the F statistics of weak instruments is 23.6). More importantly, the Sargan over-
identification test does not reject the validity of the instrument at a 5 percent significance level. 
Table A1-5-1. Estimates with Different Specification and Estimation (Linear) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
∆ln(construction) 
0.577** 0.506* 
 
(0.28) (0.26) 
 
wave   
0.030** 
  
(0.01) 
destruction 
-0.487** -0.441** -0.182 
(0.21) (0.20) (0.14) 
affected 
-0.104 -0.081 0.063 
(0.26) (0.25) (0.22) 
Constant 
-0.269* -0.239* -0.098 
(0.15) (0.14) (0.07) 
Estimation 2SLS LIML OLS 
Instrument wave 
wave 
 
wave sd 
 
Observations 1567 
* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
wave sd is the standard deviation of wave heights.  
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Finally, in the reduced form regression, the sign of the wave height variable is consistent with the 
GMM estimate. These results suggest that the estimates of the linear models are robust to 
changes in specifications and estimations. 
Non-linear models 
Second, because the outcome variable is not continuous, I examine the robustness of non-
linear models. Estimation methods for non-linear instrumental variable regressions are still under 
development and there is not yet a consensus on which perform best. In addition, violent events 
are fairly rare, which creates further complications. I first fit the ordered and multinomial probit 
models, treating the decrease, no change, and increase of the violent events as an ordinal and 
nominal scale respectively. Next, I employ a control function approach to estimate separate 
probit models (one for no change versus decrease and another for no change versus increase of 
violent events). Finally, I estimate separate rare-event logit models using the two-stage residual 
inclusion (2SRI) techniques. 
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As seen in Table A1-5-2, the estimates of the ordered probit models are consistent with 
both of the hypotheses, though the proportional odds assumption is rejected (p < 0.001). Thus, I 
also estimate the multinomial probit models and separate probit and rare-event logit models. The 
results of these models indicate that reconstruction relates to whether the conflicts decrease or 
not, rather than whether the conflicts increase or not. These results provide further support for 
the theory, as my interest in this study is the distribution of violent events across the country 
rather than the absolute number of violent events in each individual location. The fact that 
housing construction relates to a decrease and non-decrease, instead of increase and non-increase, 
Table A1-5-2. Estimates with Different Specification and Estimation (Non-linear) 
  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
Trichoto
mized 
∆violenc
e 
Trichotomized 
∆violence 
decrease increase decrease increase 
Outcome decrease increase 
∆ln(construction) 1.060** -4.133*** -2.538** -1.420*** -1.283*** -6.797*** -3.767* 
 
(0.51) (1.06) (1.19) (0.11) (0.38) (1.77) (2.19) 
destruction -1.014** 2.699*** 0.569 0.958*** 0.155 4.429*** 0.857 
 
(0.43) (0.68) (1.23) (0.22) (0.69) (1.02) (2.36) 
affected 0.021 1.449* 1.989** 0.457 1.130* 2.394* 2.848* 
 
(0.50) (0.85) (0.89) (0.36) (0.61) (1.30) (1.50) 
First-stage 
residual 
-1.142** 3.998*** 1.962 
  
6.624*** 2.797 
 
(0.51) (1.07) (1.20) 
  
(1.81) (2.20) 
Constant 
 
-1.038** 
-
1.891*** 
-0.391 -1.189* -0.861 -2.463*** 
    (0.44) (0.50) (0.29) (0.61) (0.74) (0.91) 
Model 
Ordered 
Probit 
Multinomial Probit 
Instrumental Variable 
Probit 
Rare-event Logit 
Instrumental 
Variable 
Approach 
2SRI Control Function 2SRI 
Observations 1567 
* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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may indicate that a natural disaster relates to general pacification and therefore a reduction of 
violent events in absolute terms, as the “pacifying effect” thesis in the literature suggests 
(Slettebak 2012). This interpretation should nonetheless be balanced with the fact that a civil war, 
not peace, actually followed the tsunami in Sri Lanka. 
SI 1-6 QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT 
In this section, I provide qualitative evidence for the causal mechanisms, especially 
focusing on whether post-tsunami housing reconstruction provided the government and 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) with opportunities to obtain direct benefits, and to 
expand sources of taxes and manpower. I first describe the scheme and distributions of the 
tsunami aid. I then discuss how the aid flows contributed to differential power growths of the 
government and LTTE. Finally, I look at the Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure 
(P-TOMS) as an example of a bargaining failure. 
Note that the qualitative assessment is not a substitute for in-depth case studies. Because 
relevant sources are still classified, it is not currently possible to examine the dynamics of power 
shifts, commitment problems, and the locational choices for battles. Future research will likely 
conduct in-depth qualitative analyses once the information becomes public. 
Tsunami Relief 
Soon after the tsunami on 26th of December 2004, the government and the LTTE separately 
established aid coordination bodies. Within a month, the government set up the Task Force for 
Rebuilding the Nation (TAFREN), which evolved into the Reconstruction and Development 
Agency (RADA) in November 2005, while the LTTE coordinated the post-disaster 
reconstruction through the existing organizations, including the Planning and Development 
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Secretariat (PDS) and the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO). There were international 
and domestic efforts to coordinate the government and rebel bodies, as seen in the agreement of 
the Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS), but the agreement ultimately 
failed to achieve its goal. Because the information about the PDS and TRO is not available (due 
in part to the downfall of the LTTE), I focus on the government side.5 
The government implemented the Owner-driven Housing Construction (OHC) programs 
and the Donor-driven Housing Construction (DHC) programs. While the OHC programs were 
funded by foreign states and regional organizations and implemented through the government, 
the DHC programs were directly managed by the donors with cooperation of national and local 
agencies. In terms of the committed amounts of aid, the OHC and DHC programs were roughly 
equal (41 and 50 million dollars in 15 May 2006 respectively; RADA 2006). 
In the DHC programs, the donors signed the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with 
housing owners, and then built houses with or without subcontracts. On 15th May 2006, the 
DHC programs included 469 projects, 35,048 MoUs, 9,319 units under construction, and 5,979 
houses. Of the 35,048 MoUs, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and intergovernmental 
organizations (IGOs) accounted for 31,891 (91%), while governmental agencies signed the rest. 
Although it is unlikely that the government and LTTE misappropriated funding from the NGO-
managed programs, that does not mean that the DHC programs distributed resources to the 
government- and rebel-controlled areas proportionally to needs. Indeed, while only 6,274 MoUs 
                                                          
5 The TRO did not manage a large amount of disaster relief. For instance, 18 months after the 
tsunami, the TRO managed to build 836 permanent houses, significantly fewer than that of the 
RADA even accounting for its narrower regional coverage (TRO 2006). 
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were signed in the LTTE-held districts (Jaffna, Kilinochchi, and Mullaitivu), the government-
held districts saw over 28,000 MoUs by 15 May 2006 (RADA 2006).  
In contrast to the DHC programs, the OHC programs were implemented through the 
government. The donors supplied financial resources to the government, and then the 
government allocated cash to the house owners. Officially, the amount of payment was 250,000 
and 100,000 rupees with four and two installments for fully and partly damaged houses 
respectively. Although the exact numbers are unavailable, the OHC programs are reported to 
have been mostly funded by foreign governments and IGOs (RADA 2006). In addition, although 
the government could have allocated the OHC programs to the LTTE areas so as to mitigate the 
differential growth, the government decisions were substantially constrained by the local politics 
of disaster relief. Local politicians were reported to attract programs to their constituencies and 
hence to gain support from their respective publics (Frerks and Klem 2011; Moonesinghe 2007). 
By October 2005, while only 3,128 owners received the first installments in the LTTE-controlled 
districts (Jaffna, Kilinochchi, and Mullaitivu), the payment was made for 48,154 owners in the 
government-held districts (RADA 2006). 
Implications for Power Balance 
It appears that the disproportionate allocation of disaster relief allowed the government to 
expand its military capability with a short time lag. Although post-disaster reconstruction could 
influence the military power directly or indirectly, I focus on the indirect mechanism because the 
direct effects, including misappropriation of aid and fees on aid activities, are hard to observe. 
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As seen in the first pane of Figure A1-6-1, the 2004 Tsunami caused an upward spike in 
the aid inflow, which stayed at an elevated level until the end of the Eelam IV War. The influx of 
disaster aid stimulated the local economies. Athukorala and Resosudarmo (2005, 25–27), for 
Figure A1-6-1. Aid, Tax Revenue, and Military Expenditure 
 
Note: The amounts of bilateral aid inflows, tax revenue, and military expenditure 
in current LCU (World Bank 2015). The red dotted lines indicate the years of the 
natural disaster and the beginning of the Eelam IV War. The Eelam IV War 
ended in 2009. 
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instance, report that one year after the tsunami, Sri Lanka experienced a sharp 18 percent spike in 
investment growth, as opposed to the pre-tsunami prediction of 8.5 percent, which could even 
have offset the overall loss from the disaster. The reconstruction boom is also confirmed by the 
inflation of labor wages. Jayasuriya and McCawley (2008) mention that the wages of skilled 
laborers, such as carpenters and masons, doubled in several regions. The boom in housing 
reconstruction led to a labor scarcity, which in turn attracted further migration from the 
unaffected areas. The labor migration, combined with the resettlement through the OHC and 
DHC programs, resulted in a large demographic shift in Sri Lanka. 
The second panel in Figure A1-6-1 indicates that the aid influx corresponded to the 
increase in the government’s tax revenue. Although the tax revenue had been increasing since 
2003, the slope became steeper starting in 2005, and the tax revenue continued to expand during 
the Eelam IV War. Although we need to be careful about causal attribution, it appears that the 
government improved its fiscal base in the post-tsunami period. 
With a short time lag, the improvement in the government’s tax revenue led to an 
increase in its military expenditure. As seen in the third pane of Figure A1-6-1, although the aid 
inflow and the increased tax revenue did not immediately entail military expansion, they 
appeared to allow the government to strengthen its military after the onset of the Eelam IV War. 
In fact, it was in late 2005, just a half year before the Eelam IV War, that the government 
reassessed the strategic reasons for the failure of its counterinsurgency policies, leading to the 
conclusion that “the solution was to increase the force strength” (Hashim 2013, 187). The 
strategic reorientation made by the new Rajapaksa government led to the expansion of the 
military forces; “[b]etween 2005 and 2009 the armed forces increased from 125,000 men and 
women to around 450,000”(Hashim 2013, 188). 
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Note that the tactical reorientation was made at a very late stage of the post-tsunami 
period, and that its impact materialized in the military expenditure after the onset of the Eelam 
IV War. This is consistent with the bargaining argument, which hypothesizes that the initial 
implementations of reconstruction signals a future shift in the power balance. From a theoretical 
perspective, the differential growth starting in the early post-tsunami period and the strategic 
reorientation revealed the future power shift, which in turn created a strategic conundrum in the 
bargaining between the government and LTTE. 
The P-TOMS and Bargaining Failure 
The strategic impasse in bargaining can be seen in the failure of the P-TOMS. Soon after 
the tsunami, the government and LTTE signed the P-TOMS, which was supposed to allow the 
LTTE to manage the aid inflows for the entire northern region. Although the P-TOMS could 
have allowed a more rapid recovery in the LTTE-controlled north that might have mitigated the 
power shift, this did not happen. Part of the reason lies in the fact that the negotiators, especially 
the government’s representative President Kumaratunga, did not have a full control over post-
disaster reconstruction. Unlike the ceasefire agreement that she signed in 2002, the P-TOMS 
sparked large protests by Muslim and Sinhalese constituencies and elicited opposition from all 
parties except the president’s and Tamil-based parties. Even the coalition partner, JVP (Janatha 
Vimukthi Peramuna), left the government and brought the agreement to the Supreme Count. 
Finally, on 15 July 2005, the Court annulled the P-TOMS. The loss of the coalition partner also 
resulted in the fall of Kumaratunga’s government and the rise of a new president Rajapaksa in 
the November 2005 presidential election. Rajapaksa promised more resolute policies towards the 
LTTE, and indeed pursued the military expansion as I mentioned. 
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The sequence of events lends credence to the underlying assumption of the bargaining 
argument; the negotiators could hardly control the allocation of reconstruction materials. The 
vested local interests, as well as donors’ strategic incentives and bureaucratic processes, 
hampered the government from using post-disaster reconstruction for the purpose of the 
negotiation with the LTTE. When President Kumaratunga pursued the conciliatory policies 
toward the LTTE, she provoked a substantial backlash that ultimately brought down her 
government. 
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Appendix II: Supporting Information for: “The Drowning-out Effect: Voter Turnout, 
Uncertainty, and Protest 
SI 2-1. PROOF OF THE PROPOSITIONS 
In this section, I first derive the posterior belief about the size of protestors 𝑚 given the 
electoral outcomes 𝒗 = (𝑣𝑇 , 𝑣𝐿|𝑇). I then prove the Bayesian Perfect Equilibrium. 
Posterior Belief 
By Bayes’ Rule, the posterior of 𝑚 given 𝒗 is; 
Prob(𝑚|𝑣) =
Prob(𝒗|𝑚)Prob(𝑚)
Prob(𝒗)
 
=
Prob(𝑣𝐿|𝑇|𝑚, 𝑣𝑇)Prob(𝑣𝑇|𝑚)Prob(𝑚)
Prob(𝑣𝐿|𝑇|𝑣𝑇)Prob(𝑣𝑇)
 ⋯ (1). 
Consider each term in the last expression 
 
(a) Prob(𝑣𝐿|𝑇|𝑚, 𝑣𝑇) 
Note that all of the 𝑚 protestors must vote for L by the assumption 𝜏𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 > 𝜏𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 > 0. The 
probability that each of 𝑛 − 𝑚 non-protestors vote for L given its turnout is; 
Prob(𝜃𝑖 > 𝜏𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒|𝜃𝑖 < −𝜏𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 or 𝜏𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 < 𝜃𝑖 < 𝜏𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡) 
=
𝐹𝜃(𝜏𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡) − 𝐹𝜃(𝜏𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒)
𝐹𝜃(𝜏𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡) + 𝐹𝜃(−𝜏𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒) − 𝐹𝜃(𝜏𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒)
≡ 𝜌𝑎 . 
Then; 
 Prob(𝑣𝐿|𝑇|𝑚, 𝑣𝑇) = (
𝑛𝑣𝑇 − 𝑚
𝑛𝑣𝑇𝑣𝐿|𝑇 − 𝑚
) 𝜌𝑎
𝑛𝑣𝑇𝑣𝐿|𝑇−𝑚(1 − 𝜌𝑎)
𝑛𝑣𝑇(1−𝑣𝐿|𝑇). 
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(b) Prob(𝑣𝑇|𝑚) 
Note that all of the 𝑚  protestors must turnout by the assumption 𝜏𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 > 𝜏𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 > 0 . The 
probability that each of 𝑛 − 𝑚 non-protestors turns out is; 
Prob(𝜃𝑖 < −𝜏𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒|𝜃𝑖 < 𝜏𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡) + Prob(𝜃𝑖 > 𝜏𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒|𝜃𝑖 < 𝜏𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡) 
=
𝐹𝜃(𝜏𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡) + 𝐹𝜃(−𝜏𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒) − 𝐹𝜃(𝜏𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒)
𝐹𝜃(𝜏𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡)
≡ 𝜌𝑏 . 
Then; 
Prob(𝑣𝑇|𝑚) = (
𝑛 − 𝑚
𝑛𝑣𝑇 − 𝑚
) 𝜌𝑏
𝑛𝑣𝑇−𝑚(1 − 𝜌𝑏)
𝑛(1−𝑣𝑇). 
 
(c) Prob(𝑚) 
The prior probability that 𝑖 joins protest is; 
Prob(𝜃𝑖 > 𝜏𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡) = 1 − 𝐹𝜃(𝜏𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡) ≡ 𝜌𝑐 . 
Then; 
Prob(m) = (
𝑛
𝑚
) 𝜌𝑐
𝑚(1 − 𝜌𝑐)
𝑛−𝑚. 
 
(d) Prob(𝑣𝐿|𝑇|𝑣𝑇) 
The probability that 𝑖 votes for L given its turnout is; 
Prob(𝜃𝑖 > 𝜏𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒|𝜃𝑖 < −𝜏𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 or 𝜏𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 < 𝜃𝑖) =
1 − 𝐹𝜃(𝜏𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒)
1 + 𝐹𝜃(−𝜏𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒) − 𝐹𝜃(𝜏𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒)
≡ 𝜌𝑑 . 
Then; 
Prob(𝑣𝐿|𝑇|𝑣𝑇) = (
𝑛𝑣𝑇
𝑛𝑣𝐿|𝑇𝑣𝑇
) 𝜌𝑑
𝑛𝑣𝐿|𝑇𝑣𝑇(1 − 𝜌𝑑)
𝑛𝑣𝑇(1−𝑣𝐿|𝑇). 
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(e) Prob(𝑣𝑇) 
The probability that 𝑖 turns out is; 
Prob(𝜃𝑖 < −𝜏𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 or 𝜏𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 < 𝜃𝑖) = 1 + 𝐹𝜃(−𝜏𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒) − 𝐹𝜃(𝜏𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒) ≡ 𝜌𝑒 . 
Then; 
Prob(𝑣𝑇) = (
𝑛
𝑛𝑣𝑇
) 𝜌𝑒
𝑛𝑣𝑇(1 − 𝜌𝑒)
𝑛(1−𝑣𝑇). 
 
By inserting (a)-(e) into (1) and simplifying it, we obtain; 
Prob(𝑚|𝒗) = (
𝑛𝑣𝑇𝑣𝐿|𝑇
𝑚
) 𝛿𝑚(1 − 𝛿)𝑛𝑣𝑇𝑣𝐿|𝑇−𝑚, 
where 𝛿 =
1−𝐹𝜃(𝜏𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡)
1−𝐹𝜃(𝜏𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒)
. Let the CDF of the binomial distribution be 𝐹𝑚|𝒗 . By using normal 
approximation to the binomial distribution, the probability of 𝑚 < 𝜎𝑛  is approximated by 
𝐹𝑚|𝒗(𝜎𝑛) ≈ Φ (
𝜎𝑛−𝑛𝑣𝑇𝑣𝐿|𝑇𝛿 
√𝑛𝑣𝑇𝑣𝐿|𝑇𝛿(1−𝛿)
), where Φ is the standard normal CDF. 
Bayesian Perfect Equilibrium 
Since L knows the exact value of 𝑚, L’s response rule is the following. When 𝑚 ≥ 𝜎, L 
accepts the offer only if 𝑥 ≥ 1 − 𝑔. When 𝑚 < 𝜎𝑛, L accepts any offer as 𝑥 > −𝑔 is always 
satisfied. Given L’s response rule, W’s optimal offer is either 𝑥 = 0, which L accepts only if 𝑚 <
𝜎𝑛, or 𝑥 = 1 − 𝑔, which L accepts regardless of 𝑚. As seen in Figure A2-1-1, any other offer 
between 0 and 1 − 𝑔 reduces W’s payoff when W accepts. Any other offer between 1 − 𝑔 and 1 
will be accepted by L, but W receives less than what she receives by offering 1 − 𝑔. W’s expected 
payoff of offering 𝑥 = 0 and 1 − 𝑔 are; 
E[𝑢𝑊(𝑥 = 0)|𝒗] = Prob(𝑚 < 𝜎𝑛|𝒗) = 𝐹𝑚|𝒗(𝜎𝑛); 
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E[𝑢𝑊(𝑥 = 1 − 𝑔)|𝒗] = 𝑔. 
Thus, when 𝐹𝑚|𝒗(𝜎𝑛) ≥ 𝑔, W offers 𝑥
∗ = 0. When 𝐹𝑚|𝒗(𝜎𝑛) < 𝑔, W offers 𝑥
∗ = 1 − 𝑔. 
 
By the above discussion, when 𝐹𝑚|𝒗(𝜎𝑛) ≥ 𝑔, the strategy profile in Proposition 1 constitutes a 
Bayesian Perfect Equilibrium.  
Probability of Protest 
The probability of protest conditional on 𝒗 is 1 − 𝐹𝑚|𝒗(𝜎𝑛) ≈ 1 − Φ (
𝜎𝑛−𝑛𝑣𝑇𝑣𝑊|𝑇𝛿 
√𝑛𝑣𝑇𝑣𝑊|𝑇𝛿(1−𝛿)
), 
which is increasing with 𝑣𝑇 . In particular, the protest probability is increasing with 𝑣𝑇 for two 
reasons. The first is the effect through the variance term 𝑛𝑣𝑇𝑣𝑊|𝑇𝛿(1 − 𝛿) , which I call a 
drowning-out effect. High voter turnout increases the variance of the posterior distribution of 𝑚, 
which in turn increases the tail density of Prob(𝑚 ≥ 𝜎𝑛|𝒗). The second is the effect through the 
mean term 𝑛𝑣𝑇𝑣𝑊|𝑇𝛿. If the other conditions are constant, high turnout means more active citizens 
Figure A2-1-1. W’s Expected Utility with Respect to 𝒙 
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NOTE: The case of Prob(𝑚 < 𝜎𝑛|𝒗) > 𝑔 .The 
horizontal and vertical axes show W’s offer and her 
expected utility. 
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(whether they support W or L). As a result, in expectation, the number of potential protestors is 
also large as well. This increases the probability of protest after the election. Substantively, the 
mean-shift effect can be considered as a selection process: high turnout reflects the surge of 
political interests and hence has an effect to increase the likelihood of protests. The later empirical 
analysis teases out the drowning-out and mean-shift effects by using election-day rainfall deviation 
as an instrumental variable. Because the instrumental variable estimator is local to cost-sensitive 
voters (more precisely, units whose turnout are sensitive to election-day weather), the mean-shift 
effect, which is primarily concerned with the turnout of motivated voters, cannot explain the local 
effect.  
Finally, note that these arguments hold when 𝑔 is sufficiently small. By contrast, when 𝑔 
is not negligible (such as in autocracies), it creates a selection process; exactly because a large 𝑣𝑇 
means a higher probability of protest, it incentivizes W to offer 𝑥 = 1 − 𝑔 instead of 𝑥 = 0 and 
hence to avoid protest. That is, large 𝑣𝑇 makes the condition 𝐹𝑚|𝒗(𝜎𝑛) > 𝑔 unlikely to be satisfied, 
alters the equilibrium to one in which W offers 𝑥 = 1 − 𝑔 and L always accepts it, and hence 
eliminates any probability of protest. The selection process, however, does not exist when the 
coordination costs are sufficiently small such that 𝑔 ≤ 𝐹𝑚(𝜎𝑛) ≈ Φ (
(𝜎−𝛿)𝑛
√𝑛𝛿(1−𝛿)
), where 𝐹𝑚 is the 
CDF of a binomial distribution (
𝑛
𝑚
) 𝛿𝑚(1 − 𝛿)𝑛−𝑚 , and hence the equilibrium condition 𝑔 ≤
𝐹𝑚|𝒗(𝜎𝑛) is satisfied regardless of 𝑣𝑇. 
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SI 2-2. RAINFALL MEASUREMENT 
Table A2-2-1 is a list of possible data sources for the rainfall measurement. As seen in the 
table, the CMORPH provides the finest spatial resolution with the longest temporal coverage. For 
this reason, this study uses the CMORPH product. 
 
Because the CMORPH satellite images are available every 30 minutes, I calculate the 
rainfall deviation at every 30 minutes from 8:00 AM to 6:00 PM on polling days. The observed 
rainfall amount is the average rainfall amount within a boundary of a constituency.1 The normal 
                                                 
1  The constituency boundaries are obtained from the website of Sandip Sukhtankar 
(http://www.dartmouth.edu/~sandip/data.html: accessed on 29 September 2017) and a GitHub 
host of the DataMeet project (https://github.com/datameet: accessed on 29 September 2017). 
Table A2-2-1. Potential Data Sources 
Data Source 
Temporal 
Coverage 
Temporal 
Resolution 
Spatial 
Coverage 
Spatial 
Resolution 
Organization 
Global Precipitation Measurement 
(GPM) 
2014 – 30 min Global 0.1 NASA 
Tropical Rainfall Measurement 
Mission (TRMM) 
1998 – 3 hour 
Tropical 
regions 
0.25 NASA 
NOAA CPC Morphing Technique 
(CMORPH) 
1998 – 30 min Global 0.07 NOAA 
Precipitation Estimation from 
Remotely Sensed Information using 
Artificial Neural Networks 
(PERSIANN) 
2000 – 1 hour Global 0.25 UCI 
Precipitation Estimation from 
Remotely Sensed Information using 
Artificial Neural Networks Climate 
Data Record (PERSIANN CDR) 
1983 – Daily Global 0.25 UCI 
Quantitative Precipitation Estimates 
(K1-VHR-QPE) 
2008 – 30 min India 1 MOSDAC 
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rainfall amount is estimated by the average of the observed rainfall amounts in different years. In 
particular, as seen Figure A2-2-1, for observed rainfall at 11:30 AM on August 23, 2000 (the black 
bar), the corresponding normal rainfall is the average of the rainfall amounts at the times of the 
gray bars. The rainfall deviation at 11:30 AM is computed as the observed rainfall minus the 
average of the rainfall at the times of the gray bars. In this way, each normal rainfall is estimated 
from a sample of 187 observations, which should be sufficiently large. The daily aggregate is the 
average of the 30-minutes rainfall deviations. Although I could potentially use the 30-minutes 
rainfall deviations as separate instruments, the first-stage F statistic becomes small. This is because 
these variables are highly correlated and thus provide little additional information (the F statistic 
penalizes the inclusion of weak predictors). 
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SI 2-3. COVARIATES 
The covariates are derived from the Census of India 2001. The census data are available at 
the level of third administrative units, which are called “Tehsil”, “Taluk”, “Community 
Development Block”, “Sub-division”, and “Police Station”, depending on the states. The census 
Figure A2-2-1. Rainfall Deviation Measurement 
23 Aug
(polling)
24 Aug 25 Aug 26 Aug 27 Aug 28 Aug18 Aug 19 Aug 20 Aug 21 Aug 22 Aug
2000
23 Aug 24 Aug 25 Aug 26 Aug 27 Aug 28 Aug18 Aug 19 Aug 20 Aug 21 Aug 22 Aug
1999
23 Aug 24 Aug 25 Aug 26 Aug 27 Aug 28 Aug18 Aug 19 Aug 20 Aug 21 Aug 22 Aug
2000
23 Aug 24 Aug 25 Aug 26 Aug 27 Aug 28 Aug18 Aug 19 Aug 20 Aug 21 Aug 22 Aug
2014
11:30 AM
・
・
・
23 Aug 24 Aug 25 Aug 26 Aug 27 Aug 28 Aug18 Aug 19 Aug 20 Aug 21 Aug 22 Aug
1998
17 Aug 29 Aug
17 Aug
17 Aug
17 Aug
17 Aug
29 Aug
29 Aug
29 Aug
29 Aug
 
NOTE: Each row is a time window of a given year. The black bar is 11:30 AM on 23 August 2000. The 
gray bars are the dates whose rainfall amounts are used for calculating the normal rainfall of 11:30 
AM on 23 August 2000. 
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data are first projected to the boundary map of the third administrative units.2 The projected data 
are then transformed to 1 km-by-1 km grid cells (bilinear interpolation). Finally, for each assembly 
constituency, I calculate the average values. 
SI 2-4. DATA SUMMARY 
Figure A2-4-1 is the summary of the outcome, explanatory, instrument, and covariate 
variables. The first column shows the histograms of the covariates with and without post-election 
protest. The first row presents the corresponding boxplots with median and quantile values. The 
diagonal elements show the histograms of the covariates. The lower triangle of the figure (except 
for the first row and column) includes the scatter plots of the covariates. The upper triangle presents 
the correlation coefficients.  
                                                 
2 The boundaries of the third administrative units are obtained from a GitHub host of the DataMeet 
project (https://github.com/datameet: accessed on 29 September 2017). 
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Figure A2-4-1. Data Summary 
 
NOTE: The first row and column are the comparisons of the units with and without post-election 
protest. The other parts contain the histograms, scatter plots, and correlation coefficients of the 
explanatory, instrumental, and covariate variables.  
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The following figure (Figure A2-4-2) maps protests, turnout rates, and rainfall deviation 
for each constituency. The first map shows the constituencies that have at least one protest for the 
periods before and after the 2008 delimitation of the constituencies, and the second and third maps 
show the turnout rates and rainfall deviation averaged over the corresponding periods. The 
locations of protests fairly spread across the country, while the turnout rates are systematically low 
in the northern states, which is often attributed to the general lack of political interests in those 
regions. The systematic differences in turnout rates warns against naïve regressions of protests on 
turnout and justifies the use of the instrumental variable approach. By contrast, the average rainfall 
deviation has much less variation across the country with only a few exceptions. The average 
rainfall deviation is between -0.5 and 0.5 in a majority of constituencies, while a few constituencies 
in Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, and Jharkhand have large positive values.3 This is not surprising as 
there are only a few elections for each constituency, and hence if one election is held under heavy 
rainfall, the average rainfall deviation should take large values as well (however, by the law of 
large numbers, if there would be a sufficient number of elections, the average rainfall deviation 
should converge to zero). To be sure, in SI 2-13, I conduct a robustness check by removing the 
constituencies that take large values of average rainfall deviation. 
                                                 
3 131 out of 4375 constituencies (before the 2008 delimitation) and 104 out of 4369 constituencies 
(after the delimitation) take more than 0.5 in the average rainfall deviation. 
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Figure A2-4-2. Spatial Distribution of Protests, Turnout, and Rainfall Deviation 
 Pre-delimitation Elections Post-delimitation Elections 
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NOTE: The figure shows the spatial distribution of protests, turnout, and rainfall 
deviation in India. The first row shows the constituencies that have at least one protest 
for the periods before (left) and after (right) the 2008 delimitation of the 
constituencies. The second and third columns show the turnout rates and rainfall 
deviation averaged over the elections before (left) and after (right) the 2008 
delimitation. 
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SI 2-5. CONCURRENT STATE ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS 
Because the sample size is large, I subset the data to observations that have elections at the 
same period and apply the near-far matching to each subset. Table A2-5-1 lists the groups of the 
concurrent elections. Note that I cannot apply the near-far matching to each election, as some states, 
including Tripura, Mizoram, Meghalaya, Sikkim, and the Union Territories, are too small for the 
matching.  
Table A2-5-1. List of Concurrent Elections 
Election 
Group ID State Year 
Average 
Polling Date 
First 
Polling Date 
Last 
Polling Date n 
1 Haryana 2000 2000-02-22 2000-02-22 2000-02-22 90 
1 Manipur 2000 2000-02-17 2000-02-12 2000-03-08 60 
1 Orissa 2000 2000-02-19 2000-02-17 2000-02-22 147 
2 Assam 2001 2001-05-11 2001-05-10 2001-09-22 126 
2 Kerala 2001 2001-05-10 2001-05-10 2001-05-10 140 
2 Puducherry 2001 2001-05-08 2001-05-01 2001-05-10 24 
2 Tamil Nadu 2001 2001-05-10 2001-05-10 2001-05-10 231 
2 West Bengal 2001 2001-05-10 2001-05-10 2001-05-10 292 
3 Manipur 2002 2002-02-16 2002-02-14 2002-02-21 60 
3 Punjab 2002 2002-02-13 2002-02-13 2002-02-21 117 
3 Uttar Pradesh 2002 2002-02-18 2002-02-14 2002-05-31 403 
3 Uttarakhand 2002 2002-02-14 2002-02-14 2002-02-14 70 
4 Goa 2002 2002-05-30 2002-05-30 2002-05-30 38 
5 Gujarat 2002 2002-12-12 2002-12-12 2002-12-12 182 
6 Jammu and Kashmir 2002 2002-09-26 2002-09-16 2002-10-08 74 
7 Himachal Pradesh 2003 2003-03-02 2003-02-25 2003-06-08 68 
7 Meghalaya 2003 2003-02-26 2003-02-26 2003-02-26 60 
7 Nagaland 2003 2003-02-26 2003-02-26 2003-02-26 60 
7 Tripura 2003 2003-02-26 2003-02-26 2003-02-26 60 
8 Chhattisgarh 2003 2003-12-01 2003-12-01 2003-12-01 90 
8 Delhi 2003 2003-12-01 2003-12-01 2003-12-01 70 
8 Madhya Pradesh 2003 2003-12-01 2003-12-01 2003-12-01 230 
8 Mizoram 2003 2003-11-20 2003-11-20 2003-11-20 40 
8 Rajasthan 2003 2003-12-01 2003-12-01 2003-12-01 200 
9 Andhra Pradesh 2004 2004-04-23 2004-04-20 2004-04-26 294 
9 Karnataka 2004 2004-04-22 2004-04-20 2004-04-26 224 
9 Orissa 2004 2004-04-22 2004-04-20 2004-04-26 147 
9 Sikkim 2004 2004-05-10 2004-05-10 2004-05-10 27 
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10 Arunachal Pradesh 2004 2004-10-07 2004-10-07 2004-10-07 57 
10 Maharashtra 2004 2004-10-13 2004-10-13 2004-10-13 287 
11 Haryana 2005 2005-02-03 2005-02-03 2005-02-03 90 
11 Jharkhand 2005 2005-02-14 2005-02-03 2005-02-23 81 
12 Bihar 2005 2005-11-02 2005-10-18 2005-11-19 243 
13 Assam 2006 2006-04-06 2006-04-03 2006-04-10 126 
13 Kerala 2006 2006-04-26 2006-04-22 2006-05-03 140 
13 Puducherry 2006 2006-05-07 2006-05-03 2006-05-08 24 
13 Tamil Nadu 2006 2006-05-08 2006-05-08 2006-05-08 231 
13 West Bengal 2006 2006-04-27 2006-04-17 2006-05-16 292 
14 Manipur 2007 2007-02-13 2007-02-08 2007-02-23 60 
14 Punjab 2007 2007-02-13 2007-02-13 2007-02-13 117 
14 Uttarakhand 2007 2007-02-21 2007-02-21 2007-02-21 70 
15 Uttar Pradesh 2007 2007-04-22 2007-04-07 2007-05-08 403 
16 Goa 2007 2007-06-02 2007-06-02 2007-06-02 38 
17 Gujarat 2007 2007-12-13 2007-12-11 2007-12-16 182 
17 Himachal Pradesh 2007 2007-12-17 2007-11-14 2007-12-19 68 
18 Meghalaya 2008 2008-03-03 2008-03-03 2008-03-03 60 
18 Nagaland 2008 2008-03-05 2008-03-05 2008-03-05 60 
18 Tripura 2008 2008-02-23 2008-02-23 2008-02-23 59 
19 Karnataka 2008 2008-05-15 2008-05-10 2008-05-22 224 
20 Chhattisgarh 2008 2008-11-17 2008-11-14 2008-11-20 90 
20 Delhi 2008 2008-11-29 2008-11-29 2008-12-13 69 
20 Jammu and Kashmir 2008 2008-12-11 2008-11-17 2008-12-24 76 
20 Madhya Pradesh 2008 2008-11-27 2008-11-27 2008-11-27 230 
20 Mizoram 2008 2008-12-02 2008-12-02 2008-12-02 40 
20 Rajasthan 2008 2008-12-04 2008-12-04 2008-12-04 200 
21 Andhra Pradesh 2009 2009-04-19 2009-04-16 2009-04-23 294 
21 Orissa 2009 2009-04-19 2009-04-16 2009-04-23 147 
21 Sikkim 2009 2009-04-30 2009-04-30 2009-04-30 31 
22 Arunachal Pradesh 2009 2009-10-13 2009-10-13 2009-10-13 57 
22 Haryana 2009 2009-10-13 2009-10-13 2009-10-13 90 
22 Maharashtra 2009 2009-10-13 2009-10-13 2009-10-13 286 
23 Jharkhand 2009 2009-12-05 2009-11-25 2009-12-18 81 
24 Bihar 2010 2010-10-30 2010-10-21 2010-11-20 242 
25 Assam 2011 2011-04-07 2011-04-04 2011-04-11 126 
25 Kerala 2011 2011-04-13 2011-04-13 2011-04-13 140 
25 Puducherry 2011 2011-04-13 2011-04-13 2011-04-13 28 
25 Tamil Nadu 2011 2011-04-13 2011-04-13 2011-04-13 234 
25 West Bengal 2011 2011-04-27 2011-04-18 2011-05-10 294 
26 Goa 2012 2012-03-03 2012-03-03 2012-03-03 38 
26 Manipur 2012 2012-01-28 2012-01-28 2012-01-28 60 
26 Punjab 2012 2012-01-30 2012-01-30 2012-01-30 117 
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26 Uttar Pradesh 2012 2012-02-19 2012-02-08 2012-03-03 403 
26 Uttarakhand 2012 2012-01-30 2012-01-30 2012-01-30 70 
27 Himachal Pradesh 2012 2012-11-04 2012-11-04 2012-11-04 68 
28 Gujarat 2012 2012-12-15 2012-12-13 2012-12-17 162 
29 Meghalaya 2013 2013-02-23 2013-02-23 2013-02-23 60 
29 Nagaland 2013 2013-02-23 2013-02-23 2013-02-23 60 
29 Tripura 2013 2013-02-14 2013-02-14 2013-02-14 59 
30 Karnataka 2013 2013-05-05 2013-05-05 2013-05-05 224 
31 Chhattisgarh 2013 2013-11-17 2013-11-11 2013-11-19 90 
31 Delhi 2013 2013-12-04 2013-12-04 2013-12-04 69 
31 Madhya Pradesh 2013 2013-11-25 2013-11-25 2013-11-25 230 
31 Mizoram 2013 2013-11-25 2013-11-25 2013-11-25 40 
31 Rajasthan 2013 2013-12-01 2013-12-01 2013-12-13 200 
32 Arunachal Pradesh 2014 2014-04-09 2014-04-09 2014-04-09 49 
32 Orissa 2014 2014-04-13 2014-04-10 2014-04-17 147 
32 Sikkim 2014 2014-04-12 2014-04-12 2014-04-12 31 
33 Andhra Pradesh 2014 2014-05-04 2014-04-30 2014-05-07 293 
34 Haryana 2014 2014-10-15 2014-10-15 2014-10-15 90 
34 Maharashtra 2014 2014-10-15 2014-10-15 2014-10-15 285 
35 Jammu and Kashmir 2014 2014-12-07 2014-11-25 2014-12-20 76 
35 Jharkhand 2014 2014-12-08 2014-11-25 2014-12-20 74 
NOTE: The table shows the group ID, state, year, the first polling date, average polling date, last 
polling date, and the number of constituencies for each State Assembly election. 
 
SI 2-6. OPTIMIZATION OF THE NEAR-FAR MATCHING 
In the grid search of the tuning parameters, I repeat the near-far matching for a range of 𝜏 
and 𝜌 values and calculate the strength of the instrument and covariate balance metrics for each. 
The parameter 𝜏 is the threshold values above which the penalty is applied. The parameter 𝜌 is the 
proportion of discarded observations in the matching (in order to omit hardest-to-match 
observations). Because raw 𝜏 values are different depending on the scale of 𝑑𝑖𝑗 (the difference in 
the values of an instrumental variable), I use quantile of unique values of |𝑑𝑖𝑗| as a grid-search 
range of 𝜏. By using unique values, the quantile values are also ensured to be unique. This is 
beneficial as we do not repeat the matching for the same value of 𝜏. For instance, for  
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|𝑑𝑖𝑗| = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 4, 5, 5, 6,7,22, 25, 40, 41, 42), 
the unique quantile values are (0, 1.2, 2.4, 3.6, 4.8, 6, 10, 23.2, 34, 40.8). Let me denote the unique 
quantile as 𝜏′.  
Figure A2-6-1 to Figure A2-6-3 shows the first-stage F statistics, absolute means of the 
covariate differences, and averages of the variance ratios of the covariates for a range of tuning 
parameters 𝜏′ and 𝜌 . In Figure A2-6-1, there are two “hills” in which the F statistics are locally 
maximum: (𝜏′, 𝜌) ∈ {(0.3, 0.1), (0.9, 0.4)}. In Figure A2-6-2 and A2-6-3, these cells tend to have 
relatively worse covariate balances, but the imbalances do not exceed the recommended ranges. 
Taking the sample sizes into account, I choose (𝜏′, 𝜌) = (0.3, 0.1)  as the optimal value and 
conduct an additional analysis with tuning values (𝜏′, 𝜌) = (0.9, 0.4).  
  
186 
 
Figure A2-6-1. Grid-search of Tuning Parameters: First-stage F Statistics 
 
NOTE: Each value in the cell is a first-stage F statistic. The column is the proportions of discarded 
observations in the near-far matching (𝜌). The row is the threshold values (𝜏′; decile of the unique values 
of 𝑑𝑖𝑗). A high first-stage F statistic indicates a strong instrument. As a rule of thumb, the first-stage F 
statistic less than 10 is a warning sign of a weak instrument.  
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Figure A2-6-2. Grid-search of Tuning Parameters: Absolute Means of Covariate Differences 
 
NOTE: Each value in the cell is the mean of the absolute standardized differences of the covariates. The 
column is the proportions of discarded observations in the near-far matching (𝜌). The row is the threshold 
values (𝜏′; decile of the unique values of 𝑑𝑖𝑗). A small absolute mean indicates good covariate balance. As 
a rule of thumb, the absolute mean more than 0.2 is a warning sign of covariate imbalance.  
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Figure A2-6-3. Grid-search of Tuning Parameters: Means of Variance Ratios 
 
NOTE: Each value in the cell is the mean of variance ratios of the covariates. The column is the proportions 
of discarded observations in the near-far matching (𝜌). The row is the threshold values (𝜏′; decile of the 
unique values of 𝑑𝑖𝑗). A variance ratio around 1 indicates good covariate balance. As a rule of thumb, the 
variance ratio more than 2 or less than 0.5 is a warning sign of covariate imbalance. 
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When I conduct the near-far matching with tuning parameters 𝜏′ = 0.9 and 𝜌 = 0.4, the 
Hodge-Lehmann estimate of the causal effect of turnout on the onset of protest becomes 1.08 with 
the 95% confidence interval [0.20, 2.37]. The TSLS with covariates and standard error clustered 
for each constituency is 0.98 with a confidence interval of [0.02, 1.94]. The corresponding 
Anderson-Rubin confidence interval is [0.18, 2.33].  
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SI 2-7. COVARIATE BALANCE BEFORE AND AFTER NEAR-FAR MATCHING 
The following table (Table A2-7-1) presents the balance statistics without and with the 
near-far matching.4 The standardized differences are the average differences between the treated 
and control units divided by the standard deviation. The variance ratio is the variance among 
treated observations divided by that among control observations. As a rule of thumb, the 
standardized difference should be between -0.2 and 0.2 and ideally between -0.1 and 0.1, and the 
variance ratio should be between 0.5 and 2 (Rosenbaum 2009; Rubin 2001). As seen in the first 
two columns of Table A2-7-1, even though the rainfall deviation is expected to be randomly 
assigned, in a finite sample, there exist differences between those of abnormal rain and those of 
normal weather. Indeed, the constituencies that have a larger population, more scheduled castes 
and tribes, and less urban residents tend to receive treatments. The large standardized differences 
also indicate that linear regressions cannot adjust the differences without heavily relying on 
parametric assumptions (Rubin 2001). In contrast, as shown the last two columns of Table A2-7-
1 and also Figure A2-7-1, the near-far matching properly adjusts the remaining imbalances.  
  
                                                 
4 For non-matching, I use a dummy variable for positive rainfall deviation versus zero or negative 
deviation. The balance statistics of the near matching are similar to those of the near-far matching.  
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Table A2-7-1. Covariate Balance without and with the Near-far Matching 
 No Matching  Near-far Matching 
 Standardized 
Difference 
Variance 
Ratio 
 Standardized 
Difference 
Variance 
Ratio 
Population (log) 1.51 0.44  0.01 1.04 
Muslim 0.18 1.72  -0.01 0.97 
Scheduled castes and tribes 0.39 1.14  0.02 1.00 
Urban -0.27 0.65  -0.06 0.88 
Farmer -0.02 0.95  0.07 1.03 
NOTE: The table shows the balance statistics for the data without and with near-far matching. The 
standardized differences are the average differences between the treated and control units 
divided by the standard deviation. The variance ration is the variance among treated observations 
divided by that among control observations. The treated and control units are those of positive 
rainfall deviations and the rest of observations for the results without matching. As a rule of 
thumb, the standardized difference should be between -0.2 and 0.2. The variance ratio should be 
between 0.5 and 2. If the values are outside of these ranges, they are bolded.  
 
Figure A2-7-1. Covariate Balance after the Near-far Matching 
 
NOTE: Density plots of the covariates for treated and control units (after the near-
far matching).  
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SI 2-8. OTHER ESTIMATES 
This section provides the results of the OLS and TSLS estimates with and without the near-
far matching. 
OLS Estimate 
As seen in Table A2-8-1, the naïve OLS estimate is close to zero. The naïve OLS model 
includes the covariates and election-group fixed effects with standard errors clustered for 
constituencies.5 
 
TSLS Estimates without Near-far Matching 
I also estimate the TSLS with different specifications of the first-stage regressions without 
the nearfar matching (the other specifications are the same as the OLS: the controls for the 
covariates and election-group fixed effects with clustered standard errors). In particular, I create 
polynomials and cubic splines of the rainfall deviations and use them as instrumental variables. 
Unlike the other regression-based approach, these transformations do not harm the desirable 
properties of the TSLS (thus, there is no concern with so-called forbidden regression). While 
                                                 
5  For the purpose of the comparison with the results of the nearfar matching, in which 
constituencies are matched within each election group, I include the election-group fixed effects. 
For details of the election groups, see SI 2-5. 
Table A2-8-1. OLS Estimate of the Effect of Turnout on Protest 
Point Estimate 95% Confidence Interval 
-0.012 [-0.04, 0.02] 
NOTE: The table shows the OLS estimate with the covariates, election-
group fixed effects, and standard error clustered for constituencies. 
𝑛 = 11,500. 
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polynomial can be susceptible to overfitting, the spline transformation is more robust to overfitting. 
When the order of polynomial or cubic spline is 1, the first-stage regression is equivalent to the 
linear regression of turnout on the rainfall deviation variable (as well as the covariates and the 
election-group fixed effects). As the polynomial or spline order increases, it adds more flexibility 
to the model while decreasing the parsimony. Since the F statistics penalize overly complicated 
models, we can usually find a reasonable value of a polynomial or spline order that maximizes the 
first-stage F statistic.  
 As seen in Table A2-8-2 and A2-8-3, while the TSLS estimates with inflexible first-stage 
specifications are unstable and even negative with very small first-stage F statistics, the TSLS 
estimates are positive and stable with sufficiently high orders of the cubic splines. As seen in Table 
A2-8-2, the polynomial regressions do not greatly improve the instrument’s power. By contrast, 
as seen in Table A2-8-3, the spline regressions increase the F statistics close to the conventional 
threshold 𝐹 = 10. These results are consistent to the fact that spline regressions are less susceptible 
to overfitting than polynomial regressions (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998). In any case, the results 
indicate that if one could find a first-stage specification that can strongly predict turnout, the weak-
instrument biases become sufficiently small, and hence the regression-based estimates are similar 
to the non-parametric estimates in the main paper. When rainfall is a weak predictor of turnout, 
however, the weak-instrument biases become so large that the estimated effects become even 
negative.   
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Table A2-8-2. TSLS Estimate with Polynomial First-stages (No Near-far Matching) 
Polynomial order Estimate 95% CI First-stage F 
1 -0.95 [-1.92, 0.02] 2.50 
2 -0.10 [-0.87, 0.68] 4.92 
3 0.14 [-0.64, 0.93] 4.76 
4 0.29 [-0.41, 0.99] 5.51 
5 0.36 [-0.20, 0.93] 5.48 
6 0.34 [-0.16, 0.85] 4.35 
NOTE: The table shows the TSLS estimates with the covariates, election-group 
fixed effects, and standard error clustered for constituencies. In each of the 
regressions (row), rainfall instruments with a different order of polynomial 
are used. The first to fourth columns show the orders of the first-stage 
polynomial, the second-stage estimate of the effect of turnout on the onset 
of protests, the corresponding confidence intervals, and the first-stage F 
statistics. The optimal polynomial order is bolded. 𝑛 = 11,500. 
 
Table A2-8-3. TSLS Estimates with Spline First-stages (No Near-far Matching) 
Spline order Estimate 95% CI First-stage F 
1 -0.95 [-1.92, 0.02] 2.50 
2 -0.01 [-0.79, 0.77] 5.11 
3 0.43 [-0.14, 1.01] 6.89 
4 0.81 [0.25, 1.38] 9.27 
5 0.82 [0.27, 1.38] 8.88 
6 0.83 [0.28, 1.39] 8.01 
NOTE: The table shows the TSLS estimates with the covariates, election-group 
fixed effects, and standard error clustered for constituencies. In each of the 
regressions (row), rainfall instruments with a different order of cubic spline 
are used. The first to fourth columns show the orders of the first-stage splines, 
the second-stage estimate of the effect of turnout on the onset of protests, 
the corresponding confidence intervals, and the first-stage F statistics. The 
optimal spline order is bolded. 𝑛 = 11,500. 
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TSLS Estimates with Near-far Matching 
Finally, I also estimate the TSLS and corresponding Anderson-Rubin confidence interval 
after the near-far matching to account for potential temporal autocorrelation. As seen in the 
following table (Table A2-8-4), the results are similar to the main estimate. 
 
SI 2-9. POLLING-DAY PROTEST 
As a falsification test (a test that “falsifies” the claim that rainfall deviation affects poling-
day protest and thus it violates the exclusion restriction), I conduct a Fisher exact test for the 
contingency table of the treatment status and the onset of polling-day protest. Table A2-9-1 is the 
contingency table. The corresponding p-value is 1, providing no evidence that rainfall deviation 
would affect the risks of polling-day protest. 
 
SI 2-10. DIFFERENT TIME WINDOWS FOR POST-ELECTION PERIODS 
In the main analysis, I define the outcome variable as the onset of protest within one year 
after polls. Because there is no particular reason to use the one-year time window, I also conduct 
Table A2-8-4. TSLS Estimate with Near-far Matching 
Point Estimate 
95% Confidence Interval 
 Conventional  Anderson-Rubin 
1.63 [0.04, 3.21] [0.46, 5.13] 
NOTE: The table shows the TSLS estimate, its conventional confidence interval, and 
Anderson-Rubin confidence interval with the covariates, election-group fixed 
effects, and standard error clustered for constituencies. 𝑛 = 11,500. 
Table A2-9-1. Contingency Table of Treatment Status and Polling-day Protest 
 
Polling-day Protest 
No Protest Protest 
Treatment 
Status 
Control 5162 3 
Treated 5163 2 
Note: 𝑛 = 10,330. 
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an additional analysis. In particular, I estimate the causal effects with moving time windows; the 
first estimate is the effect on the onset of protest between a polling day and four months after the 
polling, the second is the effect on the onset of protest between the first month and five months 
after the polling day, and so forth. I repeat this procedure until I estimate the effect on the onset of 
protest between twenty and twenty-four months after the poll. The horizontal axis in Figure A2-
10-1 shows the middle month of a time window. The points and bars in Figure A2-10-1 are the 
Hodge-Lehman estimates and 95% confidence intervals. Note that the effect sizes become smaller 
than the main estimate as a protest probability within four months is smaller than the corresponding 
probability within one year. 
 
Figure A2-10-1. Rolling Estimates with Different Time Windows 
 
NOTE: The figure shows the results of the rolling estimates. On each month in the horizontal axis, I 
estimate the effect of turnout on the onset of protest within two months before and after the month. 
The points and bars are the estimates and 95% confidence intervals of the Hodge-Lehman estimator. 
The red dotted line indicates null effect. 
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The above figure (Figure A2-10-1) shows that the effects are pronounced from two to nine 
months after elections. It usually takes several months until governments devise new policies after 
elections. Moreover, as time passes, the information revealed by the elections will become obsolete 
and its effect on the protest will disappear. Admittedly, it is difficult to specify the exact time until 
a government revises its policies and the time until the information becomes obsolete, but those 
results (three to nine months after polling) are, at least, not unreasonable.  
SI 2-11. REPORTING BIASES AND PLACEBO TESTS 
If the satellite-based rainfall measure were to be contaminated by reporting biases for some 
reason, the reporting biases could explain the main finding. As seen in Figure A2-11-1, without 
any correlation between the instrumental variable (rainfall deviation) and reporting biases in the 
ICEWS dataset, the reporting biases do not bias the causal estimate. The mere existence of 
reporting biases or correlations between the explanatory variable (turnout) and the reporting biases 
is not sufficient to bias the causal estimate. Moreover, because reporting frequencies are likely to 
be positively correlated with the onset of post-election protests, the causal estimate would be 
spurious only when the rainfall deviation is also positively correlated with reporting frequencies. 
Otherwise, the causal estimate would understate the true causal effect of turnout on protests, and 
thus the true causal effect would be larger than the estimated.  
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Although I do not find compelling reasons for such a possibility, I also conduct a placebo 
tests by replacing the outcome variables to the incidence of protests one-year before polling. The 
pre-election protests should not be affected by turnout but can still positively correlate with 
reporting biases. Thus, in absence of correlations between rainfall deviation and reporting biases, 
we should see no discernible relationship between the instrument and the pre-election protests. By 
contrast, when there is a correlation between rainfall deviation and reporting biases, there should 
be a correlation between the rainfall deviation and the pre-election protests as well.  
The following table (Table A2-11-1) shows the estimate of a regression of the incidence of 
pre-election protests on the instrumental variable. As seen in the table, there is no evidence for 
possible relationship between protests and rainfall deviation. Moreover, the point estimate is 
negative, suggesting that the true causal estimate would be even stronger if there would happen to 
be reporting biases. 
Figure A2-11-1. Causal Diagrams in Presence of Reporting Biases 
rainfall 
deviation
turnout
post-election
protests
Reporting
++
Case 1: Reporting biases do not bias the causal estimate Case 2: Reporting biases do bias the causal estimate
rainfall 
deviation
turnout
post-election
protests
Reporting
++
++
??
 
NOTE: Causal diagrams with presence of reporting biases. In the left pane, reporting biases are 
associated with turnout but not with rainfall deviation, which does not bias the causal estimate. By 
contrast, in the right pane, reporting biases correlate with rainfall deviation, which does bias the IV 
estimate. 
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SI 2-12. LEAVE-ONE-STATE-OUT TESTS 
Because the sample includes several states that are distinct in many respects, such as 
Jammu and Kashmir, Bihar, Sikkim, and Arunachal Pradesh, I repeat the analyses by omitting 
observations within each state. Figure A2-12-1 presents the Hodge-Lehmann estimates of the 
effect of turnout on protests when I drop a state from the sample. The results show that the effect 
of turnout is robust to presence or absence of a certain state.  
Table A2-11-1. The Effect of the Treatment on the Incidence of Pre-election Protests 
Point Estimate 95% Confidence Interval 
-0.01 [-0.02, 0.001] 
NOTE: The OLS estimate. In the near-far matching, 10% of 
observations are discarded for the purpose of better balance. 𝑛 =
11,322. 
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SI 2-13. LARGE VALUES IN AVERAGE RAINFALL DEVIATION 
At the end of SI 2-4, I show that several constituencies take large values in average rainfall 
deviation, which is not surprising as there are only a few elections for each constituency, and hence 
if one election is held under heavy rainfall, the average rainfall deviation should take large values 
as well (by contrast, if there would be 100 or more elections, the mean rainfall deviation should 
converge to zero). To be sure, in this section, I drop those observations and re-estimate the effect 
of turnout on protest. In particular, based on the distribution of the average rainfall deviation in 
Figure A2-4-2, I drop constituencies whose absolute values of average rainfall deviation are over 
Figure A2-12-1. The Leave-one-state-out Tests 
 
NOTE: The figure shows the effect of turnout on the onset of protests when a certain state is omitted 
from the analysis. The horizontal and vertical axes are the names of the omitted states and the effect 
sizes. The points and error bars in the figure are the point estimates and corresponding 95% confidence 
intervals. The gray solid and dashed lines are the point estimate and corresponding 95% confidence 
interval when no state is dropped (the main estimate in the manuscript). 
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0.5.6 The following table (Table A2-13-1) shows the results. Although the effect size becomes 
slightly smaller, it still shows that high turnout has an effect to increase the risk of protests. 
 
SI 2-14. CASE STUDY: THE SINGUR CONFLICT 
In the bargaining model, I consider the following steps to protests; 
(1) A high turnout rate and the resultant changes in the vote shares update the winning 
party’s belief about their relative support bases; 
(2) The updated information incentivizes the winning party to take hardline policies; 
(3) The optimistic policies trigger protest, and the protest successfully forces the winning 
party to abandon the policies. 
Since it is not possible to quantify all of these strategic actions or to make rigorous causal 
inferences about their relationship, I focus on the effect of turnout on the onset of protests in the 
main analysis, which is probably one of the most counterintuitive implications of the model. An 
analytical narrative however is helpful for understanding the formal model. To this end, I provide 
a focused case study of the Singur Conflict after the 2006 West State Assembly Election. The 
Singur Conflict can be best understood as a so-called “on-regression-line” case (high turnout and 
                                                 
6 Those are 134 out of 4375 constituencies (before the 2008 delimitation) and 104 out of 4369 
constituencies (after the delimitation). 
Table A2-13-1. The Effect of Turnout on Protest 
Point Estimate 95% Confidence Interval 
1.39 [0.26, 3.08] 
NOTE: The Hodge-Lehmann estimate without constituencies whose 
absolute values of average rainfall deviation are over 0.5. In the near-
far matching, 10% of observations are discarded for the purpose of 
better balance. 𝑛 = 9,920. The first-stage F statistic is 25.46.  
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protest), meaning that the case is representative of the theoretical and empirical models in the main 
paper. This case selection strategy is suitable for the purpose of the analytical narrative, that is to 
illustrate the strategic dynamics of the formal model. The following table (Table A2-14-1) is a 
timeline of the Singur conflict, which I detail in the following subsections. 
 
Background 
Singur is a small rural town of about 20,000 people, located about 40 kilometers northwest 
from Kolkata, the state capital of West Bengal. Over 90% of the population were Hindi, and the 
Table A2-14-1. Timeline of the Singur Conflict and Elections 
2005-07-23 The central government of India enacted the Special Economic Zone Act 2005. 
2006-03-01 The schedule of the 2006 West Bengal State Assembly Election was announced.  
2006-04-17 The first poll of the West Bengal State Assembly Election. 
2006-05-08 The final poll of the West Bengal State Assembly Election. 
2006-05-11 The results of the election were announced. 
The Left Front won the 2006 West Bengal Assembly Election.  
2006-05-18 The government of West Bengal and Tata Motors jointly announced a Special 
Economic Zone plan at Singur, including construction of automobile factories. 
2006-06-01 The first protest by over 3000 people at Singur. 
2006-06-04 The Krishji Jami Raksha Committee, an organization of the protestors, was formed. 
2006-07-17 The government of West Bengal issued notices of the land acquisition. 
2006-07-26 The highway to Singur was blocked by the protestors. 
2006-07-31 The government of West Bengal formally signed an agreement with Salim Group. 
2006-08-08 A demonstration by about 5000 people at Singur. 
2006-09-01 Over 100 villagers prevented the government officials from entering Singur. 
2006-09-25 The government West Bengal started forceful land acquisition. 
A demonstration by about 5000 people at Singur. 
 Escalation of the protest, including demonstration, general strikes, suicides, and 
deployment of armed police forces. 
Mamata Banerjee, the leader of the Trinamool Congress party, started a hunger strike 
and emerged as an opposition leader. 
2008-10-03 Tata Motors announced their decision to move out from Singur. 
 De-escalation of the protest. Although the government of West Bengal did not officially 
return the lands, the residents returned their home. 
2011-05-11 The Trinamool Congress won the 2011 West Bengal Assembly Election. 
Mamata Banerjee was appointed as the Prime Minister of West Bengal. 
2011-06-14 The government of West Bengal officially returned the lands at Singur. 
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dominant economic sector was agriculture, including potatoes. After the central government of 
India enacted the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) Act in 2005, the Left Front, which had ruled West 
Bengal for nearly 30 years, started the preparation of the SEZ policies in West Bengal. Due to the 
proximity and highway access to Kolkata, Singur was considered as one of the six candidates of 
the SEZ. Although the West Bengal government did not publicly announce the Singur SEZ plan 
before the 2006 West Bengal State Assembly Election, they announced a similar plan at 
Nandigram, another rural town in West Bengal, creating a tension over the SEZ policies. No protest 
was however reported either at Singur or Nandigram before the 2006 election.  
High Turnout and Surprising Victory 
The West Bengal State Assembly Election in May 2006 ended with high turnout. The 
turnout rate increased from 75% in the last election to 81%, perhaps due to the increasing attention 
to the Nandigram dispute. Despite the tension, however, the Left Front won a surprising majority 
of the seats; the Communist Party of India (Marxist), the leading party of the leftist coalition, won 
176 out of 279 seats (63%), which was an increase of 33 seats from the last election. In total, the 
Left Front secured 81% of the votes and 78% of the seats. Although the victory could be attributed 
to a number of factors, the skillful combination of land redistribution and industrial policies, strong 
party machineries, and absence of strong competitors were often cited as primary reasons (The 
Hindu 2006).7 Interestingly, the landslide victory was surprising not only to general public but also 
                                                 
7 The Hindu. (16 April 2006). “Why the Left will win West Bengal again.” 
http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/why-the-left-will-win-west-bengal-
again/article3148130.ece (20 April 2018). 
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to the Left Front itself. After the election, the coalition leader Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee stated that 
the electoral results was “beyond all our expectations” (Outlook India 2006),8 implying that the 
electoral victory was not something expected by their prior beliefs.  
Government’s Optimism 
Given the high turnout, landslide victory, and public attention to the Nandigram conflict, 
it is not surprising that the government perceived the electoral victory as broad-based support for 
their SEZ policies. One week after the election (18 May 2006), the West Bengal government and 
Tata Motors jointly announced a new SEZ plan at Singur, including the acquisition of 10,000 acres 
of the land for the construction of automobile factories. Given the growing attention to the SEZ 
policies, this announcement was perceived as the government’s strong commitment to the SEZ 
policies. In fact, retrospectively, a witness states that “the poll outcome was wrongly interpreted 
as a popular support in favour of the path followed by the LF for industrialisation” (Dinda 2013, 
28). 
Protest and the Left Front’s Demise 
The government’s policy however triggered a series of protests at Singur. The first protest 
occurred in 1 June 2006 by over 3,000 landowners, and the protest entailed a series of 
demonstrations and strikes for several months. Although most of the protests are peaceful, the 
leftist government took hardline policies against the protestors, including the forceful land 
                                                 
8 Outlook India. (11 May 2006). “Buddha Smiles.” 
https://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/buddha-smiles/231201(20 April 2018). 
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acquisition (25 September 2006), deployment of armed police (7 November 2006), and prohibition 
of public gathering at Singur (30 November 2006). 
The government was however eventually forced to abandon the SEZ policies at Singur. 
The prohibition of assemblies was quashed by the Calcutta High Court on 14 February 2007. Tata 
Motors, which was increasingly concerned about the escalation of the protest and possible 
damages to its brand images, announced the relocation of the car manufacture plan on 3 October 
2008. Not only failing to implement the policy, the Left Front was also forced to pay large, in fact 
fatal, political costs. The Singur conflict created the pro-industrialist image of the Leftist Front, 
alienating the large segment of the peasant voters. Moreover, although “the opposition parties had 
no leader who could match the charisma of Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee” (Outlook India 2006)9 in 
the 2006 election, Mamata Banerjee, the leader of the Trinamool Congress party, emerged as a 
strong competitor out of the Singur movement. Not only did she organize a series of 
demonstrations and strikes, but also she committed herself to a hunger strike for a month, 
successfully creating a heroic image of an opposition leader. In the 2011 West Bengal State 
Assembly Election, “[t]he Trinamool Congress rose like a phoenix from the Singur and Nandigram 
movements chipping away at the hold of the Left Front to sweep into the portals of power in West 
Bengal after 34 years of uninterrupted Marxist rule” (The Economic Times 2011).10 The Triamool 
                                                 
9 Outlook India. (11 May 2006). “Buddha Smiles.” 
https://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/buddha-smiles/231201 (20 April 2018). 
10  The Economic Times. (13 May 2011). “Assembly election 2011 West Bengal: Trinamool 
Congress rises like phoenix.” https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-
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Congress obtained 227 out of 296 seats, a dramatic increase by 197 seats from the last election. 
With the landslide victory, on 14 June 2011, Mamata Banerjee issued the land rehabilitation law 
to return the disputed land to their owners with compensation packages.  
Discussion 
Thus, at the end, the Singur SEZ policy was disastrous to the Left Front; they were not only 
forced to abandon the policy but also lost the election. Given these large costs, it would be hard to 
argue that the Left Front precisely understood that the consequences of the Singur SEZ policy. A 
more plausible explanation is that the Left Front miscalculated the strategic consequences. One 
source of such strategic miscalculation can be traced back to the high turnout and landslide victory 
in the 2006 election, which gave an impression that people would have unanimously supported the 
SEZ policies. Although it still remains unclear in the case of Singur conflict whether the high 
turnout or vote share was the main cause of the miscalculation, the landslide victory itself would 
have not been misinterpreted as broad-based support if the turnout rate would have been lower. In 
fact, the analysis in the main paper (Table 4) shows that a larger number of loser votes increases 
the risk of post-election protests. 
Note that even though the Singur conflict involved a series of strikes and hunger strikes, 
the first incident was a peaceful demonstration. At the early stage of the conflict, the organizational 
support, especially from the Triamool Congress, was limited, and hence the contesters had few 
choices other than demonstration; given their peasantry occupations, strikes would be hard to 
                                                 
nation/assembly-election-2011-west-bengal-trinamool-congress-rises-like-
phoenix/articleshow/8293363.cms (20 April 2018). 
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organize, and hunger strikes would also be too costly for them. Only after the Triamool Congress 
intervened the conflict and Mamata Banerjee exploited the case for her political aspiration, the 
opposition was able to organize and initiate strikes and hunger strikes. Thus, strikes and hunger 
strikes may or may not occur depending on particular political contexts, the onset of demonstration 
is less likely to be conditioned by these factors. This is consistent with the argument in the main 
paper (see Causal Mechanisms I subsection in the main paper). 
Finally, in the case of the Singur conflict, the first protest occurred one month after the 
election. However, this fact does not necessarily contradict the findings in SI 2-10 that the turnout 
has a particular strong effect in three to nine months after elections, as the quantitative estimates 
are average effects. In fact, in the case of the Singur conflict, the government had a sufficient 
amount of time for policy making even before the election. After the central government of India 
enacted the Special Economic Zone Act 2005 (23 July), the West Bengal government started the 
preparation of the SEZ policy. This means that the West Bengal government was able to spend 
over eight months for the policy preparation even before the 2006 election. Therefore, if a 
government would have started the policy preparation after the election, or if opposition parties 
would have won the election and begun policy making, ceteris paribus, the new policy proposal 
should have been delayed by eight months. This means that if all conditions would have been the 
same, the protests should have occurred 8 + 1 = 9  months after the election. The weighted 
average of the observed and counterfactual cases indicates 1(1 − 𝑤) + 9𝑤 ∈ [1,9] months (𝑤 ∈
[0,1] is the proportion of counterfactual cases), which is roughly consistent with the quantitative 
finding. Thus, even though we need to be careful of generalizing these stylistic facts, there is a 
good reason to believe that the case of the Singur conflict is not inconsistent with the quantitative 
findings.  
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Appendix III: Supporting Information for “It Never Rains But It Storms: Armed 
Conflict and Maritime Piracy as Strategic Substitutes” 
SI 3-1. FORMAL ANALYSIS 
The problem is maximizing 𝑢 = (𝑏𝐺 − 𝑦𝐺)𝑦𝐺 − 𝑐𝐺𝑦𝐺 + (𝑏𝑀 − 𝑦𝑀)𝑦𝑀 − 𝑐𝑀𝑦𝑀 subject to 
a resource constraint 𝑦𝐺 + 𝑦𝑀 ≤ 𝑟 and 𝑦𝐺 , 𝑦𝑀 ≥ 0. I solve the optimization problem by using the 
Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions (Kuhn and Tucker 1951). The Lagrangian is; 
𝐿 = (𝑏𝐺 − 𝑦𝐺)𝑦𝐺 − 𝑐𝐺𝑦𝐺 + (𝑏𝑀 − 𝑦𝑀)𝑦𝑀 − 𝑐𝑀𝑦𝑀 − 𝜆(𝑦𝐺 + 𝑦𝑀 − 𝑟).  
Then, the KKT conditions are; 
{
 
 
 
 
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑦𝐺
≤ 0,  𝑦𝐺
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑦𝐺
= 0,  and 0 ≤ 𝑦𝐺 ≤ 𝑟 − 𝑦𝑀
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑦𝑀
≤ 0,  𝑦𝑀
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑦𝑀
= 0,  and 0 ≤ 𝑦𝑀 ≤ 𝑟 − 𝑦𝐺
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝜆
≤ 0,  𝜆
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝜆
= 0,  and 𝜆 ≥ 0
. 
1. Interior solutions: 𝜆 = 0 
1.1. When 𝑦𝐺 = 𝑦𝑀 = 0 
The KKT condition is 𝑦𝐺 = 𝑦𝑀 = 0, 𝑐𝐺 > 𝑏𝐺 , and 𝑐𝑀 > 𝑏𝐺. 
1.2. When 𝑦𝐺 > 0 and 𝑦𝑀 = 0 
The KKT condition is 𝑦𝐺 =
𝑏𝐺−𝑐𝐺
2
, 𝑦𝑀 = 0, 𝑏𝐺 − 2𝑟 < 𝑐𝐺 ≤ 𝑏𝐺 , and 𝑐𝑀 > 𝑏𝑀. 
1.3. When 𝑦𝐺 = 0 and 𝑦𝑀 > 0 
The KKT condition is 𝑦𝐺 = 0, 𝑦𝑀 =
𝑏𝑀−𝑐𝑀
2
, 𝑐𝐺 > 𝑏𝐺 , and 𝑏𝑀 − 2𝑟 < 𝑐𝑀 ≤ 𝑏𝑀. 
1.4. When 𝑦𝐺 , 𝑦𝑀 > 0 
The KKT condition is 𝑦𝐺 =
𝑏𝐺−𝑐𝐺
2
, 𝑦𝑀 =
𝑏𝑀−𝑐𝑀
2
, 𝑐𝐺 ≤ 𝑏𝐺 , 𝑐𝑀 ≤ 𝑏𝑀, and 𝑐𝐺 + 𝑐𝑀 > 𝑏𝐺 +
𝑏𝑀 − 2𝑟. 
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2. Boundary solutions: λ > 0 
2.1. When 𝑦𝐺 = 𝑟 and 𝑦𝑀 = 0 
The KKT condition is 𝑦𝐺 = 𝑟, 𝑦𝑀 = 0, 0 < 𝑐𝐺 < 𝑏𝐺 − 2𝑟, and 𝑐𝐺 − 𝑐𝑀 ≤ 𝑏𝐺 − 𝑏𝑀 − 2𝑟. 
2.2. When 𝑦𝐺 = 0 and 𝑦𝑀 = 𝑟 
The KKT condition is 𝑦𝐺 = 0, 𝑦𝑀 = 𝑟, 0 < 𝑐𝑀 < 𝑏𝑀 − 2𝑟, and 𝑐𝐺 − 𝑐𝑀 ≥ 𝑏𝐺 − 𝑏𝑀 + 2𝑟. 
2.3. When 𝑦𝐺 , 𝑦𝑀 > 0 
The KKT condition is reduced to 𝑦𝐺 =
𝑏𝐺−𝑏𝑀−𝑐𝐺+𝑐𝑀+2𝑟
4
, 𝑦𝑀 =
−𝑏𝐺+𝑏𝑀+𝑐𝐺−𝑐𝑀+2𝑟
4
, 𝜆 =
𝑏𝐺+𝑏𝑀−𝑐𝐺−𝑐𝑀−2𝑟
2
, and 𝑥𝐺 , 𝑥𝑀 , 𝜆 > 0. The later inequalities give binding conditions 𝑏𝐺 −
𝑏𝑀 − 2𝑟 < 𝑐𝐺 − 𝑐𝑀 < 𝑏𝐺 − 𝑏𝑀 + 2𝑟 and 𝑐𝐺 + 𝑐𝑀 < 𝑏𝐺 + 𝑏𝑀 − 2𝑟. 
In summary, rebels’ optimal choices are; 
(𝑦𝑀, 𝑦𝐺) =
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0, 0) if 𝑐𝐺 > 𝑏𝐺  and 𝑐𝑀 > 𝑏𝐺
(0,
𝑏𝐺−𝑐𝐺
2
) if 𝑏𝐺 − 2𝑟 < 𝑐𝐺 ≤ 𝑏𝐺  and 𝑐𝑀 > 𝑏𝑀
(
𝑏𝑀−𝑐𝑀
2
, 0) if 𝑐𝐺 > 𝑏𝐺  and 𝑏𝑀 − 2𝑟 < 𝑐𝑀 ≤ 𝑏𝑀
(
𝑏𝑀−𝑐𝑀
2
,
𝑏𝐺−𝑐𝐺
2
) if 𝑐𝐺 ≤ 𝑏𝐺 , 𝑐𝑀 ≤ 𝑏𝑀, and 𝑐𝐺 + 𝑐𝑀 > 𝑏𝐺 + 𝑏𝑀 − 2𝑟
(0, 𝑟) if 0 < 𝑐𝐺 < 𝑏𝐺 − 2𝑟 and 𝑐𝐺 − 𝑐𝑀 ≤ 𝑏𝐺 − 𝑏𝑀 − 2𝑟
(𝑟, 0) if 0 < 𝑐𝑀 < 𝑏𝑀 − 2𝑟 and 𝑐𝐺 − 𝑐𝑀 ≥ 𝑏𝐺 − 𝑏𝑀 + 2𝑟
(
−𝑏𝐺+𝑏𝑀+𝑐𝐺−𝑐𝑀+2𝑟
4
,
𝑏𝐺−𝑏𝑀−𝑐𝐺+𝑐𝑀+2𝑟
4
 ) if 𝑏𝐺 − 𝑏𝑀 − 2𝑟 < 𝑐𝐺 − 𝑐𝑀 < 𝑏𝐺 − 𝑏𝑀 + 2𝑟 and 𝑐𝐺 + 𝑐𝑀 < 𝑏𝐺 + 𝑏𝑀 − 2𝑟
. 
The corresponding outcomes (𝑌𝑀, 𝑌𝐺) = (I(𝑦𝑀 > 0), I(𝑦𝐺 > 0)) are; 
(𝑌𝑀, 𝑌𝐺) =
{
 
 
(0, 0) if 𝑐𝐺 > 𝑏𝐺  and 𝑐𝑀 > 𝑏𝐺
(0,1) if 𝑐𝐺 ≤ 𝑏𝐺  and (𝑐𝑀 > 𝑏𝑀 or 𝑐𝐺 − 𝑐𝑀 ≤ 𝑏𝐺 − 𝑏𝑀 − 2𝑟)
(1, 0) if (𝑐𝐺 > 𝑏𝐺 or 𝑐𝐺 − 𝑐𝑀 ≥ 𝑏𝐺 − 𝑏𝑀 + 2𝑟) and 𝑐𝑀 ≤ 𝑏𝑀
(1,1 ) if 𝑐𝐺 ≤ 𝑏𝐺 , 𝑐𝑀 ≤ 𝑏𝑀, and 𝑏𝐺 − 𝑏𝑀 − 2𝑟 < 𝑐𝐺 − 𝑐𝑀 < 𝑏𝐺 − 𝑏𝑀 + 2𝑟
. 
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SI 3-2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
This supporting information provides basic information of the data that are used in the main 
analysis. The following table (Table A3-2-1) lists the countries and periods that are selected based 
on the criteria I detailed in the paper. 
 
The following figures (Figure A3-2-1 and Figure A3-2-2) show descriptive statistics of the weather 
variables before and after they are de-meaned, deseasoned, and standardized. As seen in the 
relationship between annual rainfall and wind speed in Figure A3-2-1, without transformation, the 
variables have differences across countries, resulting in non-smooth distribution and bivariate 
relationships.  
Table A3-2-1. List of Countries 
Country n Beginning End Country n Beginning End 
Algeria 5845 12/31/2000 12/31/2016 Liberia 1056 12/31/2000 11/21/2003 
Angola 3288 12/31/2000 12/31/2009 Libya 1745 2/28/2012 12/7/2016 
Bangladesh 5845 12/31/2000 12/31/2016 Malaysia 4498 12/31/2000 4/24/2013 
Colombia 5843 12/31/2000 12/29/2016 Mauritania 3946 12/31/2000 10/20/2011 
Congo 5824 12/31/2000 12/10/2016 Mozambique 5783 12/31/2000 10/30/2016 
DRC 5845 12/31/2000 12/31/2016 Myanmar 5845 12/31/2000 12/31/2016 
Ivory Coast 2778 9/19/2003 4/27/2011 Nigeria 5845 12/31/2000 12/31/2016 
Egypt 5845 12/31/2000 12/31/2016 Peru 3652 12/31/2000 12/30/2010 
Eritrea 952 12/31/2000 8/9/2003 Philippines 5845 12/31/2000 12/31/2016 
Haiti 1420 12/31/2000 11/19/2004 Senegal 4017 12/31/2000 12/30/2011 
India 5845 12/31/2000 12/31/2016 Sierra Leone 355 12/31/2000 12/20/2001 
Indonesia 1747 12/31/2000 10/12/2005 Somalia 5845 12/31/2000 12/31/2016 
Iran 5834 12/31/2000 12/20/2016 Sri Lanka 3108 12/31/2000 7/4/2009 
Iraq 5845 12/31/2000 12/31/2016 Thailand 5845 12/31/2000 12/31/2016 
Kenya 5845 12/31/2000 12/31/2016 Yemen 5845 12/31/2000 12/31/2016 
NOTE: The table lists the countries that are selected based on the criteria which I detailed in the paper. 
The table also provides the numbers of observations, earliest dates, and last dates of the observations 
for the countries. 
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Figure A3-2-1. Descriptive Statistics (before transformation) 
 
NOTE: The figure shows the descriptive of statistics of the weather variables before they are de-
meaned, deseasoned, and standardized. The diagonal panes are density plots of the variables. The 
panes in the lower corner are bivariate scatter plots of the variables. The panes in the upper corner 
show the correlation coefficients of the variables.  
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Figure A3-2-2. Descriptive Statistics (after transformation) 
 
NOTE: The figure shows the descriptive of statistics of the weather variables after they are de-meaned, 
deseasoned, and standardized. The diagonal panes are density plots of the variables. The panes in the 
lower corner are bivariate scatter plots of the variables. The panes in the upper corner show the 
correlation coefficients of the variables.  
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Finally, the following table (Table A3-2-2) is a contingency table of violence and piracy (before 
they are de-meaned, de-seasoned, and standardized). As seen in the table, although there are a fair 
numbers of violent and piracy events, it is extremely rare to have both violence and piracy. 
 
SI 3-3. DIFFERENT THRESHOLDS OF COASTAL DISTANCES 
In the paper, I use 100 kilometers as a threshold for determining the coastal land and sea 
areas. In this robustness check, I conduct additional analyses with two different thresholds: 50 and 
200 kilometers. The following table (Table 1) shows the results of the analyses. 
  
With the 200-kilometer threshold, the p-value of the interactive effect on violence (third column 
of Table ) increases to 0.055. This can explained by the fact that with the 200-kilometer threshold, 
Table A3-2-2. Contingency Table 
 𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 
0 1 
𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 
0 
119,659 
(90.77%) 
22,278 
(1.73%) 
1 
9,445 
(7.16%) 
449 
(0.34%) 
NOTE: The table is a contingency table of 𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 and 𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡. The parentheses 
are proportions in the sample 
Table A3-3-1. Results with Different Thresholds of Coastal Distances 
 50-kilometer threshold 200-kilometer threshold 
Outcome 𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 
𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 
-0.0038 
[-0.0100, 0.0024] 
0.0039 
[0.00032, 0.0074] 
-0.0044 
[-0.0110, 0.0021] 
0.00073 
[-0.0031, 0.0045] 
𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 
-0.0020 
[-0.0092, 0.0053] 
-0.0050 
[-0.0106, 0.0007] 
-0.0053 
[-0.0159, 0.0053] 
-0.0041 
[-0.0096, 0.0015] 
𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 
-0.0054 
[-0.0093, -0.0015] 
0.0065 
[-0.0026, 0.0156] 
-0.0032 
[-0.00642, 0.0001] 
0.006 
[-0.0016, 0.0122] 
NOTE: The table shows the OLS estimates of the standardized coefficients. The 95% confidence 
intervals (based on clustered standard errors and corrected degrees of freedom) are in brackets. The 
models include country fixed effects, country-month-day fixed effects, cubic splines of common time 
trends. The control variables are the past-one-year averages of ground rainfall and ocean wind speed, 
and their interaction. 𝑛 = 131,831  with 30 coastal conflict countries for 2001-2016 period.  
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the violent events include those in far inland areas, which are less relevant to piracy or ocean 
weather conditions. 
SI 3-4. RESULTS WITH THE GTD AND MPELD MEASURES 
Although I use the UCDP GED and MPD as main data sources of violence and piracy in 
the main analysis, it is also useful to check the robustness of the findings with different datasets. 
To this end, I present the results with the Global Terrorism Database (GTD; LaFree and Dugan 
2007) and the Maritime Piracy Event and Location Dataset (MPELD; Daxecker and Prins 2013) 
in this supporting information. As seen in Table A3-4-1, the main results hold even with those 
alternative measures. 
 
When I use the MPELD measure for 𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡, the interactive effect becomes positive and 
statistically significant. However, as I mentioned in the paper, this does not necessarily mean that 
there would be complementary relationship between violence and piracy. Since the MPELD does 
not identify the origins of pirates and includes pirate attacks that occurred within 100 kilometers 
from coastal lines of a country, one possible explanation would be that while rebels in country 𝑖 
Table A3-4-1. Results with Alternative Measures of Violence and Piracy 
Outcome 
𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 
(GTD) 
𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 
(MPELD) 
𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 
-0.0019 
[-0.0115, 0.0076] 
0.0033 
[-0.0031, 0.0097] 
𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 
-0.0056 
[-0.0158, 0.0045] 
-0.0061 
[-0.0142, 0.0021] 
𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 
-0.0049 
[-0.0088, -0.0009] 
0.0075 
[0.0006, 0.0143] 
NOTE: The table shows the OLS estimates of the standardized coefficients. The 95% confidence 
intervals (based on clustered standard errors and corrected degrees of freedom) are in brackets. The 
models include country fixed effects, country-month-day fixed effects, cubic splines of common time 
trends. The control variables are the past-one-year averages of ground rainfall and ocean wind speed, 
and their interaction. 𝑛 = 131,831  with 30 coastal conflict countries for 2001-2016 period.  
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are less or no more likely to engage in neither ground nor marine military activities with stormy 
weather, it actually invites an even larger number of foreign pirates who try to exploit the void, 
resulting in an increase in reported piracy events. Formally establishing this argument or rigorously 
testing the hypothesis is beyond the scope of this paper, so I leave it as a task for future studies. 
For the purpose of this paper, it is sufficient to state that the information about pirates’ origins is 
critical for the main analysis. 
SI 3-5. CONTROLLING FOR TEMPERATURE 
In the paper, I do not include temperature as a control variable, as rainfall can causally 
affect temperature and hence controlling for temperature can cause a bias due to the posttreatment 
control. It is, however, likely that temperature correlates with rainfall and also affects violence and 
piracy, creating a backdoor path, 𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 ← 𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 → 𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 → 𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒. In this 
supporting information, I therefore control for daily minimum and maximum temperatures in order 
to account for possible omitted variable biases. The temperature data come from NOAA Climate 
Prediction Center (CPC) Global Temperature Monitoring dataset, which is available daily at a 
spatial resolution of 0.5-degree by 0.5-degree grid cells (NOAA 2018). As seen Table A3-5-1, 
controlling for temperature does not alter my findings. 
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SI 3-6. DIFFERENT MOVING AVERAGES OF WEATHER VARIABLES 
In the paper, I control for past-one-year averages of rainfall and ocean wind speed to account for 
the effect of long-term weather conditions, such as those on crop production and economic growth 
(Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti 2004). Controlling for long-term weather conditions is useful to 
limit the focus to day-to-day tactical variation. I use the one-year-averages as they always include 
every season in a year regardless of countries. However, it is useful to show the results with 
different moving averages of the weather variables. The following table (Table A3-6-1) shows the 
results with controls for past-one-month or past-one-week averages of the rainfall and ocean wind 
speed. As seen in the table, the main results hold even with these controls. 
Table A3-5-1. Results with Controlling for Temperature 
Outcome 𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 
𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 
-0.0053 
[-0.0132, 0.0026] 
0.0016 
[-0.0026, 0.0058] 
𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 
-0.0038 
[-0.0125, 0.0048] 
-0.0059 
[-0.0122, 0.0004] 
𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 
-0.0040 
[-0.0065, -0.0015] 
0.0061 
[-0.0022, 0.0144] 
NOTE: The table shows the OLS estimates of the standardized coefficients. The 95% confidence 
intervals (based on clustered standard errors and corrected degrees of freedom) are in brackets. The 
models include country fixed effects, country-month-day fixed effects, cubic splines of common time 
trends. The control variables are the past-one-year averages of ground rainfall and ocean wind speed, 
their interaction, and daily minimum and maximum temperature. 𝑛 = 131,831  with 30 coastal conflict 
countries for 2001-2016 period.  
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SI 3-7. CONTROLLING FOR COUNTRY-SPECIFIC TRENDS 
In this supporting information, I present the results with controls for cubic splines of country-
specific trend variables, which can account for unobserved time-varying heterogeneities within 
countries. For instance, even though the common trend variable in the main model can account for 
climate changes and global warming, each country might have a different climate change trend. In 
this case, the country-specific trend variables can account for the heterogeneities within countries. 
The following table (Table A3-7-1) indicates that this does not change the results. 
Table A3-6-1. Control for Past-one-month or Past-one-week Mean of Rainfall and Wind 
 Past-one-month Averages Past-one-week Averages 
Outcome 𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 
𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 
-0.0032 
[-0.0092, 0.0028] 
0.0019 
[-0.0018, 0.0057] 
-0.0035 
[-0.0098, 0.0028] 
0.00220 
[-0.0012, 0.0056] 
𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 
-0.0019 
[-0.0105, 0.0066] 
-0.0032 
[-0.0091, 0.0027] 
-0.0021 
[-0.0117, 0.0075] 
-0.0045 
[-0.0104, 0.0013] 
𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 
-0.0042 
[-0.0069, -0.0014] 
0.0051 
[-0.0027, 0.0130] 
-0.0045 
[-0.0075, -0.0016] 
0.0060 
[-0.0025, 0.0145] 
NOTE: The table shows the OLS estimates of the standardized coefficients. The 95% confidence 
intervals (based on clustered standard errors and corrected degrees of freedom) are in brackets. The 
models include country fixed effects, country-month-day fixed effects, cubic splines of common time 
trends. The control variables are the past-one-month (first and second columns) or past-one-week (third 
and fourth columns) averages of ground rainfall and ocean wind speed, and their interaction. 𝑛 =
131,831  with 30 coastal conflict countries for 2001-2016 period.  
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SI 3-8. CONTROLLING FOR COUNTRY-YEAR FIXED EFFECTS 
Although it is unlikely that covariates, such as GDP per capita and democracy indexes, would 
affect the weather variable and bias the causal estimates, it is nevertheless useful to account for 
possible effects of these country-year covariates. To this end, I conduct an analysis with country-
year fixed effects. The following table (Table A3-8-1) indicates that the results are robust to the 
inclusion of the country-year fixed effects. This is not surprising given the fact that the explanatory 
variables are exogenous to those country-year covariates. 
 
Table A3-7-1. Results with Controlling for Country-specific Trends 
Outcome 𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 
𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 
-0.0045 
[-0.0115, 0.0024] 
0.0030 
[-0.0006, 0.0066] 
𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 
-0.0040 
[-0.0117, 0.0038] 
-0.0060 
[-0.0123, 0.0003] 
𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 
-0.0048 
[-0.0083, -0.0013] 
0.0057 
[-0.0025, 0.0139] 
NOTE: The table shows the OLS estimates of the standardized coefficients. The 95% confidence 
intervals (based on clustered standard errors and corrected degrees of freedom) are in brackets. The 
models include country fixed effects, country-month-day fixed effects, cubic splines of common time 
trends, and cubic splines of country-specific trends. The control variables are the past-one-year 
averages of ground rainfall and ocean wind speed, and their interaction. 𝑛 = 131,831  with 30 coastal 
conflict countries for 2001-2016 period. 
Table A3-8-1. Results with Controlling for Country-year Fixed Effects 
Outcome 𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 
𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 
-0.0036 
[-0.0086, 0.0015] 
0.0038 
[0.0000, 0.0075] 
𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 
-0.0051 
[-0.0124, 0.0022] 
-0.0059 
[-0.0117, 0.0002] 
𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 
-0.0060 
[-0.0100, -0.0019] 
0.0061 
[-0.0021, 0.0143] 
NOTE: The table shows the OLS estimates of the standardized coefficients. The 95% confidence 
intervals (based on clustered standard errors and corrected degrees of freedom) are in brackets. The 
models include country fixed effects, country-month-day fixed effects, cubic splines of common time 
trends, and country-year fixed effects. The control variables are the past-one-year averages of ground 
rainfall and ocean wind speed, and their interaction. 𝑛 = 131,831  with 30 coastal conflict countries for 
2001-2016 period. 
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SI 3-9. INCLUSION OF ZERO-VARIANCE COUNTRIES 
In the main analysis, I exclude the 14 coastal conflict countries that have zero variance in 
𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 or 𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 in the main analysis. As I detail in the footnote 17 in the paper, piracy or 
rebels’ violence are near-impossible in these countries, and these cases do not fit well to my 
theoretical argument. Nonetheless, it is also useful to check the robustness of the findings to the 
inclusion of those cases. As seen in Table A3-9-1, even though the inclusion of the zero-variance 
cases attenuates the within-country variances in the outcome variables and decreases the statistical 
significance (𝑝 = 0.0567), the main results hold. 
 
SI 3-10. COUNT VARIABLES 
In the main analysis, I use the dichotomized outcomes of rebels’ violence and piracy attacks. As I 
mentioned in the theory section, the dichotomization is useful for developing a typology of 
substitution. Furthermore, since the continuous effort levels 𝑦𝐺  and 𝑦𝑀 are complicated non-linear 
functions of 𝑐𝐺  and 𝑐𝑀 , we can only weakly identify the continuous functions in an empirical 
analysis. In addition, the counts of violent and piracy events have skewed distributions, which 
Table A3-9-1. Results with All Coastal Conflict Countries 
Outcome 𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 
𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 
-0.0049 
[-0.0105, 0.0008] 
0.0020 
[-0.0008, 0.0048] 
𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 
-0.0022 
[-0.0081, 0.0038] 
-0.0032 
[-0.0068, 0.0005] 
𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 
-0.0021 
[-0.0042, 0.0001] 
0.0045 
[-0.0011, 0.0102] 
NOTE: The table shows the OLS estimates of the standardized coefficients. The 95% confidence 
intervals (based on clustered standard errors and corrected degrees of freedom) are in brackets. The 
models include country fixed effects, country-month-day fixed effects, and cubic splines of common time 
trends. The control variables are the past-one-year averages of ground rainfall and ocean wind speed, 
and their interaction. 𝑛 = 189,696  with 44 coastal conflict countries for 2001-2016 period.  
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make the estimation of the interactive models sensitive to outliers. Despite these facts, it is still 
useful to provide the results with the count variables. The following table (Table A3-10-1) shows 
the estimates coefficient values when I use the counts of rebels’ violence and piracy attacks. 
 
The p-values for the interactive effects are 0.105 and 0.084 for violence and piracy respectively. 
Consistent with my expectation, these results suggest that the interactive effects might exist but it 
is difficult to empirically detect the interactive effects. These are not surprising given the 
potentially complicated functional forms of the interactive effects, and the skewness of the count 
variables. 
SI 3-11. LEAVE-ONE-COUNTRY-OUT TESTS 
One may be concerned about whether a few outliers, such as Somalia and Nigeria, drive the 
empirical findings. I address this concern by conducting leave-one-country tests, in which I drop 
each country and re-estimate the regression models. The following figures (Figure A3-11-1) shows 
the estimates of the coefficients for the interaction terms (𝛽3 and 𝛾3 in the equation in the main 
paper) when each country in the horizontal axis is omitted from the sample. Regardless of the 
omitted countries, ground and ocean weather conditions interactively affect the incidence of rebels’ 
Table A3-10-1. Results with Count Variables 
Outcome 𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 (𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡)𝑖𝑡 𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 (𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡)𝑖𝑡 
𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 
-0.0052 
[-0.0109, 0.0005] 
0.0008 
[-0.0031, 0.0046] 
𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 
-0.0037 
[-0.0118, 0.0043] 
-0.0077 
[-0.0174, 0.0019] 
𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 
-0.0047 
[-0.0106, 0.0011] 
0.0060 
[-0.0009, 0.0128] 
NOTE: The table shows the OLS estimates of the standardized coefficients. The 95% confidence 
intervals (based on clustered standard errors and corrected degrees of freedom) are in brackets. The 
models include country fixed effects, country-month-day fixed effects, and cubic splines of common time 
trends. The control variables are the past-one-year averages of ground rainfall and ocean wind speed, 
and their interaction. 𝑛 = 131,831  with 30 coastal conflict countries for 2001-2016 period. 
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violence, while there is no such evidence for the incidence of piracy attacks. When I drop 
Bangladesh, the point estimate about the interactive effect on 𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 becomes near zero, and the 
confidence interval becomes narrower. This is because Bangladesh is one of the three countries 
within which the interactive effect is positive and statistically significant, and Bangladesh has the 
largest number of piracy incidences per year among those three countries (the other two countries 
are Colombia and Yemen). This implies that the seemingly positive interactive effect is driven by 
the outlier, and if we remove the outlier, the confidence interval becomes even closer to zero. 
These results provide further evidence for the “no” interactive effect on 𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 , which is 
consistent with the upward substitution hypothesis. 
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Figure A3-11-1. Leave-one-country-out Tests 
 
 
NOTE: The figures show the estimates of the coefficients for the interaction terms when each country in 
the horizontal axis is omitted from the sample. In the first and second figures, the outcome variables are 
the incidences of rebels’ violence and piracy attacks respectively. The point estimates and corresponding 
95% confidence intervals are the dots and error bars. The gray solid and dashed horizontal lines are the 
estimates and confidence intervals when no country is dropped. 
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SI 3-12. MECHANISM: FISHERY 
As I discuss in the manuscript, a possible alternative explanation of my findings is fishery; rainfall 
decreases rebel violence especially when the ocean is windy, for rough seas may limit 
opportunities for fishery industries and people might alternatively engage in violence. Although I 
am skeptical on this view as switching from non-violent (fishing) to violent activities (violence) is 
usually more difficult than switching between violent activities (piracy and violence), I also 
conduct an additional analysis to test this possibility. I collect data on phytoplankton absorption 
coefficient, which is a measure of phytoplankton abundance in the ocean (Flückiger and Ludwig 
2015). Since phytoplankton abundance is a predictor of fish abundance and does not affect 
operational costs of piracy activities, I can exclude the alternative explanation if the results hold 
even after controlling for phytoplankton abundance. Note that this causal mechanism test can 
suffer posttreatment control bias as ocean wind can affect phytoplankton abundance. 
The phytoplankton data are derived from the MODIS Aqua products. I calculate the 
average phytoplankton absorption coefficients within 100 kilometers from coastal lines. Due to 
the MODIS’s limited coverage, the values of the phytoplankton variable are missing for 43,489 
observations (32.99% of the sample; the within-100-kilometer average). Since the missing values 
are due to almost-random variation in the satellite orbits, the missing-completely-at-random 
assumption is not implausible,1 and hence I drop those observations of missing values. In the 
following analysis, the phytoplankton variable and its interaction with ground rainfall are added 
                                                 
1 In fact, even with list-wise deletion, the estimates of the regression models are very similar to the 
main results. 
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to the regression model.2  As seen in Table A3-12-1, even when I account for the effect of 
phytoplankton abundance, it does not change the main findings. 
 
SI 3-13. MECHANISM: TACTICAL OR MONETARY INCENTIVES 
One may also be interested in whether the main findings are driven by rebels’ tactical or monetary 
incentives. As I discussed in the theory section of the main paper, the “profits” that the rebel group 
received can be the tactical control over territory and navigation or the monetary gain from looting 
and ransom activities. I test these causal mechanisms by disaggregating the outcome variables. In 
particular, the variable 𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡  is disaggregated into three variables— 𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒,𝑖𝑡 , 
𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒,𝑖𝑡  and 𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑,𝑖𝑡 —which correspond to the incidences of rebels’ 
violence against a government, non-government organizations, and civilians respectively. If the 
                                                 
2 Due to missing values, I cannot calculate the past-one-year average of the phytoplankton variable 
without massive interpolation, hence I do not include the variable. 
Table A3-12-1. Results with Phytoplankton Abundance 
Outcome 𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 
𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 
-0.0094 
[-0.0214, 0.0026] 
-0.0001 
[-0.0084, 0.0083] 
𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 
-0.0051 
[-0.0167, 0.0066] 
-0.0062 
[-0.0136, 0.0012] 
𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 
-0.0070 
[-0.0153, 0.0013] 
-0.0003 
[-0.0069, 0.0063] 
𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 
-0.0116 
[-0.0225, -0.0008] 
0.0023 
[-0.0023, 0.0070] 
𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 
0.0037 
[-0.0056, 0.0129] 
-0.0035 
[-0.0088, 0.0017] 
NOTE: The table shows the OLS estimates of the standardized coefficients. The 95% confidence 
intervals (based on clustered standard errors and corrected degrees of freedom) are in brackets. The 
models include country fixed effects, country-month-day fixed effects, and cubic splines of common time 
trends. The control variables are the past-one-year averages of ground rainfall and ocean wind speed, 
and their interaction. 𝑛 = 88,342 with 30 coastal conflict countries for 2001-2016 period.  
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substitution is driven by rebels’ tactical choices, the interactive effect should exist on 
𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒,𝑖𝑡 and 𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒,𝑖𝑡, as these activities involve transfers of territorial controls. 
In contrast, the monetary explanation predicts that the interactive effect exists on 
𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑,𝑖𝑡 through which rebels can loot civilians’ possessions and demand ransoms. If 
both mechanisms exist, we should see the interactive effects on both variables.  
Since 𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑,𝑖𝑡  can potentially affect rebels’ control over territories as well 
(Kalyvas 2006), the comparison of the different outcomes may not constitute a “shape” test for the 
causal mechanisms. I therefore disaggregate the GTD-based outcome variable to those relating to 
tactical objectives (𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙,𝑖𝑡; unarmed and armed assaults, bombing, facility destruction, 
and assassination) and those relating to monetary gains (𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦,𝑖𝑡 ; kidnapping and 
hijacking). The tactical explanation expects a negative interactive effect on the former variable, 
while the monetary explanation predicts a negative interactive effect on the latter variable. 
I also disaggregate 𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡  to those that involve looting activities or ransom demands 
(𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦,𝑖𝑡) and those without those actions (𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙,𝑖𝑡). The MPD contains whether 
each piracy attack involves looting activities or ransom demands (Coggins 2012). While the 
downward and equivalent substitutions expect the interactive effect on those variables, the upward 
substitution, for which I find evidence in the empirical analysis, does not expect an interactive 
effect on any of those variable. The following table (Table A3-13-1) summarizes the effects on the 
disaggregated outcomes. 
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As seen in Table A3-13-1, the interactive effects are statistically significant only for the 
outcomes relating to tactical objectives. The coefficients of the interactive terms are statistically 
significant for 𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒,𝑖𝑡 and somewhat significant on 𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒,𝑖𝑡 (𝑝 = 0.086) but not for 
𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑,𝑖𝑡 (𝑝 = 0.397). Similarly, when I used the GTD-based variables, there exists a weakly 
significant interactive effect on 𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙,𝑖𝑡  ( 𝑝 = 0.097 ), while the corresponding effect on 
𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦,𝑖𝑡 is far from the conventional threshold of statistical significance (𝑝 = 0.319).  
Finally, consistent with the upward substitution hypothesis, the coefficient of the interaction term 
is not statistically different from zero for 𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦,𝑖𝑡 (𝑝 = 0.148). By contrast, the interactive effect 
Table A3-13-1. Results with Disaggregated Outcome Variables 
Outcome 
UCDP GED 
𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒,𝑖𝑡 𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒,𝑖𝑡 𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑,𝑖𝑡 
𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 
-0.0045 
[-0.0118, 0.0028] 
-0.0021 
[-0.0080, 0.0037] 
-0.0027 
[-0.0094, 0.0040] 
𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 
-0.0038 
[-0.0148, 0.0072] 
0.0021 
[-0.0032, 0.0075] 
-0.0029 
[-0.0105, 0.0047] 
𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 
-0.0026 
[-0.0045, -0.0008] 
-0.0026 
[-0.0055, 0.0004] 
-0.0014 
[-0.0047, 0.0020] 
Outcome 
GTD  
𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙,𝑖𝑡 𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦,𝑖𝑡  
𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡  
-0.0013 
[-0.0097, 0.0071] 
-0.0021 
[-0.0062, 0.0019] 
 
𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡  
-0.0043 
[-0.0146, 0.0060] 
-0.0025 
[-0.0122, 0.0071] 
 
𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡  
-0.0039 
[-0.0084, 0.0006] 
0.0010 
[-0.0030, 0.0010] 
 
Outcome 
MPD  
𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙,𝑖𝑡 𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦,𝑖𝑡  
𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡  
0.0020 
[-0.0028, 0.0069] 
0.0015 
[-0.0027, 0.0056] 
 
𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡  
-0.0030 
[-0.0080, 0.0021] 
-0.0039 
[-0.0091, 0.0013] 
 
𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡  
0.0028 
[-0.0003, 0.0060] 
0.0062 
[-0.0024, 0.0147] 
 
NOTE: The table shows the OLS estimates of the standardized coefficients. The 95% confidence 
intervals (based on clustered standard errors and corrected degrees of freedom) are in brackets. The 
models include country fixed effects, country-month-day fixed effects, and cubic splines of common time 
trends. The control variables are the past-one-year averages of ground rainfall and ocean wind speed, 
and their interaction. 𝑛 = 131,831  with 30 coastal conflict countries for 2001-2016 period. 
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on 𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙,𝑖𝑡 is positive and weakly significant (𝑝 = 0.075). This implies that ocean wind decreases 
the likelihood of tactical piracy attacks when it is sunny. One possible explanation for the positive 
interactive effect would be that rainy weather may prevent pirates from sailing out to the ocean and hence 
that there is no piracy attacks regardless of ocean wind speed. However, we should not over-interpret this 
result. As I explained in Supporting information 11, the weak positive interactive effect is driven by 
Bangladesh. Indeed, when I drop the outlier, the weak statistical significance disappears (𝑝 = 0.294), and 
the confidence interval becomes closer to zero [−0.0008, 0.0026]. Overall, those results provide some 
support for the tactical mechanism and the upward substitution, while there is no such evidence for the 
monetary mechanism.  
SI 3-14. MARGINAL EFFECT PLOTS 
In the paper, I do not present the marginal effect plots partly because I use linear models, in which 
the coefficients of the interaction terms have direct interpretation, and also because the marginal 
effect plots are misleading especially in a regression of 𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡. In this supporting information, I 
present the marginal effect plots and explain why the plots can be potentially misguiding. 
As seen in Figure A3-14-1, the marginal effect of rainfall (top-left pane) is steadily 
decreasing as ocean wind speed become stronger, and its confidence interval is within a reasonable 
range. By contrast, the marginal effect of ocean wind speed (top-right pane) is increasing with an 
explosively large confidence intervals. Although the point estimates might suggest sizable 
interactive effects, such an interpretation is misguided because the confidence intervals are very 
large and we therefore cannot make meaningful inferences from the data. A reason for those results 
lies in the skewness of the distribution of the conditioning variables (bottom panes of A3-14-1). 
As seen in the bottom-right pane, ground rainfall has a skewed distribution. As a result, the 
interactive effects on piracy is influenced by a few outliers of extremely heavy rainfall, providing 
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a misleading picture of the conditioning effect. In contrast, the distribution of ocean wind speed is 
fairly close to a normal distribution, which makes the marginal effect at the edge values of 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡 
representative of the data and limits the confidence interval within a reasonable range.  
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